

# *American* SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

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# *American* SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

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## THE CONCEPTS SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION AND SOCIAL PARTICIPATION\*

STUART A. QUEEN  
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THE PURPOSE of this paper is to make a critical examination of two frames of reference for the study of the sociological aspects of social problems. No definition of social problems will be attempted here. Suffice it to say that they are practical difficulties in real life, while sociological (and other scientific) problems involve the abstraction of certain phases or aspects for intensive study. A sociologist may appropriately examine the ways in which certain events and conditions come to be regarded as "evils." He may seek to learn what culture traits are associated with the "evils," and what social processes, if any, are involved in their appearance. He may limit his research even more and inquire whether any relation exists between a given "evil" and the breakdown of a certain type of social group, or how much the presence of this "evil" affects the social participation of certain persons.

There are many sociological problems which may be abstracted from a given type of practical difficulty. On the other hand, any given sociological problem may reappear in relation to many different practical issues. The solution of a sociological problem is not the immediate relief of distress, but the identification and measurement of relationships and processes. In the formulation of his task, the student must make use of some conceptual framework. It matters little whence it comes, provided it meets the test implied in these questions: Is it clearly defined? Are there precise criteria for its identification? Are concrete data available for the studies it suggests? Can these data be measured? Are the formulations relevant to the reality which was the point of departure? Do they lead to new generalizations or to the checking of old ones?

1. *Social Disorganization.* Social disorganization is suggested as the verbal symbol of a frame of reference, perhaps because of the impression one gets

\* A somewhat condensed version of the paper read to the Section on Sociological Theory and Social Problems of the American Sociological Society, Dec. 29, 1940, Chicago, Illinois.

of confusion and disorder in a situation wherein social problems are acute. However, its utility must be tested in the ways just suggested. First, has the concept been so clearly defined as to leave no doubt concerning the kind of experience it symbolizes? Unfortunately, the answer is not an unqualified affirmative. Various writers (including myself) have employed the term to describe a state of affairs at a given time and also to identify a process of change. Sometimes the concept is "stretched" to include every sort of circumstance or behavior that is considered troublesome. Sometimes disorganization seems to be a synonym for evil. On the whole, the available definitions are rather vague and too lacking in precision to be immediately useful in research. Perhaps that may be excused on the ground that they are presenting a general concept, or representing a point of view. But this defense is not to be accepted unless there are definite criteria for the identification of that to which the concept refers. Let us consider this with reference to *groups*.

Social groups are said to grow and decline in numbers, material resources, and consensus. Numbers and wealth are rather easily identified and measured. Consensus is harder to manage. If it includes the facts of contact, interaction, joint behavior, symbols, esprit de corps, and morale, each of these needs to be examined separately. Contacts can be measured as to frequency and variety. Interaction can perhaps be classified on some such basis as attraction and repulsion or cooperation and competition. Incidents of each type might then be counted, the time during which each type of behavior was in evidence might be computed, the number of persons displaying each might be enumerated. Changes over a period of time might then be regarded as indicating an organizing or a disorganizing trend. Similar treatment might be accorded behavior labelled joint or collective, in which varying numbers of persons act together in pursuit of a common objective. Esprit de corps and morale are still more difficult to identify and measure, other than by inference from procedures already suggested. Perhaps these should be supplemented by attitude tests and scales. See, for example, Rundquist and Sletto's and Zeleny's efforts to measure morale.<sup>1</sup> If satisfactory instruments were developed for this purpose, we should then be able to compute coefficients of correlation between the several series of data: membership, resources, interaction, joint action, attitudes, and lifespan of the group. If there should be a high degree of correlation between several of these series, we then might use them in describing one direction of change as group organization and its opposite as group disorganization. Perhaps it would be possible to combine measures of these data into a single index of

<sup>1</sup> Edward A. Rundquist and Raymond F. Sletto, *Personality in the Depression*, Minneapolis, 1936; L. D. Zeleny, "The Sociometry of Morale," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, Dec. 1940, 799-808; see also, Delbert C. Miller, "Morale of College-trained Adults," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, Dec. 1940, 880-889.

organization-disorganization. It would be constructed on the basis of correlation between various series and the persistence of groups, so that a high index number would represent the condition of a group possessing to the maximum traits associated with longevity (of groups), while a low index number would represent their partial or complete absence. Then by rating given groups at convenient intervals, it would be possible to characterize those with a downward trend as in process of disorganization, those with an upward trend as in process of organization. It may perhaps be assumed that at all times in every group there are simultaneously indications of organization and of disorganization. An index, therefore, would show which is dominant.

The relevance of these suggested procedures to an understanding of practical social problems is this. Certain so-called social problems, such as widowhood, migration, or desertion, directly involve changes in group membership and contacts. Others, such as unemployment, sickness, or accident, are accompanied by changes in the interaction and roles of group members. Crises of all sorts, mortgage foreclosure, bank failure, flood, accident, death, war, call forth varied manifestations of morale. On the other hand, the defeat of a political party, disbanding of a congregation, disruption of a trade union, or scattering of a family, implies not only the disintegration of a social group, but some change in personalities involved, and some change in relationships throughout a community or larger area. Whether such changes mark the emergence or the solution of a social problem makes no difference for the moment, but the proposition that there is always some relation between a social problem, however defined, and group organization-disorganization is both worthy of study and a useful working hypothesis for research.

In actual research, it is wise and perhaps essential to examine one class of groups at a time. In studying families (Mowrer), neighborhoods (Kolb), communities (Sanderson), gangs (Thrasher), and sects (P. Young), the general concepts "social organization" and "disorganization" furnish a point of view and formulation for the central problem. The subsidiary questions and the available data are bound to vary, but it is reasonable to expect to find some correlates of group persistence recurring in all these classes. Whether such uniformities actually exist is another proper question for research.

Each of these classes of social groups seems to have a characteristic life-cycle. Burgess has identified one for the urban neighborhood, Kolb for the special interest group, Groves for the American family, so on. Each stage in each life-cycle may prove, on further research, to be marked by certain index numbers of organization-disorganization. Thus, if 0 represents complete absence of factors associated with group continuance, and if 100 represents their presence in the highest number and degree, various periods of

group development might be expected to show index numbers within specified ranges. Thus, hypothetically:

Period	Range of Index Numbers	Median
Stimulation	20-40	30
Rise	40-60	50
Carrying on	50-70	60
Decline	10-40	25

Deviation below the usual range of index numbers may be associated with conditions popularly described as social problems. Again we have an hypothesis that is relevant both to our interest in social problems and to our concern for the development of sociology as a science. Furthermore, there appear to be practicable means of testing this hypothesis.

It should be unnecessary to remark that no one has yet carried out studies of group organization and disorganization in the ways I have suggested. At least, the published works in this field fall short of the task as outlined and my proposals are not to be regarded as complete. Hence, critics of this frame of reference with some justice may charge that its possibilities are as yet undemonstrated; and that, judged by its products to date, it is inadequately defined, its criteria lack precision, most of the data are impressionistic descriptions, and in general the results are somewhat confused and inconsistent. Even admitting the most severe of these charges, I believe that enough has been accomplished to warrant further efforts to develop and utilize this frame of reference. Moreover, I regard such efforts as important, because groups really do go to pieces, such breakdown is often associated with social problems, and the identification of the processes involved is essential to sociological theory.

So far we have been discussing group disorganization; let us turn now to *cultural disorganization*. To me, one of the most helpful concepts for the study of stresses and strains in a social system is found in Ogburn's hypothesis of culture lag. Even if we agree with Woodard that the theory needs restatement, and even though we acknowledge some merit in Mueller's<sup>2</sup> criticism, we can make use of this idea in analyzing the confusion and inconsistencies that seem so numerous in our own society and that may appear in any culture. To be sure, there is danger that we may overestimate the degree of harmony in a social system prior to a given change. There is also danger that we may approve the traits that have changed most rapidly and scorn those which have changed little or none, or vice versa, if we happen to be conservatives. However, in my judgment, these hazards do not warrant abandoning our hypothesis which should be very useful in eliminating the

<sup>2</sup> James W. Woodard, "A New Classification of Culture and a Restatement of the Culture Lag Theory," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, Feb. 1936, 89-104; John H. Mueller, "Present Status of the Cultural Lag Hypothesis," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, June 1938, 320-327; see also Michael Choukas, "The Concept of Cultural Lag Reexamined," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, Oct. 1936, 752-760.



"personal devil interpretation" of social problems. I refrain from further comments, on the assumption of general familiarity with the culture lag hypothesis.

Another concept that promises great usefulness in the study of cultural disorganization is that of culture conflict. Unfortunately this term is used in several different ways which need to be clearly differentiated. It may refer to the clash of total cultures (and corresponding masses of people) pitted against each other, e.g., European vs. American Indian, totalitarian vs. democratic. It may refer to the clash of major complexes within the same general culture, e.g., militarism vs. pacifism, Protestantism vs. Catholicism, prohibition vs. social drinking. It may refer to the experience of groups or individuals in bicultural situations, especially when each shares in both cultures, e.g., the children of immigrants. However, it should not be difficult to distinguish these varied situations for purposes of analysis. Objective criteria of cultural differences have been developed by the anthropologists and the facts of conflict are capable of identification. Indeed, a good deal of such work has already been done. The chief criticisms to be offered are that we do not as yet have satisfactory symbols for the various types of sequences involving culture conflict, nor have we learned the relative frequency of each type. Most of the data used in studying culture conflicts take the form of narration and description, personal documents, and other material difficult to manipulate.

Curiously neither textbook bearing the title *Social Disorganization* makes effective use of the concepts culture lag and culture conflict. Although my colleague, Dr. Bodenhafer, wrote a rather clearcut discussion of each, I failed to utilize these hypotheses in analyzing the disorganization of economic, political, and other institutions. Instead, I adopted the concepts of internal inconsistency and institutional malfunctioning.

Internal inconsistency was restated in terms of mutual incompatibility or contradiction of traits, e.g., in our economic system, the tradition of free competition and the practice of monopolistic control; in our religious complex, the doctrine of the brotherhood of man coupled with the support of war, exclusion of Negroes, and condemnation of radicals. These might perhaps be interpreted as culture lags and conflicts. Yet the very contradictions noted may imply the development of rationalizations which, far from destroying an institution or total culture, may actually serve to tide it over a crisis. Hence, if we continue to employ this concept of internal inconsistency, we must differentiate between discrepancies involved in the appearance of a culture lag or conflict and rationalizations which may constitute an accommodation or a step in reorganization. Another difficulty is that in pointing out contradictions within a culture complex one is tempted to play the role of Sophist or Pharisee, "Thank God, I am not as other men; I see through all this confusion; and I can show you what fools they are who accept it with

complacency." Such an attitude can hardly be said to promote scientific objectivity! On the whole, the category of internal inconsistency seems to be of doubtful utility.

Institutional malfunctioning was described in several ways that utilized or might utilize rather precise methods. For example, in studying the economic complex of our culture, use was made of the studies of waste in industry made by the Hoover Committee and others. The criterion of waste was failure to achieve the efficiency (in terms of time, cost, etc.) of the best plant in a given industry. Of course, in some cases this might have been more appropriately related to unorganization than to disorganization. However, by using such a measure at regular intervals of time, one might identify a series of changes properly designated organizing or disorganizing. In studying our governmental complex, some of the criteria employed were the maladjustment of governmental areas (multiplicity, overlapping, expensiveness, lack of homogeneity), miscarriage of justice ("mortality" of criminal cases, conviction of innocent persons, recidivism, etc.), defiance of law by those charged with enforcement and other administration (spoils system, graft, etc.). Unfortunately, there was no well-defined criterion for the rating of governmental areas, or for measuring graft, and other political spoils. However, failure of the system of criminal justice was rather objectively described and partly measured as by the Wickersham Commission, e.g., by ratio of arrests to crimes reported, ratio of convictions to indictments, ratio of recidivists to prisoners released, etc. These illustrations indicate that, while much of the writing on institutional malfunctioning is impressionistic, because criteria are vague and ill-defined, it should be possible to formulate precise criteria and to assemble quantitative data for the objective rating of institutional functioning. When such instruments are devised, their application at regular intervals should yield reliable measures of the direction of change, i.e., toward more or less institutional organization.

The hazards of using such a concept as institutional malfunctioning are bound to be great. The temptation to identify positive indexes with "good" and negative indexes with "bad" will be hard to resist. In fact, this will probably be true of all studies within the intellectual framework of social disorganization. The very term itself implies, as Fuller has said, "a departure from an unquestioned and smooth-running cultural status quo."<sup>3</sup> As an assumption, this is unwarranted; as an hypothesis to be tested it should not be discarded too hastily. In our day of rapid social change, some people define social problems in relation to their own nostalgia for "the good old days" while others overlook the possibility that a large part of every culture may be relatively stable and that the number and degree of deviations

<sup>3</sup> Richard C. Fuller, "The Problem of Teaching Social Problems," *Amer. J. Sociol.*, Nov. 1938, 415-425, with discussions by C. A. Ellwood, John L. Gillin, Lawrence K. Frank, Stuart A. Queen, Mabel A. Elliott, and Richard C. Fuller, 425-435.

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may prove to be very useful measures of that stability or its opposite. At all events, this issue has been well put by Lawrence K. Frank:

We can think of the socially prescribed norms of conduct as the modal frequency of social behavior around which there will be a greater or less range of deviation. If we wish to speak of these deviations from a modal pattern as "social disorganization" or "social pathology," we may do so, but it only increases the confusion when we imply some sort of underlying "social order" or "organization" that is breaking down or becoming diseased.<sup>4</sup>

Of course there are still other ways of conceiving and studying institutional disorganization,<sup>5</sup> but space forbids further enumeration and discussion. Let me close this section with the proposition that social disorganization in general and at large is too vague a concept to be serviceable in either research or teaching, but we probably can make effective use of the concept social disorganization in the study of specific types of groups and institutions.

11. *Social Participation.* The concept social disorganization has been applied to the study of groups and culture complexes. As a matter of fact, it has also been employed in the study of persons, the assumption being that the disorganization of personality is somehow related to the state of affairs in social groups and institutions. To avoid complicating our discussion unduly, I shall omit consideration of personal disorganization, although I regard it as a legitimate and important field of study for sociologists as well as psychiatrists. Instead, I shall present the case for another frame of reference for the study of persons in their social relations. It is symbolized by the term "social participation" and is described at some length in the 1940 edition of *Social Pathology* by Queen and Gruener.

This concept is made to include membership and activity in social groups, sharing in a culture through various media of communication and engaging in "expressional" activities, and "acceptance" by other individuals. I think we have demonstrated that these aspects of our general concept are capable of being made very specific. Some rather precise criteria have been developed for the identification of various kinds of social participation and several scales have been produced for the measurement of degrees of social participation. In our search, we found a dearth of concrete data, but we have outlined procedures through which we believe they can be made available.

The significance of this concept for sociology should be obvious. Our science is directly concerned with the extent and varieties of personal participation in groups and their cultures and with the factors associated with various degrees and kinds of social participation. The relevance of this con-

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 428.

<sup>5</sup> John F. Cuber, "The Measurement and Significance of Institutional Disorganization," *Amer. J. Sociol.*, Nov. 1938, 408-414, and "Some Aspects of Institutional Disorganization," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, Aug. 1940, 483-488; see also in same issue, note by Read Bain and articles by Louis Wirth and Harvey J. Locke.

cept to the study of social problems may be less obvious, but it is no less real. Persons who claim benefits from given groups and institutions without contributing proportionately or at all to their maintenance are often considered a nuisance by others. Persons experiencing certain physical, mental, and economic conditions are usually regarded as "handicapped" and are not expected to be so active in social life as are persons without these "handicaps." The attaching of certain stereotypes, e.g., "poor white," "nigger," "illegitimate," "exconvict," "dope fiend," is related to the exclusion of persons so labelled from certain cultural opportunities and personal relationships. Hence, it becomes a proper object of investigation to inquire what is the relative amount of social participation actually experienced by these persons and what kinds of social participation are available to them.

There are several ways of going about the study of social participation in relation to social problems. It should be helpful to get first a statistical norm by studying a large random sample of the population. However, even without taking that step we might select two smaller samples:

one of persons known to be active in social groups and to possess a wealth of cultural experience, the other of persons whose range of contacts is known to be narrow and cultural experience meager. Both samples would be studied with reference to a large number of factors . . . which are suspected of having a significant relationship to social participation.<sup>6</sup>

A third type of project would involve comparison of social participation indexes of persons presenting a given physical, mental, economic, or other characteristic, with the indexes of persons not having that trait. Another line of research would be the measurement of the social participation of persons before and after experiencing some crisis such as amputation, loss of sight, discharge from job, conviction of crime, or loss of a loved one.

Finally, we might study two samples of persons having a given handicap: one made up of persons with high indexes of social participation, the other made up of persons with low indexes. By a systematic study of their traits and experiences, we might discover whether the supposed handicap is actually more or less significant than some other factor previously neglected. . . . Large-scale studies of the types we have suggested seem not to have been made, but there are numerous projects, more limited in scope, concerning which we have some information.<sup>7</sup>

The range of information to be sought under the head of social participation is suggested by the outline on pages 21-22 of our *Social Pathology*. To organize such data to best advantage, we need a number of instruments of measurement (tests and scales). Several such scales have already been devised: e.g., Chapins' scale for measuring participation in organized interest groups, Jessie Bernard's for measuring neighboring, Newstetter's for measuring acceptance in a camp group, scales devised by Chapin and Sewell for

<sup>6</sup> Stuart Alfred Queen and Jennette Rowe Gruener, *Social Pathology*, 10, New York, 1940.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 11.



measuring social status, and the Rundquist-Sletto Morale score. Others are working on means of measuring schooling, reading, employment, use of radio, phone, car, and other aspects of cultural participation. Whether all these efforts will yield an inclusive index of social participation or whether we will make use of several indexes, each more limited in significance, I will not venture to predict.

For the benefit of those who are curious about the present availability of data concerning social participation and social problems, we offer a summary in the final chapter of *Social Pathology*. We roughly classified the "handicaps" studied according as the evidence in hand was "(1) fairly convincing, though not complete or precise, (2) convincing as far as it goes, but rather inadequate, (3) inadequate and sometimes conflicting, but highly suggestive."<sup>8</sup> We reviewed comparative studies of three sorts: those of handicapped and nonhandicapped persons, those of persons before and after being handicapped, and those of socially active and isolated persons with given handicaps. With reference to each, we classified the available material as: general statistical data, statistical studies of small samples, case studies, testimony based on more or less skilled observation, and general observation. It is unnecessary to reproduce that cataloguing in this paper, but it must be acknowledged that reliable data are very scarce. We have only outlined a program of study. Performance of the task lies in the future. Nevertheless, it seems fair to report that possibilities of working out relationships between various conditions regarded as social problems and amounts and types of social participation are rather good.

*Conclusion.* The *function* of a general concept like social organization or social participation is to relate a number of limited, more specific concepts to each other in a system of thought. Without such a general concept, for a frame of reference, we are left with nothing but a lot of discrete theories or collections of data. In other words, the general concept (frame of reference) is a remedy for atomism and intellectual anarchy. On the other hand, a concept general enough to indicate a frame of reference may be too vague to serve directly as a tool of research. It must be taken apart and rendered more specific in its parts before it can be put usefully to work. In other words, the major problem as stated in terms of a general concept must be broken down into lesser questions, the answering of which may yield a solution to the central issue. These minor problems must be worked out with the aid of objective criteria and concrete data which are suggested rather than identified in the initial, more general formulation. This requires a careful definition of terms on the basis of materials actually available.

From this standpoint, I believe that both frames of reference under discussion may be useful in the development of a "sociology of social problems." I believe this despite the fact that much of the work thus far done

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 637.

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has been lax; terms are often vague, criteria are ill-defined, data are not assembled in orderly fashion, inferences have been drawn casually rather than systematically, value judgments have been unwittingly injected. These faults are not peculiar to work done under these frames of reference, but appear wherever students of sociology are poorly trained, careless, or impatient.

## COMMENT

MABEL A. ELLIOTT  
*University of Kansas*

Although I am coauthor of a book on social disorganization,<sup>1</sup> I think I can be quite objective in my remarks on Mr. Queen's paper. No frame of reference for social problems can be justified except insofar as it contributes to the understanding of such problems. In my opinion, social disorganization is the most inclusive term thus far employed by sociologists to indicate a disruption in social functioning, whether we are concerned with persons, families, or communities. The justification for including personal disorganization under such a nomenclature seems obvious. Personal disorganization is socially defined: the stability of the individual's life organization is determined both by the group and by the individual's conception of his role in the group. When there is marked disparity between the social conception of individual adjustment and the individual's ability to achieve that status, we may designate the individual as disorganized.

That we have not thus far devised precise criteria for indicating the exact degree of disorganization does not of itself discredit the frame of reference. The concept "social disorganization" admittedly is broad, subsuming all factors which contribute to disturbed community or family relations or to the malfunctioning of the individual. That is, in employing such a subsuming category, we are merely using the term disorganization that long has been applied to the separate types of maladjustments which affect individuals and families, institutions, communities, or even the world society.

It must be obvious that social disorganization is a general frame of reference and must be broken down into the various factors which contribute to the total situation, and that there are many and varied indices to the different social problems. On the other hand, to employ "social participation" as an exclusive frame of reference is as futile as any of the particularistic theories of earlier years. The inability of persons to participate in group life is *one* index of maladjustment but it is in no sense the only index. Any attempt so to oversimplify social problems is unwarranted in anyone who understands the complexity of social interaction.

Before discussing that, I should like to point out that part of the confusion in the analysis of social problems is a matter of semantics, or an emphasis upon special words. Mr. Queen, whose opinion I value highly, suggests that textbooks concerned with social disorganization pay little attention to culture conflict, which is important in understanding such disorganization. As a matter of fact, Elliott and Merrill have repeatedly stressed the conflicts in values or lack of consensus in communities which lead to their disruption; the conflict between individual attitudes and social definitions have been emphasized in the various chapters dealing with personal disorganization. In the chapters on Migration and the Community, we have placed

<sup>1</sup> Mabel A. Elliott and Francis E. Merrill, *Social Disorganization*, New York, 1934, rev. ed. 1941.

special emphasis on this interpretation and have mentioned cultural conflict specifically. Willard Waller stresses the importance of conflicts in the mores in producing social problems.<sup>2</sup> The point is, I think, that whether we are employing the terms 'cultural conflict,' 'conflicting social attitudes,' 'conflict between individual attitudes and social values,' or 'conflicts in the mores' we are all referring *substantially* to the same phenomena. Perhaps a major difficulty in the analysis of social problems is the lack of consensus in terminology, but the terms just mentioned indicate a convergence in point of view. We obviously need a standardization of terms.

As for Mr. Queen's distinction between sociological and social problems, any differentiation of sociological problems from social problems is at best an academic distinction. The only problems which need concern the sociologist's theories and research are the real, practical problems of everyday living. There is no other society and there are no other social problems which sociologists legitimately can consider as subject matter. It is true, sociologists may be scientifically aloof from the outcome of the problem and be interested only in the interplay of relationships which produce the situation, but if there were no concretely observable social problems, there could be no reason for a sociological theory to explain them.

Mr. Queen suggests that no one knows what is the normal balance between the socially organizing and disorganizing forces. It is equally true that we have no valid measures for determining the norm of participation, or membership in groups. If an average is to be taken, is that a suitable index? And what average shall it be? For effective citizenship, let us agree that all persons of voting age should vote. Is this an index to problems of corrupt politics or effective citizenship? In Kansas City, e.g., the vote-frauds investigation revealed that several citizens over participated. One thousand voters registered from a single vacant lot but we must admit they "participated." If mere participation is an index to normal adjustment, we might hold that Nicholas Murray Butler is the best example of an effective personality in America. By the same logic, we might infer that the families whose members belonged to the most clubs, took part in the most community drives, went to the most social functions, did the most shopping, etc., etc., were the most suitable families, and least apt to become social problems. Carried to its ultimate conclusion, we might say "joiners" are the best organized people. From practical commonsense observations, it seems to me that the concept "participation" as a framework for studying social pathology breaks down and needs to be limited both as to the extent and to the quality or type of the participation. Too many cooks may spoil the broth, but similarly, too many broths may spoil the cook. Individuals who attend too many committee meetings are a case in point. Housewives who belong to so many civic, welfare, and literary organizations that they neglect their homes are another. Scholars may give so much time to national associations, state societies, and local university committees that the quality and quantity of their scientific output is impaired. The rush and tear of urban life frays the nerves of countless persons some of whom become mentally ill.

Participation is no improvement over social disorganization as a concept for analyzing social problems because it is equally vague and inaccurate, or perhaps more so. Some participation is actually pathological in itself. Individuals may participate extensively in organized groups which are definitely disruptive both to the group and the participating individuals. One may be an active member of a gang, vice ring, or a corrupt political machine, and the major values of society will condemn both the group and the individual participating. Participation as a satisfactory

<sup>2</sup> Willard Waller, "Social Problems and the Mores," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, 1: 922-933, December 1936.



index of social adjustment is thus demonstrably a defective gauge for establishing social norms.

We also may criticize participation as a useful concept because it does not accurately describe the nature of certain major problems. For such types of problems as old age and women in industry, e.g., the concept is especially defective. Old people, it is true, generally do not lead as active lives as younger people. Even so, old age is a normal stage in the life cycle and is not in itself pathological, nor is its slower pace an *abnormal* stage. Old age is a problem primarily because of financial insecurity and because of fear and stigma of dependency; the fear and stigma in turn are based on the age-old tradition that relatives should take care of dependent old people. To say that old people cannot participate to the same extent as younger people is beside the point. One might equally well say babies are pathological because they do not participate.

Similarly, participation breaks down as a satisfactory conceptual approach to many other social problems, notably the problem of women in industry. Queen and Gruener, in their *Social Pathology*, hold that women in industry cannot participate as actively in leisure-time activities as nonemployed women. This is true, but the major reasons why women in industry constitute a social problem lie in other directions. Such women usually work long hours for low pay; they tend to be exploited because their bargaining power is low; they are frequently overworked because they must do their housework as well as their job; women with children must often neglect them because they cannot afford to employ anyone. The major reason why such women are a problem obviously is because they are underpaid and overworked, while their children go unsupervised; it is not because they do not "participate" in bridge, P.T.A., and other clubs. Professional women work hard, too, but they usually receive a fair return for their industry. They are not usually exploited; and if they have children, they can hire a nursemaid. They may be problems to themselves, but no one considers them a serious social problem, even though they have few leisure-time contacts or community activities.

War, as the major problem of our generation, furnishes an even better example of a problem of social disorganization, if you will, which cannot be analyzed in any sense in terms of failure to participate!

All this does not mean that participation has no value as a concept in social pathology. Participation is obviously one index both to social organization and social disorganization. The very functioning of our political structure, of democracy itself, depends upon the participation of citizens. Here again, however, participation is not enough. We must have *socially intelligent* participation for effective social organization. In the wide variety of situations which constitute the subject matter of social pathology, participation is too limited a concept to be considered the sole or even major index to indicate whether and to what degree persons, families, or communities are adjusted or unadjusted. Other factors are often more important and it is obvious that one can participate in groups which subvert effective social functioning or social welfare. Moreover, one can overparticipate even in desirable or socially acceptable activities and thereby lessen his own efficiency as well as that of the group.

Furthermore, there is always the difficulty of eliminating subjective considerations in developing indices of participation. The personal satisfactions to be derived from participating in a given group, organization, or activity are not always compatible with a sense of individual responsibility or with accepted social values. Thus, youngsters who participate in Hallowe'en pranks may be socially condemned and punished. Delinquents and criminals are more severely renounced. Even reformers may be rejected and condemned, however worthy their motives, though they obvi-



ously are "participating" very actively and perhaps beneficially for the long-run welfare of society.

Another difficulty presents itself. Participation, as an index to social problems, obviously entails the question of contacts. These contacts admittedly take place on a variety of levels. Thus, we may have contacts with the printed page and participate passively. There may be contacts with single personalities, with informal groups and with formal, organized groups. Each of these contacts involves widely varying degrees of participation. Thus, we have a very practical problem of devising indices of participation which measure accurately the level of contact. How much of each is normal? Which involves a higher degree of participation? Here, as with the concept of social disorganization, we are forced to admit many obstacles to rigid accuracy. Even so, we may all admit that a certain degree of socially approved participation is related to *balance* in the individual's life, but people who maintain a wide reading acquaintance may suffer less from lack of personal contacts than those who neither read nor communicate verbally. Thus, if we employ the concept "participation" in the study of social problems, it becomes as complicated as the concept social disorganization because of the complexity of life itself.

Finally, the amount and type of participation may be as much a matter of status as of anything else. The underprivileged do not participate much because they are underprivileged. Their lack of participation is as much an effect as a cause. The common herd has been the "great unheard" because of inarticulateness, but this is not the basic reason for their status. Both are by-products of the sum total of factors which produced the individual. Mere lack of participation thus may be an exceedingly superficial frame of reference which points to fundamental basic factors which still must be explained.

To summarize my point of view, participation as a concept is too limited and vague a frame of reference to provide a satisfactory theory for the wide variety of problems subsumed under social pathology. Participation may even produce ineffective or distorted functioning of individuals, groups and communities; hence, to be a useful concept it must be qualified both as to extent and quality. Social disorganization in my opinion is a much broader and hence more satisfactory framework for considering the multiplicity of disruptive forces which produce problems of social pathology. Participation is at best a particularistic approach.

## THE NATURAL HISTORY OF A SOCIAL PROBLEM\*

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IT IS OUR THESIS that every social problem has a natural history and that the natural history approach is a promising conceptual framework within which to study specific social problems.

Let us first clarify our usage of the terms "social problem" and "natural history." The concept "social problem" as used in this paper can be stated in a series of propositions.

1. A social problem is a condition which is defined by a considerable number of persons as a deviation from some social norm which they cherish. Every social problem thus consists of an objective condition and a subjective definition. The objective condition is a verifiable situation which can be checked as to existence and magnitude (proportions) by impartial and trained observers, e.g., the state of our national defense, trends in the birth rate, unemployment, etc. The subjective definition is the awareness of certain individuals that the condition is a threat to certain cherished values.

2. The objective condition is necessary but not in itself sufficient to constitute a social problem. Although the objective condition may be the same in two different localities, it may be a social problem in only one of these areas, e.g., discrimination against Negroes in the south as contrasted with discrimination in the north; divorce in Reno as contrasted with divorce in a Catholic community. *Social problems are what people think they are* and if conditions are not defined as social problems by the people involved in them, they are not problems to those people, although they may be problems to outsiders or to scientists, e.g., the condition of poor southern sharecroppers is a social problem to the braintrusts of the New Deal but not to many southern landowners.

3. Cultural values play an important causal role in the objective condition which is defined as a problem, e.g., the objective conditions of unemployment, race prejudice, illegitimacy, crime, divorce, and war come into being, in part at least, because people cherish certain beliefs and maintain certain social institutions which give rise to these conditions.

4. Cultural values obstruct solutions to conditions defined as social problems because people are unwilling to endorse programs of amelioration which prejudice or require abandonment of their cherished beliefs and institutions, e.g., one possible "solution" to illegitimacy would be social acceptance of contraception and abortion, practices which in themselves are now defined as violations of the mores.

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5. Social problems thus involve a dual conflict of values: first, with regard to some conditions, people disagree as to whether the condition is a threat to fundamental values, e.g., race prejudice, divorce, child labor, war, unorganized labor; second, with regard to other conditions, although there is a basic agreement that the condition is a threat to fundamental values, because of a disparity of other values relative to means or policy, people disagree over programs of reform, e.g., crime, mental and physical disease, motor car accidents.

6. In the last analysis, social problems arise and are sustained because people do not share the same common values and objectives.

7. Sociologists must, therefore, study not only the objective condition phase of a social problem but also the value-judgments of the people involved in it which cause them to define the same condition and means to its solution in different ways.<sup>1</sup>

The specific analytical frame which we have called the "natural history" is derived from the above conception of what constitutes a social problem. In our concept "social problem," we have attributed to all social problems certain common characteristics. These common characteristics imply a common order of development through which all social problems pass, consisting of certain temporal sequences in their emergence and maturation. The "natural history" as we use the term is therefore simply a conceptual tool for the examination of the data which constitute social problems.

Social problems do not arise full-blown, commanding community attention and evoking adequate policies and machinery for their solution. On the contrary, we believe that social problems exhibit a temporal course of development in which different phases or stages may be distinguished. Each stage anticipates its successor in time and each succeeding stage contains new elements which mark it off from its predecessor. A social problem thus conceived as always being in a dynamic state of "becoming" passes through the natural history stages of awareness, policy determination, and reform. As we proceed to discuss the qualitative differences between these stages, we will refer by way of illustration to data gathered by graduate students on the residence trailer problem in Detroit.

<sup>1</sup> The basic idea that the social problem is a conflict of values is not a new one. See Lawrence K. Frank, "Social Problems," *Amer. J. Sociol.*, 1925, 30: 463-473, page 468 for Frank's definition; Harold A. Phelps, *Contemporary Social Problems*, rev. ed., 737, New York, 1938; Willard Waller, "Social Problems and the Mores," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, 1936, 1: 922-933; Kingsley Davis, "The Sociology of Prostitution," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, 1937, 2: 749-755, and "Illegitimacy and the Social Structure," *Amer. J. Sociol.*, 1939, 45: 215-233; Richard C. Fuller, "The Problem of Teaching Social Problems," *Amer. J. Sociol.*, 1938, 44: 415-425, and [with Richard R. Myers], "Some Aspects of a Theory of Social Problems," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, 1941, 6: 24-32; Stuart A. Queen and Jennette R. Gruener, *Social Pathology*, 38-42, New York, 1940; Louis Wirth, "Ideological Aspects of Social Disorganization," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, 1940, 5: 472-482. Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action*, *passim.*, New York, 1937, and "The Role of Ideas in Social Action," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, 1938, 3: 652-664, and Robert K. Merton, "Social Structure and Anomie," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, 1938, 3: 672-682, have also analyzed the concepts of social problem and social disorganization from a general sociological point of view.

*Shows the first stages of a social movement*  
*Thank you, Douglas*

*Awareness.* The genesis of every social problem lies in the awakening of people in a given locality to a realization that certain cherished values are threatened by conditions which have become acute. Definitions of alarm emerge only as these group values are thought to be involved. Without awareness or "problem consciousness" in certain groups of people, be they scientists, administrators, or likeminded neighbors, no identifiable problem can be said to exist. Before a social problem can be identified, there must be awareness on the part of people who express their concern in some communicable or observable form.<sup>2</sup> The outstanding characteristic of this initial phase of awareness inheres in the constantly recurrent statements of people involved in a challenging situation that "something ought to be done." As yet, these people have not crystallized their definition sufficiently to suggest or debate exact measures for amelioration or eradication of the undesirable condition. Instead, there is unsynchronized random behavior, with protest expressed in general terms.

The objective condition aspect of the residence-trailer problem is the residence-trailer camp or community. The earliest record of such a community in Detroit goes back to the spring of 1920. This was a small camp of eight or ten families located on the periphery of the city; the residents were industrial workers living in homemade trailers. At this time, no discernible residence-trailer problem existed in Detroit. The three Detroit newspapers contain no reference to the situation and the records of the police, health department, and social work agencies are equally silent. Although neighbors remember the camp, they insist it was "no trouble at all." However, the objective condition grew rapidly in proportions. By 1930, there were four well-established camps within the city limits and by 1935 the number had increased to nine. In five of these nine communities, the inhabitants made no pretense of temporary camping, but removed the wheels from their trailers, mounted them on saw horses and two-by-fours, and settled down to a semipermanent existence. As the visibility of trailers and trailerites increased, there came the dawn of a social problem awareness as measured by newspaper items, gossip of neighbors, formal complaints of neighbors to the press and to civic authorities, and the official utterances of these civic authorities.

A sampling of the three Detroit newspapers reveals no comment on the situation either in the form of news or editorials until January, 1925, when we have an item in one paper noting a "brawl" which occurred in one of the camps. During the next decade, 1925-35, there was a steadily increasing number of items and in the two-year period 1936-37, the items reached their greatest frequency. If a qualitative interpretation of these items is permissible, we can say that up to 1930 their tone was one of curiosity and amuse-

<sup>2</sup> As yet, we have not perfected research techniques which can penetrate covert mental states very satisfactorily. *Very humbly*



ment rather than alarm. Before 1930, the editorial columns and "letters to the editor" section gave very little attention to the situation. After 1930, the editorial departments of all three papers made frequent comment and "letters to the editor" became quite common. In both straight news reporting and in editorial page comment, the tone of the items rapidly took on a note of concern and alarm. In 1936-37, over one half of the items were editorials or letters to the editor; the remainder were news items concerned with crime, disease, fires, accidents, and humorous incidents in the camps. The letters to the editor were principally from people living in the neighborhoods close to the trailer communities, from school authorities, from real estate dealers, and from social workers.

Complaints of neighbors were articulated on the grounds of the unsightliness of the camps, noises, odors, immorality, crime, and property depreciation in the surrounding districts. The response of neighborhood groups to the condition was measured not only by formal complaints to police, health officials, and newspapers, but also by the participant observations of students living in local areas near trailer camps. One student reported:

At first, none of us paid much attention when a number of families moved into the big open lot on the next corner below us. They were poor factory workers and the depression was pretty tough in 1932. They did not have to pay much rent. Most of us thought they would only stay a month or two and then be on their way. But after a year there were more trailers there than ever and neighbors began to say, "Well, it looks as if they were here to stay." But no one seemed to think that the camps were hurting any of us. Then we all began to miss certain small articles around the house. Newspapers, milk bottles, and tools began to disappear. We laid it to the trailer kids and blamed their parents for letting them run wild. Then someone said, "Why aren't these kids in school? That will keep them out of trouble." A neighbor wrote a letter to the truant officer about it but nothing came of it at first.

[Another typical comment] Dad said mother thought the trailer children were a bunch of sex perverted brats, but Dad said he did not worry half so much about that as how he would ever sell his house unless they got the campers out of the district. And Dad was always saying that he had nothing against the trailerites themselves. They could not help being poor, he said, but it was a "hell of a note why that should mean we all must be poor." [This statement referred to the situation in 1932.]

Awareness was registered in the official statements of organized civic authorities, such as health agencies, the police, and school functionaries, almost as soon as protests were being registered by local neighborhood groups. The health authorities were the first governmental unit to show concern in public statements and their information was given them first by social workers called into the camps to administer relief. The chief complaints of health inspectors to the Common Council were: families averaged two to each trailer and accommodations were scarcely large enough for one; several of the camps had no toilet accommodations and there was little or no privacy in such matters; water supply was low and residents were often dependent on sources outside the camp; in winter, the heating accommoda-

tions were deficient, small gas stoves serving most trailers and others had no heating whatsoever; garbage disposal was indiscriminate and dumping on nearby vacant lots was the usual expedient.

- The police, as another organized official group, came to view trailer camps as potential danger spots, presenting a new challenge to the preservation of law and order. This awareness definition reflected in official police reports emerged as the police were increasingly called in to quell brawls, apprehend delinquents, and investigate reports of indignant neighbors.
- School authorities became aware of the residence-trailer problem because the stability and routine of the school were affected. Some schools did not have the accommodations for the incoming trailer children, day to day attendance of the newcomers was extremely irregular, and, because of the impermanence of the trailer community, many children would depart before the school year was completed.

Thus, the stage of progressive awareness for Detroit's residence trailer problem covered the approximate period of 1925-35, and is measurable by newspaper indexes as well as by the definitions of citizens and government officials who felt that group values of health, education, private property, and morals were threatened by the existence of the objective condition.

*Policy Determination.* Very soon after the emergence of awareness comes debate over policies involved in alternative solutions. Ends and means are discussed and the conflict of social interests becomes intense. People who propose solutions soon find that these solutions are not acceptable to others. Even when they can get others to agree on solutions, they find agreement as to means a further difficulty. The stage of policy determination differs significantly from the stage of awareness in that interest groups are now concerned primarily with "what ought to be done" and people are proposing that "this and that should be done."<sup>3</sup> Specific programs occupy the focus of attention. The multi-sided protests have become organized and channelized.

Policy determination on the residence-trailer problem in Detroit indicated discussion on at least three interrelated levels: first, discussion by neighbors and other interested but unorganized groups; second, discussion by organized interest or pressure groups such as taxpayers, trailer manufacturers, real estate organizations, parent-teacher associations, women's clubs, and men's clubs; third, discussion among specialists and administrators in government or quasi governmental units—the police, health officials, Common Council, social workers, and school boards. The interinfluence and cross-fertilization of debate among and between these three levels of participating discussants represent the dynamics of policy determination.

Policy determination was preoccupied both with broad questions as to ends and with narrow, more specialized questions as to means. As to ends,

<sup>3</sup> Newspaper comment on the residence-trailer problem subsequent to 1935 reveals this transition in emphasis from simple alarm to concrete proposals.

should the trailer camps be prohibited entirely and expelled from the community, should they only be licensed, taxed, or otherwise restricted in growth, or should they be let alone in the hope that the situation would right itself? As to narrower questions of means, the more established, organized, and official the group, the more likely it was to agree on ends but to disagree on means. For instance, health officials debated periodic inspection, which would be costly but more efficient, as against sporadic inspection on complaints received, which would be less costly but involve more risk to the health of the community at large. Similarly, school officials debated the pros and cons of expansion, the pros and cons of vigorous truant officer activity, the pros and cons of a special class for trailer children. Police had to decide whether or not special details and augmented forces were necessary for trailer camp areas and whether a tough or lenient policy of arrest should be applied to trailer inhabitants.

Conflicts over policy determination can best be observed by charting the alignments of different interest groups who have various stakes in the solution of the difficulty. These groups represent certain institutional values, many of which appear incompatible with each other, all of which must be reconciled or compromised before the community can go ahead on a collective policy of reform. The official groups (police, health, school, social workers) can be said to be perpetuating basic organizational mores pertaining to the protection of private property, public health, education, and relief of the distressed. Then there are the special interest groups such as the real estate operators, hotel owners, and neighborhood taxpayers who want elimination or restriction of the homes on wheels because their pecuniary values of survival and status are threatened.

Lined up on the other side is the Coach Trailer Manufacturers' Association, a pressure group seeking the protection of the interests of trailerites, also motivated by self-interest and the profit mores. Then there are the interests of those who live in trailers. Though these trailer communities consist of low-income groups of migrant and transient workers, the casually employed, the chronic unemployable, factory wage earners, and the like, some of them are identified with an interest group of their own—The Mobile Home Owners' Association of America. This organization contends that trailer homes are the solution to the housing problems of the low-income family. With property and rental values held beyond their means, what is left for these people but the trailer house? There are citizens who are in sympathy with the position of trailer-residents, and although they favor some public control, they oppose abolition of these communities. Labor unions, civil rights groups, and other liberal organizations also are on record as championing the survival of trailer communities.

It seems, then, that the dynamics of policy determination on the residence-trailer problem, which became intensified during the approximate



period of 1935-37, can be represented as an alignment of certain humanitarian interests with certain organizational interests to combat other humanitarian interests aligned with other organizational interests.

*Reform.* The final stage in the natural history of a social problem is that of reform. Here we find administrative units engaged in putting formulated policy into action. General policies have been debated and defined by the general public, by special interest groups, and by experts. It is now the task of administrative experts specially trained in their jobs to administer reform. This is the stage of action, both public and private. The emphasis is no longer on the idea that "something ought to be done" or that "this or that should be done" but on the fact that "this and that are being done." Public action is represented in the machinery of government bodies, legislative, executive, and judicial; and in the delegated authority of administrative tribunals, special supervisory officers and boards. This is the institutionalized phase of the social problem in the sense that we have established policies carried out by publicly authorized policy-enforcing agencies. Reform may also be private in character, as witnessed by the activities of private clubs and organizations, private charities and other benevolent associations, and church groups.

Decisions of policy remain necessary at the reform stage, but such decisions usually involve quite technical matters pertaining to means and fall within the special bailiwick of the experts concerned with such questions. Of course, such policy questions may be taken out of the hands of the administrators whenever the general public exercises its powers of censorship, veto, or referendum. The already established public agencies may prove sufficient for the administration of reform in connection with a new community problem or it may be necessary to establish new agencies of administration.

The residence-trailer problem in Detroit is just beginning to enter the reform stage in its natural history. Although police and sanitation officials had sporadic contacts with the camps prior to 1937, their activities were not concerned with carrying out any special policies established for trailer communities. They were merely acting on community policies already established pertaining to crime and public health, wherever and whenever conditions called for bringing such old policies into action. Beginning about 1937, however, the Common Council enacted legislation which placed the trailer camps within the city under certain prohibitions and restrictions. These camps were absolutely prohibited from certain areas and allowed to survive only in specially designated areas. Also, special requirements as to licensing, inspection, and supervision of the camps were enforced on owners and/or lessees of the real estate where the camps were located. The health officials and sanitation inspectors were ordered to establish special rules of public health for the trailer communities. Reform has only begun, and



many knotty legal problems remain to be ironed out before collective action can proceed further. There is no indication that the school authorities have taken any official action. The problem seems to be on the border of transition from policy determination to reform.

It should be fairly obvious from the statement of the residence-trailer problem that the stages in the natural history are not mutually exclusive and that they tend to overlap. For conceptual purposes, however, the three general phases may be set off from each other; in practical reality, the state of development of a problem at any one time usually contains elements of all three stages.

Is the natural history technique equally adaptable to all types of social problems? The residence-trailer problem is a situation which can be observed on a local and emergent basis in specific neighborhoods and communities. The factors of localism and emergence offer the investigator a delimited area and a timeliness of observation which permit a current, intimate focus on the items of awareness, policy determination, and reform. The data are fresh and immediate and the participant observer technique is available. Such problems are often transitory—that is, awareness, discussion, and conflict cease permanently with some arrangement for compromise or removal of the difficulty; or the abatement of conflict may be only momentary and the issue flares up again and again.

What of the traditional, older, more pervasive problems which have occupied the attention of teacher and student in social problems texts for the past fifty years or more? What of crime, poverty, insanity, war, family disorganization, prostitution, illegitimacy, and race prejudice? Obviously, we cannot go back into antiquity to record the first awareness of social groups defining such conditions as problems. We cannot trace the earliest conflicts over policy and the first attempts at solution. Anthropological, historical, and contemporary data may be used to demonstrate to the student the universal aspects of these problems in space and in time. Such materials, however, are inadequate in that they do not bring the student face to face with the dynamics of the problem. If the student is to understand why these old established problems persist and defy solution, he must examine the values of our social organization which bring the undesirable conditions into existence and which obstruct efforts to remove them. His laboratory for the study of these realities is the local community where the cross-sectional conflicts at the core of the problem can be observed most intimately.

The important fact which the textbooks overlook is that the old traditional problems are given relative emphases in the local community. At the awareness stage, a problem such as crime may be receiving very little attention in community *A*, whereas in the neighboring community *B* it is the all-absorbing focus of interest. Similarly, there may be no discussion of policies relative to race discrimination in *B*, whereas the people of *A* are

intensely occupied with such discussion. The administration of relief for unemployment may be in an advanced stage in *B*, whereas little if anything is being done in *A*. Thus, even these problems which are persistently national in scope do not blanket the country with the same stage of development. Such conditions are only latent, dormant, or potential problems in the local area, and before they rise to local consciousness, debate, and control, a local issue is essential to set the natural history going. Although the conflicts of social values which make up the problem, once it has evolved, are much the same in all communities, the natural history technique provides a specific focus on these conflicts as they function in the concrete reality of a local situation.

*Conclusion.* We have presented the "natural history" interpretation of social problems as a broad conceptual frame for the examination of the dynamics of specific social problems. Obviously, before the natural history technique can be made a precise tool of research, the many implications of our statement must be refined and explored by further analysis.

Within our experience as teachers, the natural history approach has proved most valuable in bringing students to grips with the realities of social problems. These realities, as we see them, are the cross purposes at which people find themselves because they cherish incompatible and inconsistent objectives. The very norms of organization which give the community a working routine tend to produce conflicts of cultural values which create and sustain conditions defined as social problems.

In the search for temporal sequences in the "becoming" of a social problem, the student does not take problem conditions for granted, as objective "evils" caused by "evils." He seeks to explain social problems as emergents of the cultural organization of the community, as complements of the approved values of the society, not as pathological and abnormal departures from what is assumed to be proper and normal. As such, the natural history technique is a sociological orientation rather than a social welfare orientation. If social problems theory is to come of age, it must cease being a poor relation of sociological theory and become sociological theory in its own right.

#### COMMENT

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For ten years, I have tried to sell the theme of this paper as a thesis for the doctorate. I wish all my graduate students who didn't buy could have been here to feel sorry for their lack of imagination. In other words, I agree wholly that it is a good scientific hunch to assume that social problems have a natural history which it is important to study.

How can it best be studied? Through data on emerging current problems? Possibly the earliest stages can best be studied in the raw in this manner, but the full

natural history of a social problem becomes, I suspect, for the most part, a task of historical research. We need to study cases whose development is behind them, rather than those in their adolescent stages. What, for example, is the natural history of the problem of dependent children, or of industrial accidents? Here we are dealing with social problems of older vintage whose history through a number of stages has been written, and written quite clearly. I'm not depreciating the emerging current problem approach. I'm asking for its supplementation through historical research on older problems.

The second part of the paper which I should like to comment on are the stages in the natural history of social problems which are identified. These are (1) awareness, (2) policy determination, and (3) reform. For suggestive purposes, I should like to present an outline of the natural history of social problems which I have presented to my classes in recent years. It follows: (1) recognition of the problem; (2) discussion of its seriousness; (3) attempts at reform, usually intuitively arrived at, often ill-advised, promoted by the "Well, let's do *something* folks"; (4) suggestions that more careful study is needed—"What we need is a survey"; (5) here follows some change in personnel of people interested; (6) emphasis upon broad basic factors; (7) dealing with individual cases; (8) another change in personnel; (9) program inductively arrived at; (10) refinements of technique of study and treatment; (11) refinements of concepts; (12) another change in personnel.

## WAR AND THE FAMILY\*

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**S**TUDIES of the effects of war have concerned themselves in the past chiefly with its economic and political consequences, somewhat less with its social reverberations, and to a rather minor extent with its meaning for the family. This paper deals with this last named, relatively neglected, relationship.

*Preliminary Considerations.* Four considerations should be noted by way of preface. 1: *The first of these is the recurrence of war.* For centuries, among most peoples, war has been a customary pursuit, as normal a condition as that of peace. Warfare was both constant and inevitable among tribes subsisting upon the free products of nature. The role of conquest was predominant in the ancient world. War for the Greeks was a business enterprise, it existed by "nature," peace had to be established by special treaty. To Rome, an inland city, war was the only possible form of business expansion. The Germanic tribes glorified war with naive directness while Rome was busy cloaking her squabbles with plausible pretexts. Under feudalism, war was the respectable method of business investment. For centuries, a war with France was the only method by which an English gentleman could become rich. The division of booty was like the contemporary declaration of dividends. In the period of the origins of nationality, war was the established mechanism of nation making. Nations are seldom born except in the travail of battle. The commercial wars of the 17th and 18th centuries were incidental costs of the legitimate maintenance and pursuit of trade.<sup>1</sup>

Recent studies have furnished striking statistical evidence on the extent to which war is a recurrent phenomenon. A contemporary revision of Odysse-Barot (*Letters sur le Philosophie de l'Histoire*, 1864, page 20) points out that in the 3428 years between the formation of the Amphictyonic League in 1496 B.C. and 1932, there were wars in 3145, or 91.7 percent, of these years.<sup>2</sup> Particularly significant here are the recent findings by Sorokin. An analysis of 950 years in the history of France shows that the French were at war in more than 80 percent of those years, and that of 34 quarter-centuries in this period, only one was free from an important war.<sup>3</sup> Of 875 years in English history, 72 percent were war years, and of the 35 quarter-

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<sup>1</sup> Edward Van Dyke Robinson, "War and Economics in History and Theory," *Pol. Sci. Quart.*, XV: 581-622.

<sup>2</sup> Charles H. Cooley, Robert C. Angell, and Lowell J. Carr, *Introductory Sociology*, 281, New York, 1933.

<sup>3</sup> Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, III: 309, New York, 1937.



centuries included, only one was free from an important war.<sup>4</sup> After finding some 967 wars in world history in recorded times, Sorokin concludes that war phenomena are almost as common and normal as those of peace. Periods of peace as long as a quarter of a century have been exceedingly rare in the histories of the countries studied. Almost every generation in the past, with very few exceptions, he points out, has been a witness of, or an actor in, war phenomena.<sup>5</sup>

Obviously, our problem must be considered in the lengthened perspective of the centuries, which reveals both the frequency and the persistence of war. Modern students must guard against the kind of zealous mistake which advocates of prohibition made a quarter of a century ago: they must not prove too much. If alcohol were as destructive as its foes of that era alleged, the human race would have drunk itself into a state of inebriate impotence long ago; similarly, if war were so destructive of family life as some modern students contend, mankind could not have survived its own history.

2. *The Specificity of the Problem.* All social problems are specific—as to time, place, and particular combination of circumstances.<sup>6</sup> In turning, then, to the effects of war upon the family, one asks: the effects of what war, in which country, upon what kind of family?

(a) Each war is peculiar to itself and its meaning for family life in its most concrete and significant aspects will vary with its distinguishing features.<sup>7</sup> Some wars are fought with large armies on land; some, with far-flung navies at sea. One war involves danger to large proportions of the population; another, extensive equipment with relatively few persons engaged in actual combat. The World War of 1914–1918 was a war of men, organized in large armies, with an unbelievably high casualty rate; the present war is a war of machines, of elaborate equipment, and with relatively low casualty rate. There have been wars, fought chiefly between armies; there are wars which are totalitarian, like the present. Some wars are fought chiefly in terms of blockade, and counter blockade, with resultant malnutrition and an aftermath of widespread disease; others, like the present, are fought in part in psychological terms, with a strategy of terror and deception. Finally, one might distinguish between wars in which the chief losses are from bullets and those where the human costs take the form of large losses in military and civilian populations because of disease. The British in the Crimea lost twenty-five times more men from disease than from bullets. By the end of the Thirty Years War, one third of the population of the Palatinate had succumbed.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 316.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 352.

<sup>6</sup> James H. S. Bossard, *Social Change and Social Problems*, Chap. IV, rev. ed., New York, 1934.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Hans Speier, "The Social Types of War," *Amer. J. Sociol.*, January 1941, 445–455.

(b) The effects of war vary obviously from one country to another, dependent upon the role it plays and the fate it meets. The effects of war upon the family in an invaded Poland differ from those in a victorious Germany. The psychology of an entire nation varies from defeat to victory. The psychology of a vanquished Germany was written into *Little Man, What Now*; that of the conqueror of the continent in 1940 finds expression in the flaming cry of the Führer: "Soldiers of Germany, you are making history for the next thousand years."

(c) Finally, what war means to the family depends upon the family. What is the effect upon new families, i.e., families formed as the war begins or during its continuance? Over against these are older, established families, where the husband or son is withdrawn for military service. There is the unhappy family, in which war offers an honorable and socially acceptable way out of a difficult, and often seemingly hopeless, situation. Over against such cases are those families which may be termed happy, as well as that large number in which the emotional tone of the relationship is, figuratively speaking, neither black or white, but shows intermediate shades of indefinite gray. Finally, one might include those informal unions commonly called "living together." Experience in the administration of public assistance funds in recent years has shown a large proportion of such unions, particularly in the urban centers of population. Obviously, war has a different meaning for each of these as well as various other types or varieties of family which one might identify.

3. *Direct and Derivate Effects.* War, like all major social changes, has its immediate, direct effects and its subsequent, derivative effects. The distinction is an important one, and emphasizes again the necessity of maintaining a long-range point of view. By way of example, it is interesting to contemplate in the objective retrospect of the centuries, the chain of consequences of the Punic Wars in the third century B. C. First, for the thirty or more years of actual warfare, a large proportion of able-bodied Romans saw service in the field. Husbands were away from home years at a time.

As a consequence, the management of estates and households devolved upon their wives, many women receiving a training in self-reliance and efficiency in responsible position. This in turn led such women to submit with ill grace to the restrictions in their daily lives and interests that their husbands imposed upon them on their return from the wars. Before long, the *Manus*, i.e., the power of the Roman husband over his wife, came to be indicted by these women as a tyranny. After the second Punic War, the controversy was compromised, and the practice of marriage without *Manus* grew up. It was this sad circumstance which led the elder Cato to remark: "We Romans rule over all men, and our wives rule over us."

But the end is not yet. In due time, the Roman matrons "deliberately sought to become learned and clever." In the age of Cicero, a band of bril-

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liant and often unscrupulous women were not only versed in the learning of their time, but became also a power in politics. It was, writes Miss Goodsell, against such women that Juvenal at a later time launched this biting satire:

Let not the matron that shares your marriage bed possess a set style of eloquence, or hurl in well-rounded sentences the enthymeme curtailed of its premise; nor be acquainted with all histories. But let there be some things in books which she does not understand. I hate her who is forever poring over and studying Paleamon's treatise; who never violates the rules and principles of grammar; and, skilled in antiquarian lore, quotes verses I never knew; and corrects the phrases of her friends as old-fashioned, which men would never heed.<sup>8</sup>

4. "*Multiple Effects.*" The effects of war upon the family are numerous and varied. Modern students speak of the "multiple effects" of important social changes. Still continuing with the Punic Wars, one can see clearly, in the perspective of more than two thousand years, the range and diversity of consequences of war for the family. As a result of the triumph over Carthage, many Romans became wealthy. This made fathers unwilling to release their control over their daughters and their dowries. Free marriages grew up without the *Manus* and with the girl remaining under the control of her family. Women retained their own incomes. With financial independence came demands for other privileges and rights. The marriage rate began to decline. Roman men resented the attitude of women. "Why have I not a rich wife?" asks the poet Martial, "Because I do not wish to be my wife's maid." Also, the wars of conquest brought many subject women into the Empire. Many of these were attractive. Mistresses were easy to obtain. The birth rate began to decline. Children involved too irrevocable a tie-up between a man and his wife. Divorce became popular and easy. By the time of the Augustan age, its frequency had attained the proportions of a public scandal. Seneca says that the women of his day counted their years not by consuls but by husbands, and Juvenal charges some women with divorcing their husbands before the marriage garlands had faded on the lintels.

*War and the Formation of New Families.* Most obvious are the effects of war upon the formation of new families. Four such effects are noted. (1) When war becomes imminent, an immediate effect is the acceleration of the marriage rate. Such acceleration is usually temporary. Some marriages already planned are moved forward; others indicate cautious young men choosing the lesser danger of matrimony. The prospect of conscription acts like a shot in the arm of Dan Cupid. The number of marriage licenses issued in August, 1940, in New York City, for example was more than 50 percent higher than for the same months in the preceding year.

<sup>8</sup> Willystine Goodsell, *A History of the Family as a Social and Educational Institution*, 131, New York, 1915.

(2) Following this preliminary flurry, the marriage rate falls during war periods: first, because it takes marriageable males of susceptible years out of circulation; second, it creates uncertainty and insecurity not favorable to the assumption of supposedly life-long obligations. Marriage rates fell markedly during the first World War, in France, for example, from 7.7 to 2.3. On the whole, the drop was most pronounced in the invaded countries, less in those that were not, least in nearby neutral countries. When the war was over, there was a swift recovery in the marriage rate: in France from 4.8 in 1917 to 16.0 in 1920. The rebound was similarly striking in other belligerent countries. Comparing the rates for the five years after the war with those prevailing before 1914, it is significant to note that the postwar excess more than counterbalanced the losses of the war years. War, then, tends to postpone marriage. The marriage rate apparently is a relatively resilient demographic characteristic.

(3) War increases the relative number of hasty and ill-advised marriages. Such marriages are always occurring. Gin, coincidence, glandular disturbances, and many other factors are involved. In every society, there are those persons who act with unreasoned impulsiveness, even in regard to the major problems of their lives; the highly charged emotional atmosphere which war engenders increases both the number of such persons and the scope of their irrational behavior. After World War I, one heard a great deal about war marriages, and the term came to carry with it a sort of left-handed justification for whatever happened. They were marriages that were consummated under the emotional excitement and the abnormal conditions of the war period and which in most cases would not have been made under normal circumstances.

(4) Marry-and-run marriages constitute another form of war phenomena; like hit-and-run accidents, they often are rather tragic occurrences. By marry-and-run marriages are meant those legal weddings which are not followed by continuing cohabitation. The couple marry. After a day, a week or two together, they separate, to resume the accustomed tenor of their respective ways. In war time, it is usually at the call of military duty that their life together is terminated. Now the essential danger in such marriages is that the couple do not have the customary opportunity to make the gradual unbroken transition from romantic bliss to prosaic adjustment which is the basis of continued domestic accord. Happiness in marriage, according to the experts, is an achievement, not a discovery. It comes as a by-product to successful experience in living together. Beginning their life together on the romantic level, and with the help of the romantic aura, married couples learn to compromise as they cohabit. It is this normal process which is lacking in marry-and-run marriages. The romantic glow may fade, or be dimmed, during the separation, while each shares different life experiences. When, as, and if, they unite later, and they do not always

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do so, there are shadows in their relationships which the glow of the honeymoon could have dissolved.

*Effects of War upon Established Families.* 1. War separates for uncertain periods of time the members of families already established. Married men rally or are called to the colors, persons of all ages and both sexes leave their accustomed homes to engage in some activity tributary to war. The basic fact is that of separation under the psychological conditions which war engenders. (a) There are two overshadowing aspects of such separations. One is that between parent and child, usually in times past, between father and child. This is always a serious matter of far reaching consequences. The absence of the father means the loss of his contribution, whatever it may be, to the continuing personality development of his child. It means, particularly in many families, the removal of the chief disciplinarian. This loss comes at a time when the other members of the family, particularly the mother, are already disturbed and preoccupied. Students of the effects of the World War, 1914-1918, both in England and in Germany, refer repeatedly to the lack of discipline of children during the war years, due to the absence of the father and the preoccupation of the mother and other adults in the family. The general atmosphere in many families was one of hysteria and sentimentality, which obviously is not favorable for a rigorous inculcation of the group mores nor of the lesser conventions. At any rate, what discipline and training there are in many homes are wholly in the hands of the women of the household, thus carrying forward that feminization of child rearing which many students have noted in modern times.

Each war presents its own features of this separation of children from parents. The present war is witnessing that of mass evacuation. The British for example, place the total number of evacuees in January, 1941, at 1,500,000. Most of these are children, moved from urban to rural areas. In addition, there has been a sizable transfer of children to the Dominions and to the United States. In other countries, there have been the as yet uncounted number of children in war refugee families who have been separated from their parents.<sup>9</sup>

How many people are now being moved about, pawn-like, on the continent of Europe it is impossible to tell. The present war is unique in the large scale displacement and transplanting of peoples. The Germans seem to be blasting the Poles out of Poland and to be appropriating Polish homes, estates, hotels, shops, and factories. It is estimated that there were 4,000,000 less Poles in Poland in 1940 than when the Germans moved in.<sup>10</sup> It is clear that the German plan of economic integration and domination, with its division of Europe into areas of agriculture, of light industry, and of heavy industry, involves the moving of vast numbers of people as they are needed

<sup>9</sup> For data on British evacuees, cf. Willard Waller, *War and the Family*, 29, New York, 1940.

<sup>10</sup> Virgilia Sapieha, "Behind the Scenes in Poland," *The New Yorker*, July 27, 1940.

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—men or women, boys or girls. It is equally obvious that this often involves but scant consideration of family ties.

It is impossible, at such close range in point of time, to assess what these separations mean to children and families. Involved in these transfers at best is the largest child-placement job on record, done under the stress of war, with a minimum of case work. To one familiar with the wide range of adjustment problems that attend even the better done placements of children in foster homes and institutions, the present plight of hundreds of thousands of children is difficult to assess.

(b) The other outstanding aspect of family separation during war is between husband and wife. This customarily means the wife stays in the home. The result of this is the break-up of a crystallized relationship, thus creating for both the problem of adjusting to a new nonfamily pattern of living for the time being. The term *mobility of the mores* is suggested to identify the process of the revaluation of the moral code which takes place when persons change their place or their status. We shall concern ourselves first with the husband who is withdrawn from his civilian setting, taken to a camp, and made into a soldier for the time being.

One of the basic elements in all wars is their effect upon the mores of the soldier who is withdrawn from civilian life. Let us examine this in terms of process. First he is removed from his primary groups—family, neighborhood, church—with their controls over his conduct. He shakes off, as it were, his identification with the erstwhile moral pattern. He goes into the army and thus achieves a certain anonymity. He loses his identification with the groups he has known. He enters a group in which there is occupational and psychological homogeneity. His new buddies are all engaged in the same pursuits, unusual, stirring, and with a possible rendezvous with danger or death at the end.

*The Soldier and the Ingroup.* "You are in the army now." It is a man's world in which old-time and feminine controls are gone, at least for the moment. All soldiers are in the same boat. To drink, to engage in amours, is to behave as the group does. It is traditional for the soldiers to "cut loose." What the sociologists call an ingroup has come into being. No disgrace is involved in the assumption of certain liberties. A soldier's new ingroup approves, for the time being, new forms of conduct.

There are various factors which make for new patterns of conduct for this ingroup. Army life is rigid. It controls you, even your thinking, much of the time. It is a life of routine. When there is temporary release from the schedule, various vagaries of conduct become emotionally satisfying. Such sequence would be particularly pronounced among privates and non-commissioned officers. They are the underdogs. They take the orders. They do the actual fighting. An affair with a woman reestablishes status, just as does the ugly duckling with her illicit love affair compensate for the rivalry

of her more lovely sisters. Again, the soldier's new military status gives him opportunity. There are no women folk to check the hours of his pursuits. The uniform has its own appeal in wartime. The government furnishes prophylactics. There is no local court to comprehend you. The girl knows you are in the army; she knows what to expect. Then, too, the soldier rationalizes his need. He is serving his country. Doesn't this girl owe something to him? In other words, the wearing of the uniform is rationalized to confer upon the individual a different set of moral precepts. Older, more stringent, inhibitive mores continue to have his approval, to be sure, but they hold for the folks who stay at home, particularly for his women folk. He is "in the army now" and the moral code has to be translated and changed to meet the needs of a unisexual group which is serving the country in time of crisis and with great danger to himself. He is serving his country, and he has his needs and the rights which the situation confers. When one is dealing with armies, and particularly armies on the move, one must face this transvaluation of the mores. Such transvaluation may be temporary; it may last only so long as he is in the army; when he returns to civilian life, he may take up where he left off; but this is what the situation tends to be as long as the ingroup persists. Obviously, there are many individual reactions to the ingroup, some wholly different from what has been outlined.

*The Stay-At-Home Wife.* Meanwhile the wife is at home. Her relative isolation from other women in the same position makes the situation different. No ingroup develops here; only isolation and the temptation of opportunity. Sooner or later, confusion and misunderstandings arise between the separated couple. Each tends to become uncertain about the other; each detects the air of uncertainty in the other. The next step may be a defensive coolness toward the other, or some degree of conflict. Nobody knows what the proper relationship is; for this very reason, conflict is apt to grow. There is uncertainty, and the temptation of freedom, for each from the other, against a general social background charged with high emotion. Adultery, and the thought of it, flourish upon opportunity.

Meanwhile, there is the immediate necessity for the wife to assume greater responsibility and leadership in the family. She must now "take over," as we say. Her first steps in this direction may falter but there is no other way. Moreover, the necessity may be long continued. The assumption of leadership is a habit which feeds upon itself. Reference has already been made to what the Punic Wars did to the Roman matron. Read what a recent witness says of the effect of the Civil War upon the southern wife.

In 1860, the South became a matriarchy. The men went away from home to other battlefields, leaving the women free to manage farm and plantation without their bungling hindrance; whence they returned, those who had escaped heroic death found their surrogates in complete and competent charge and liking it. Four years

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had fixed the habit of command which, when I first began to know them, thirty had not broken.<sup>11</sup>

2. War terminates many marriages. Husbands are killed in war; they die from disease. The death toll of the World War needs no repetition. The present war is proving thus far less costly in life. Casualty lists published by the present belligerents are but as footnotes to those of the preceding one even when air raid victims are included. Some couples take advantage of the separation of war service to be divorced. Some men disappear. Some, taken prisoners, may reappear out of the blue a long time afterwards. Some return physically disabled. War, in other words, creates on a large scale, the problems of widowhood, desertion, divorce, and the readjustment that physical disability of one mate often involves.

3. For all who are reunited, there is the task of reestablishing that peculiarly intimate relationship which is the essence of family life. This it is not always easy to do. Mates are not filed in secluded portfolios when war separates them. They go on living in their respective worlds. The significant fact is that these worlds have been different, often grossly, glaringly different. Men particularly go to the ends of the world. Two million Americans went to France during the World War. Canadians went to England; Australians, to the Near East; Indians to France. When, later on, such men are reunited with their wives both have their respective pasts behind them. Husband and wife may have grown apart. There may be merely a shyness to overcome. There may be a hangover of pleasant but worrying memories. Many a married soldier (and conceivably his wife) who, in the excitement of war, takes lightly a commandment or two returns to his or her own fireside with a sense of shame and remorse. Internal struggle, which the psychiatrists call mental conflict, is often deep-seated and unconscious. It may be more than a coincidence that the World War generation was so ready, in the postwar period, to accept the psychoanalytic philosophies which held that sex satisfaction is essential to mental health.

4. It is interesting to speculate on what war means today to families in which the husband and wife are of different nationalities. There must be many families in which Germans are married to Poles, to English, or to French mates. There are Italians married to Greeks. These crossings would be found not only in the warring countries but in the neutrals as well. Particularly do they exist in the United States, where all these nationalities are represented extensively and where their intermarriage has been facilitated and even encouraged. I have shown elsewhere the extent of such intermarriages in one large eastern state and the prevailing combinations.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>11</sup> John Andrews Rice, "My Father's Folks," *Harper's Magazine*, 426, New York, September, 1940.

<sup>12</sup> James H. S. Bossard, *Marriage and the Child*, Chapter V, Philadelphia, 1940. Cf., the author's "Nationality and Nativity as Factors in Marriage," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, December 1939, 792-798.



Clearly, much family tension must develop in many such cases where the two nationalities involved are at war with each other. Few persons can escape their cultural heritage nor view their family relationships with complete scientific detachment.

5. *Air Raids and Family Life*. Air raids represent a new aspect of man's military inhumanity to man. Designed ostensibly as attacks upon military objectives, residential areas have been involved constantly in these aerial attacks. The extent of such involvement is at the present writing not clear, but it is known that there are areas in Poland, England, and Holland where as many as one half of the homes have been destroyed.

What the sudden and wanton destruction of civilian homes does to family life we do not yet know. Possibly the literature on large scale disaster episodes may give the best hint. The home is the physical symbol of the family's life and unity. The destruction of one's home means, then, more than the destruction of so much property. It is the outward loss of an inward achievement.

What does continuing recourse to air raid shelters mean? What new accommodations and mores are emerging? Are its necessities and opportunities a source of freedom for new irregularities of conduct? On the other hand, may not common dangers forge new bonds of devotion and responsibility? Does the modern blackout mean for family life what the isolated medieval castle did? Guizot, in his *Historie de la Civilisation en France*, refers to the complete isolation of the medieval castle which, while an impregnable retreat, was also a home:

Never, in any form of society, has a family, reduced to its most simple expression, husband, wife and children, been found so closely drawn together, pressed one against the other, and separated from all other powerful and rival relations.<sup>13</sup>

6. War effects established families through what it does to their planes of living, both during and after the war period. War is destructive of wealth. It redirects production to nonproductive ends. It alters the price level with particular detriment to families living on fixed incomes. Recent wars seem to be unduly costly. As war becomes more mechanical and technical, the trend is unmistakably toward greater relative cost. It cost about 75 cents to kill a man in Caesar's time. The price rose to about \$3000 in the Napoleonic wars; to \$5000 in the American Civil War; and then to \$21,000 in the World War. Estimates for the present war indicate that it is now not less than \$50,000. The present war is so expensive because it is a war of mechanized units, a clash of machines. The result is the relatively extensive destruction of property rather than of life. This means that after such a war more people will survive but with fewer reserves of wealth. This cannot but spell reduced planes of living for all peoples involved. As the present war approaches a stalemate, destruction and counter-destruction from the

<sup>13</sup> Guizot, Tome III: 343, quoted in Goodsell, *op. cit.*, 224.

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air may result increasingly. This will make the war a competitive destruction of homes and productive establishments. Poverty, plague, and human suffering thus can be the only gainers.

7. The effect of the war upon the birth rate is obvious and measurable. Belligerent countries experience a fall in their birth rates during wartime and usually a temporary rise after the close of the war. These manifestations vary, however, in different countries, dependent upon the length and duration of hostilities and relative position to the area of combat. The experience of Europe during and after World War I is interesting and instructive. Combining all northern and western Europe, the birth rate dropped from 24.2 for the years 1911-1914 to 17.0 for the years 1915-19, a drop of almost 30 percent. Among the belligerents, the drop in France, which was invaded, came earliest and fell lowest; in England, which was isolated relatively from the fighting and which reached its war peak later, the drop came late and was slight. In Bulgaria, Hungary, Belgium, Germany, and Italy, the lowest birth rate of the war period was below half of the prewar rate. For the period as a whole, including 1919, the birth rates were less than 60 percent of the prewar normal in Hungary; about 60 percent for France, Germany, Belgium and Bulgaria; approximately 65 percent for Italy and Austria; and 80 percent for England. In most countries, the curtailment in births during the World War period corresponded to the entire number of births of two whole normal years, on a prewar basis; in Italy, to the births of  $1\frac{1}{2}$  years; and in England, to those of a little less than a year.<sup>14</sup>

The recovery after the war was prompt and marked. In Germany, Hungary, Austria, Belgium, and Bulgaria, it began in 1919; in England, France, and Italy, in 1920. All Europe, even the neutrals, seem to have heaved a sigh by 1920 and settled down to having babies. The birth rates of 1921 of the warring nations were from 3 to 10 points higher per thousand population and relatively higher rates prevailed for several years. By 1925-1926, it had fallen, in most countries, to the prewar level and thereafter the long-term downward trend was resumed.

This marked reduction of the birth rate during the four to five year World War period affected subsequently the age structure of the populations in the countries involved. The contracted age levels of these war years have moved upward through the successive age groupings of the population pyramid. As these contracted age levels have come to the child-producing years, their relatively small size was and is bound to result in another marked lowering of the birth rate; when, in addition, as is now the case in Europe, this same generation must bear the brunt of another war, the significance for population growth is doubly serious. One is tempted, then, to agree with the following doleful forecast of the immediate future in Europe:

<sup>14</sup> "War and the Birth Rate," *The Statistical Bulletin*, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, March, 1940, page 4.

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War, a grave disaster at any time, is doubly so when it recurs on a large scale in the interval of one generation. Precisely this has happened in Europe. The current war threatens, therefore, to put off, for many decades, a recovery of normal balance of population in the countries engaged. . . . A long war will mean a poverty-stricken continent, with an extremely high proportion of old persons, and of women in the prime of life, either widowed or condemned to spinsterhood and childlessness.<sup>15</sup>

8. There remains to be considered, for these recent years, the effect of war upon the spread of contraceptive information. War spells uncertainty and insecurity and these cause thoughtful husbands and wives to hesitate over having more children. This naturally intensifies interest in birth control methods. The World War of 1914-1918 saw the birth control movement make tremendous strides among the poorer classes. Today, with air raids hovering over entire civilian populations, such information becomes one of the necessities of life. Under the date of October 11, 1940, a woman's surgeon in London writes:

The other night at Epping they bombed a house full of expectant mothers. I had to deal with the casualties. I thought I was inured to most things, at times almost to the point of callousness, but never have I seen anything so terrible or horrible as the results of this. To have to amputate arms of pregnant women, as well as to deal with other horrible mutilations is an experience I hope never to have to go through again.

Such a picture tells its own story and its own need. It is not unreasonable to suppose that the present war will do much to democratize further the knowledge and use of contraceptive methods.

*War and Social Changes Peculiarly Important to the Family.* (1) War cannot but affect the status of women. It is obvious that when the man is away, the woman must play—at being a man. Reference has been made to the improved status of Roman ladies during and after the Punic Wars and of southern women after the Civil War period. This process has been much accelerated in recent years as war has involved increasingly the efforts of women. The change in warfare from a clash between professional armies to a struggle between entire populations, the addition of economic to military phases of conflict, the development of totalitarian warfare, all have combined to make the efforts and contributions of women of greater importance. This involves the increasing employment of women outside of the home, their invasion of new fields of employment, the fading out or at least blurring, of class distinctions in the competitive contacts of the job, the earning of cold cash, and the enlargement of new horizons in many ways beyond the daily occupation. Air raids make her morale a basic line of defense.

Things obviously cannot stop there. When women work, earn, and spend like men do, they want the same rights as men do. This is certainly what happened during and after the first World War. War not only changed the employment of women "from a shameful business to heroism" overnight,

<sup>15</sup> "The Cumulative Effect of Successive Wars on Age Compositions of Populations," *Statistical Bulletin*, *op. cit.*, April, 1940, page 5.

but it put the finishing touches upon "the emancipation of women." But the right to behave like a man meant also the right to misbehave as he does. The decay of established moralities came about as a by-product. We call this a change in the mores.

This change in status and the change in the mores, particularly the sex mores, are of fundamental importance to the family. Equality in employment and in sex behavior means equality before the law in matters of divorce, desertion, and separation. They necessitate the democratic marriage. They encourage companionate marriage. The loosening of sex and family mores contribute to the increase of tension within the marriage bond. The challenge to time-honored sanctions results in insecurity, both in the home and outside. Increasingly, the hunt does not cease after the hare and the rabbit have been caught.

2. There are counteracting and complicating factors in the changing sex ratio which war brings about. War is the great killer—of men. It takes a nation's young men and when it is satiated, returns the leavings. Losses in war are heaviest among men under 30. In the first World War, 72 percent of German military deaths and 55 percent of the French losses were of men under 30. This means men either recently married or at the period of life when they would be most prone to marry. The toll of war means, then, a corresponding disproportion between the sexes. War alters the sex ratio, especially in the younger age groups. The first World War was of outstanding importance in this respect, creating a huge reservoir of younger women—two million in Germany, one million in France, one million in Great Britain. Mere statistics do not adequately cover the matter. Many of the men who survived were disabled, less attractive, less virile, less marriageable.

The results of all this were "sufficient to interfere seriously with the monogamous pattern of family life."<sup>16</sup> Some of them can be easily identified. (a) There were in each warring nation after 1918, large numbers of women who could not expect to marry. This situation was so serious that in fairly responsible quarters there was serious discussion of giving polygamy legal status. (b) The bargaining powers of women were reduced. Men were at a premium and not unnaturally, many of them knew it.<sup>17</sup> Women didn't like this, and they thought it wasn't good for the men. (c) The proportion of ill-fitting marriages was increased—women who in normal times would have rated an A husband had to make the best of grade C, older men marrying much younger girls, unmarriageable men getting married, etc. (d) The creation of sex antagonism, both within marriage and without.

3. War involves the reorganization of the entire societal pattern. The

<sup>16</sup> Elizabeth K. Nottingham, "The Position of English Women and the War of 1914-1918," unpublished paper, read at the Eastern Sociological Society Conference, April, 1940. An excellent discussion of the problems under discussion.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*



simplest way of stating this is to say that most people stop what they have been doing and do something else. All aspects of the social life are centered upon a new task—the waging of war. The economic structure is focussed upon the production of the sinews of war. Educational institutions train personnel and foster morale. Preachers present arms. Population is redistributed. Some areas grow phenomenally, others contract correspondingly, problems multiply inevitably in both. Accredited leaders in the peacetime regime are withdrawn for war service. Social services lag because of preoccupation with other tasks. Civil liberties are suspended or abridged. Smaller communities and neighborhoods are swallowed up in the war waging unit. All this means that large masses of people are shifted from their customary occupations and preoccupations. They are taken away from their primary control groups. If the country is invaded, many of the customary controls may vanish. Meanwhile, new conditions appear and they have the sanction of being war essentials. New judgments arise to meet these needs, which means that new folkways and mores appear. Old ones may persist and do, of course, but for the time being, in defensive vein. The threshold of inhibition is lowered. New forms of conduct are approved. Ordinarily, the mores change slowly; in war, they behave like active mutants. In brief, when war cracks the whip, peoples, classes, areas, institutions, all reform themselves into new groupings or functionings and evolve new institutionalized arrangements by which to live. *C'est la guerre.*

4. War develops its own characteristic psychology—an accumulation of kaleidoscopic changes of ideas, impressions, and emotions. War is ushered in usually on a wave of sentimentality and hysteria. This is succeeded by a sense of instability which breeds insecurity in turn. There is a sense of unreality. Old household gods and possessions lose their value. So do old folkways and mores. The Japanese legend of the doll that grew a soul and became a human being after having been the play friend of a dozen generations in the same nursery gives way to a cheap Ford car. The future is uncertain. Why, then, not eat, drink and ride in the Ford car? As Waller has aptly put it, war involves “hedonistic life adjustments on a short-term basis.”<sup>18</sup>

As war gets under way, it strikes, and it does so blindly. Modern warfare, particularly, makes a fetish of invisibility. It strikes, not only blindly but also impersonally. Perhaps the outstanding outcome of this is that large groups of people lose all confidence in justice as one of the principles which regulate the course of human life. In peacetime, the conception of a measurably just relation between effort and result, labor and the rewards of labor, seems as natural to the mind of the average citizen as it is indispensable to the maintenance of the state. With war, this conception changes. An irritating sense of incalculable chance takes its place. Things go awry from

<sup>18</sup> Willard Waller, *War and the Family*, 13.

the point of view of reasonable causality. The customary relations between cause and consequence become uncertain and fallacious. Each new day may demonstrate the futility of the most careful preparations. War cancels causality. Life becomes a carnival in which nothing remains true to itself. There is no apparent relation between what a man does and what happens to him. There is a robot-like disregard of individual effort. Why then be limited by the old restrictions? Why then be inhibited by yesterday's virtues? Why then labor, and especially save, when their rewards are taken away, impersonally through the law of chance? Why educate the next generation to a set of principles which are now being disproved?

*Summary.* To the student of dynamic sociology, war is a complex of social changes. The effects of war, broken down one by one, are similar to various other large scale changes. It disturbs most things, it dislocates and disorganizes many, it sweeps away some, it breaks others. On the other hand, it is the harbinger of much that is new. Some of the new are the products of war; in other cases, war but facilitates the secular trend, releasing that which was straining at the leash.

A final word. War, like all crises, is a selective factor operating on a gigantic scale. So far as its effects upon individual families are concerned, some are therapeutic; some, just disturbing; others are disorganizing; a relatively few, plain demoralizing. It is easy, however, to point out the vagaries of conduct and philosophy which develop. Over against these is the fact that millions of men and women come through, not unseared, for the crucible of war does not permit that, but for the most part with a better understanding of life and one's fellows, a greater tolerance of their characteristics, a higher respect for their personalities, a more abiding charity for their faults, a deeper respect for their virtues, and perhaps it is not too much to hope, with a keener understanding and perspective of one's self.

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## AMERICAN STATUS SYSTEMS AND THE SOCIALIZATION OF THE CHILD\*

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IN MOST human societies, the instigating symbols and socially defined goals of children, as well as of adults, are ordered to systems of appropriate age, sex, and kin behaviors. These roles usually exist within a hierarchy of privileges. There is great variation between societies as to the complexity and rigidity of age and sex stratification. Usually, however, male adults in their prime have the highest rank; in religious or political councils, aged males frequently are accorded precedence.

Along with the definition of roles and ranking of privileges by age and sex, our Western society includes a third type of hierarchical relational system, which limits and defines the approved responses and goals of the child. This is a type of hierarchy which ranks people in defined subordinate-superordinate relationships, without regard for their age, sex, or kinship roles. Listed in order of increasing degrees of in-marriage, the status groups of this third type include (1) social classes, (2) minority ethnic groups, and (3) castes.

The aim of this paper is to call attention to the fundamental importance in America of age, sex, and class instigations and goals in the socialization of the human organism. It must be admitted immediately that the psychological reinforcements of appropriate status behavior, that is, the nature of the striving instigations and prestige responses which apparently motivate the child's internalization of social controls is not understood. What "prestige," "approval," "acceptance," and "mastery" are in terms of biopsychological dynamics we do not yet know. Indeed, the physiologist has not yet satisfied himself concerning the nature of the biological processes underlying the "primary" eating, sexual, and pain responses of man. It seems clear, however, that even these so-called "biological drives" reach their psychological threshold only in socially determined form. Although they are less complex functions of social training than is competition for status, nevertheless eating, or sexual behavior, or even reaction to post-operative shock certainly includes psychosocial determinants. These cultural formants differentiate between variously socialized men with regard

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to the biopsychological instigations of "hunger," "sexual drive" or "anxiety."

In the present state of psychological research, one may simply accept the repeated testimony of observation and experiment that social ("secondary") reinforcements of human behavior exist in great number and complexity. Although this type of motivation is not clear, it certainly involves a seeking for, and responsiveness to, social stimulus and reward—a "drive" which may be observed in children under one year. Whether or not the infant's smiles and vocalizations, his demands for the mother's presence (even when he is not hungry or in pain), and his rejection of food in response to the social stimulus of visitors are responses to stimuli which in turn are conditioned to food, it is apparent that they constitute social intercourse. At the infantile level, the psychological meaning of such social responses is already related to the age-hierarchy in which the infant's exploration of the world must be pursued. In general, then, it appears that *social* instigations and goals (vocalization, smile, caress) are integrated into the motivational pattern of the child as early as the infantile level. If the physiological "drives" are more apparent at this age, they become increasingly obscured as weaning, cleanliness, and genital training are internalized.

A child therefore learns (acquires discrimination) not simply by being denied or allowed to achieve biologically pleasant states, but also by experiencing acceptance, approval, or disapproval as expressed in social symbols of age prestige. If the mother appears omnipotent to the child at the age of one, and is therefore clung to tenaciously by him, it is not to be assumed that he values her only, or chiefly, as his avenue to food or rest. She very likely also appears as an adult who can still his anxiety concerning his refusal to eat solid food, or his failure to achieve cleanliness. To the child, in other words, the mother is the adult at the top of his age hierarchy consisting of parents, adult visitors, and children; to the extent that he can control her, he not only quiets his hunger but also stills his anxiety as a relatively helpless being in a household of physically and socially older and more powerful individuals.

If the situation is of this nature, it seems rather useless to speak of a hierarchy of "primary" and "secondary" goal-responses. It seems more promising to face at the outset the problems of the emotional and social processes in learning. The aim of such a study of human socialization would be to develop one construct which would integrate findings dealing with both the affective and the central nervous systems into one conceptual scheme of socialization. The ultimate accomplishment of such an integrated construct of learning, such as is now being explored at several centers including the Institute of Human Relations, would be to abolish the conceptual dichotomy between biological and psychosocial behavior. It would no longer be necessary to think of affection, anxiety, or the prestige goal-



responses as being of a different *order* from those which are presumably controlled by the central nervous system. Failure to learn the required social controls, as well as emotional blocks to learning would also be dealt with under such a theory of learning, which must face the problems of both the socially adaptive and maladaptive roles of anxiety in learning.

Whatever the psychological nature of the prestige responses may be, it seems clear that all forms of status and rank in our society are maintained by the enforcement of biological, emotional, and social privileges. Any physical, geographical, or social pattern may be used at times to symbolize prestige relationships. A child's hair is cut differently from an adult's, and a male's from a female's; in Mississippi, a lower-class Negro's hair is cut and dressed in a style quite unlike that chosen by upper-and upper-middle-class Negroes. An adult sits at the head of the dinner table, a child on the side; the parent's rank is likewise symbolized by his use of the front or master bedroom in middle-and upper-class homes. Lower-class status is expressed geographically by residence "across the tracks," or in the hollows, flats, and most dilapidated housing areas in cities, and on impoverished or tenant lands in the country. In most low-status churches, women are kept from the pulpit and chancel in regular religious services. Language is also employed to symbolize rank; certain phrases and tones are forbidden to children by adults, to Negroes by whites in the South, and to lower-class persons by those of high-class positions. Clothes symbolize not only age and sex rank, but also class position; houses and automobiles express in part class status. Likewise—occupational, financial, associational, and recreational behavior are partly ordered by age, class, and caste in America, and to a lesser degree by sexual status.

Like other social hierarchies, age, sex, and class position give rise to socially controlled antagonisms between the levels of the hierarchy. Patronage, protection, and mastery are the socially prescribed behavior of the superordinate to the subordinate. Deference, compliance, and minor types of sabotage are the behaviors permitted to inferiors in their relationships with superiors in each of these hierarchies. Biological, emotional, and social rewards and punishments maintain the relative privileges of the ranked groups. As socialization proceeds, these controls are internalized as adaptive forms of anxiety. This socially approved anxiety of the child may be an instigation either to strive for the appropriate behavior, or to flee from the unrewarded or punished behavior with regard to age, sex, or class roles.

The child's learning of that behavior which is appropriate to his age and sexual status is motivated not only by social instigations, but also by the emotional interaction between him and his parents and siblings. The history of these affective identifications and hostilities determines the ease with which the age-sex behavior and evaluations are acquired.

For example, the internalization by the child of the feeding, exploratory,

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property-respecting, cleanliness, and genital controls is a process which leaves both cultural and affective marks upon the organism. In this process, the social realism and psychic ease with which the age-sex roles are learned seems to depend upon the degree of adaptive or maladaptive striving for parental and sibling roles which the child experiences. The strength of the child's emotional identifications in the age-sex hierarchy of the family is as critical as the biological and social reinforcements in his learning of the cultural requirements.

Age-subordination, which most individuals in our society must learn to accept in economic and social relationships until relatively late in life, theoretically would appear an especially difficult adaptation for the first, or only, child to make. During the first eighteen months of life, a child in any birth-position appears to accept the mother as omnipotent and to depend upon her almost entirely for his biological and emotional nurture. When feeding, cleanliness, and other types of training are required by the infant of this age, they must necessarily be instigated and maintained without the aid of prestige motivation. At the very early age in our society when most infants are required to attempt such learning, the age-prestige motivation of "acting like a big boy or girl" or "acting like Daddy or Mother" cannot yet be effective. As they grow older, however, children with siblings near them in age have constantly before them the goal of the older siblings' behavior to pace them in learning the appropriate age-sex behavior. The only child, the first child, or a child separated by about six years from his nearest sibling on the other hand, has to face a tremendously steep age-barrier. In some instances, the only or first child is stimulated constantly by his parents to strive for adult privileges. Since the only child has no siblings to break the impact of parental stimulation, nor to serve as therapeutic targets for aggression displaced from the parents, his goals are often set too near the adult level.

A child in this position and family-type also faces added pressure to achieve, for he is the class banner-carrier of the family in the next generation. If in addition, the family is attempting to increase its rank in the class system, the first or only child is most likely to be overstimulated. At the opposite pole is the child who, owing either to "spoiling" or to excessive parental dominance, does not strive for the increasingly complex age-typed behaviors. One result of such extreme parental love-demands or of over-protection is to intensify the age-subordination of the child, and to fix life-long marks of child-status upon his behavior. This consequence seems more likely if the child in question has no siblings near his own age from whom he obtains prestige responses.

Competition for the parents' favor and care (which is the essential factor in rivalry between children in the same family) likewise is expressed through the system of age-privileges. Each sibling has a stake to defend in this strug-

gle and therefore has a real source of anxiety. To "beat the game" of age-privileges with one's siblings is to win evidence of parental favor, acceptance or protection, greater than one's age-role permits. In lower-class families, such competition appears to be moderated by the custom of entrusting the parental role to an older child. Usually each child thus receives his turn to act as parent-surrogate to a younger child. A weak form of this hostility-reducing relation exists as a device in middle and upper-class families, by which the older sibling is allowed to assume minor care and supervision of a younger sibling, or is told, "This is your baby."

The problem of securing to the child in our society an adequate level of aggression for later adult life appears to center in the early management of age roles and privileges in his relationship to parents and siblings. As the child moves upward in the age-hierarchy, his social clique and school, as well as his familial relationships, define the appropriate age behaviors and evaluations. These family, clique ("gang," "peer," or "bunch") and school roles are psychologically maintained by sanctions which instigate the child toward the allowed prestige goals, and penalize inappropriate age participation. Within the family, biosocial privileges such as food and sweets, clothes, a room to one's self, an allowance, lunch money, courting and sexual exploration, use of the automobile, etc., are age-typed. Forms of play are likewise age-graded by both the family and the child's clique.

The school is our most thoroughly age-graded institution. With compulsory promotion now operating in most public school systems, we have a form of automatic, involuntary age-grading which has had few parallels in primitive societies. In the social life of the elementary or secondary school pupil, great differentiation in rank and clique behavior exists between groups separated by only one or two age-grades. Caroline Tryon has described by quantitative methods the very marked variations in social personality roles and recreational patterns among adolescent school children in Berkeley, according to narrow age-gradations.

Probably as a result of the history of their identification with, and competition for, the parents, children differ with respect to their adaptation to the age-hierarchy of the family and larger society. Some accept the required role, others strive vigorously for the privileges of a higher age-group, and still others flee downward from the appropriate age-demands to an earlier level. The child who pushes hard against the system of age-rank, fighting by cunning and aggression for the privileges of older siblings or parents is likely to meet especial difficulty in the adolescent period. At this time, when he is maturing very rapidly in sexual and physical status, he excessively resists the subadult status which society fixes upon him by economic, sexual, and educational subordination. When such upward age-striving children are also basically aggressive toward a parent, they would be expected to rebel fiercely against subadult status in adolescence. Individuals

of this type are probably more likely than are those who either accept or flee downward from their age-status, to strive also for participation with a social class higher than that of their parents. In this upward class striving, they can subordinate the parent by acquiring etiquette, or educational and occupational symbols which the society recognizes as superior to those of the parents.

With regard to age-roles, it is also interesting to notice that in relationships between the color castes in the South, or between lower-class and upper-class individuals of the same color group, the individual of subordinate rank is treated as if he had child status. White servants, for example, as well as almost all Negroes, are called by their first names by the high-status whites; a Negro man, furthermore, is called "boy" and a Negro woman "girl" by most whites.

Sex-typing of behavior and privileges is even more rigid and lasting in our society than is age-typing. Indeed, sexual status and color-caste status are the only lifelong forms of rank. In our society, one can escape them in approved fashion only by death. Whereas sexual mobility is somewhat less rare today than formerly, sex-inappropriate behavior, social or physical, is still one of the most severely punished infractions of our social code.

In most familial, occupational, and political structures the male is trained for the superordinate roles while the female is restricted largely to subordinate positions. As in other types of inferior social rankings, however, the female position allows a certain degree of chronic aggression, sabotage, and cleverness against the superior rank. The modes of expressing personality traits such as fear, aggression, and affection are also socially typed for sex. The sexual role and personality are trained by the family and school, through their insistence upon sex-appropriate language, clothes, hairdress, gait, pitch and intonation of voice, play, recreation, and work. For most of these sex-appropriate behaviors there is certainly no biological basis of sex-linked traits.

Our understanding of the processes by which sex-appropriate or inappropriate behavior is established is made especially difficult by the early presence of biosocial sexual instigations in the child. There is evidences in clinical and exploratory studies of children, however, to suggest that the child's imitation of a sex-role is functionally related to (1) his early genital training, (2) his learning of the out-marriage rule of the family, and (3) the relative strength of his cross-sex and same-sex identifications with parents. It is certain, moreover, that in middle-class child training the sexual impulses are still heavily tabooed. The degree of severity or abruptness in parental controlling of the sexual impulses seems partly to determine the child's adjustment to the sex-role.

This penalizing of the sex drive itself is intensified in those families where the child is pressed to assume the appropriate sex-role too early or too com-



pletely. Parents who are anxious concerning their own sex-typing are likely to overemphasize those controls upon the child. The learning of sex-appropriate behavior also depends upon whether the child's imitation of the same-sex parent is motivated by the effort to escape constant punishment and disfavor, or by positive reinforcements of acceptance and prestige. If he fails to imitate more fully the same-sex parent, owing either (1) to that parent's failure to reward him, or (2) to the cross-sex parent's greater power, or fuller acceptance, the child is likely to reveal the marks of inappropriate sex-typing.

The sexual role, which is first defined by the early family training of the child, is in successful cases greatly strengthened by the sex-typing controls to which he is subjected later. In his social clique, his school, and his formal organizations, the child gains prestige if he learns the sex-appropriate code, rituals and goals, but meets extreme social—and at times physical—punishment if he does not. Sexual segregation not only is maintained in most kinds of play until full adolescence, but also in the school and church, especially in lower-class environments. In the white or Negro lower-class in the South, men and women 70 years of age, as well as children, are segregated spatially in church or lodge meetings.

In American as in most societies, the crucial definition of the sex-appropriate role is made at adolescence. The study of Berkeley adolescents by Tryon, previously referred to, indicates that the earlier physical and social maturation of adolescent girls leads to rather serious adjustment problems for the boys of the same age-grade. For a time, sex roles appear to be reversed, but in a year or two the normal adult patterns usually are established. This research leads one to question whether the actual roles of males and females at different periods in childhood and adolescence may not be quite different from the unchanging dichotomy which we popularly assume.

Within broad limits, the expected behavior of age and sex groups in our society differs according to their social class. Within the lower class in Mississippi, for example, white or Negro preadolescents and women usually smoke, drink, or curse in public without meeting punishment from their family or clique. The corresponding age and sex groups in the lower-middle class, on the other hand, are forbidden such behavior. Age-sex roles in farm and house work, in family discipline and child-rearing, in school, and in church likewise differ according to class.

A social class system restricts intimate participation to a limited group within a society, above and beyond the age-sex restrictions. Social class relationships are extensions of intimate clique and family relationships; they limit participation where the basis of a *pattern* of traits (such as family rank, plus occupation, plus education, plus manners, plus clothes, plus language, etc.), all of which are differentiated according to rank in the class hierarchy. By defining the group with which an individual may have inti-

mate clique relationships, our social class system narrows his training environment. His social instigations and goals, his symbolic world and its evaluation are largely selected from the narrow culture of that class with which alone he can associate freely.

A child's social learning takes place chiefly in the environment of his family, his family's social clique, and his own social clique. The instigations, goals, and sanctions of both the family and of the intimate clique are a function principally of their class ways, that is, of *the status demands in their part of the society*. The number of class controls and dogmas which a child must learn and struggle continually to maintain, in order to meet his family's status demands as a class unit, is great. Class training of the child ranges all the way from the control of the manner and ritual by which he eats his food to the control of his choice of playmates and of his educational and occupational goals. The times and places for his recreation, the chores required of him by his family, the rooms and articles in the house which he may use, the wearing of certain clothes at certain times, the amount of studying required of him, the economic controls to which he is subjected by his parents, indeed his very conceptions of right and wrong, all vary according to the social class of the child in question.

Our knowledge of social class training and of the biological and psychological differentials in child development as between class environments is now sufficient to enable us to say that no studies can henceforth generalize about "the child." We shall always have to ask, "A child of what class, in what environment?" Very few of the statements which one might make concerning the physical growth, the socialization, or the motivation of lower-class children, for example, would hold for upper-middle-class children, even in the same city.

Class ways in child training, as well as the class-motivating factors in the child's social learning, differ sharply even when the observer considers only the classes having low status. The social instigations and goals of the lower-middle class, for example, are fundamentally unlike those of the lower class. In education, the ineffectiveness of middle-class sanctions upon the great masses of lower-class children probably is the crucial dilemma of our thoroughly middle-class teachers and school systems. The processes underlying this failure are not yet clear but it seems probable from life histories that lower-class children remain "unsocialized" and "unmotivated" (from the viewpoint of middle-class culture) because (1) they are humiliated and punished too severely in the school for *having the lower-class culture* which their own mothers, fathers, and siblings approve, and (2) because the most powerful reinforcements in learning, namely, those of emotional and social reward, are systematically denied to the lower-class child by the systems of privilege existing in the school and in the larger society.

The culture which the child brings to school with him has been in-

stilled by the class environment of his family and his intimate associates. Except in the case of class-striving families and children, this culture is maintained by this same status-bound class world, undergoing relatively slight modifications from classroom instruction. In the middle-class family and environment, it is true, the teacher meets support for her methods and goals in child training. If she is to pit herself against the lower- or upper-class child and family, who are from a quite different culture, however, she and the school administration have need for socially more skillful methods and less ethnocentric, middle-class bias with regard to manners, aggression, and recreation than they now reveal.

For in all these last named patterns of behavior, child training in the lower class and lower-middle class which have been selected here for illustrative purposes, differ markedly. In the lower-middle class, parents exert a strenuous and unrelenting push to motivate their children to study their lessons, to repress aggression at school, to inhibit sexual impulses, to avoid lower-class playmates, to attend Sunday School regularly, to avoid cabarets, beer parlors, pool parlors, and gambling houses. They keep steadily before the child, often in the face of economic disaster, the status goals of a "nice" play group and social clique, a high-school education, skilled or white-collar occupation, and a "good" middle-class marriage.

In lower-class white or Negro society, on the other hand, a child lives in a different cultural environment; he is surrounded by people who have habits quite different from those of the lower-middle class, and who make other demands and set different goals before him. Among lower-class urban whites in the South, for example extramarital partnerships are common for both husband and wife; separations are the rule; fighting, shooting, cutting, gambling, and frequently magic are accepted classways; church and lodge participations scarcely exist. With regard to sex, education, occupation, recreation, and marriage, the goals which the lower-class family, white or Negro, sets before the child are basically unlike those in the lower-middle-class family. This difference is greatest in those areas of behavior which middle-class society most strongly controls, i.e., aggression, sex responses, and property rights.

As the middle-class child grows older, the effective rewards in maintaining learning are increasingly those of status; they are associated with the prestige of middle- or upper-class rank and culture. The class goals in education, occupation, and status are made to appear real, valuable, and certain to him because he actually begins to experience in his school, clique, and family life some of the prestige responses. The lower-class child, however, *learns* by *not* being rewarded in these prestige relationships that the middle-class goals and gains are neither likely nor desirable for one in his position. He discovers by trial-and-error learning that he is not going to be rewarded in terms of these long-range, status goals, if he is a "good little boy," if he

avoids the sexual and recreational exploration available to him in his lower-class environment, or if he studies his lessons. In this learning, he is often more realistic than his teacher, if one judges by the actual cultural role which the society affords him.

In order to motivate the great masses of lower-class children who crowd our elementary and secondary schools so that they will learn the educational and technical skills, the sexual and aggressive controls, and the manners which will enable them to gain higher privileges and greater social and economic efficiency, educators must first know lower-class culture and understand the instigations and goals of the lower-class child. If these old habits and reinforcements of the lower-class child are to be replaced by new learning which will enable the school to recruit the child into the middle-class way of life (with an attendant increase in the social and economic efficiency of our society), the school must (1) remove the class punishments from the lower-class child within the school society and (2) concretely reward his tentative striving for prestige in the school community. The striving which the middle-class pupil exhibits is driven by socially adaptive forms of anxiety, learned in his class world. As yet, it seems, our society must depend upon this process for maintaining the long-range instigations which effective socialization in the high-skill roles demands. In order to reinforce the lower-class child in such striving, the teacher and social worker must learn to reward him. To be capable of this type of education, they must be able to view their own middle-class status and culture with a wholesome degree of objectivity.

#### COMMENT

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Much of this paper will find general agreement; space for detailed criticism is lacking here.<sup>1</sup> The following paragraphs aim, therefore, merely to advance certain reservations concerning the basic approach in Mr. Davis' paper and to point out some further implications of certain facts noted by him.

The attention which this paper has given to "biopsychological" considerations warrants some comment. In the analysis of status systems, biological factors are of interest as limiting or facilitating conditions of behavior, and reference points for it. For studies on the institutional level, motivation is not a central problem; the same common-human impulses may operate through very different social systems. Behavior is far more specific than its so-called biological instigations. This fact prescribes caution in any tendency to interpret cultural factors as somehow "secondary" to generic "biopsychic" motivations.

Institutional forms control a general nexus of behavior; they do not completely determine concrete activity. In analyzing status systems and socialization, it is possible to focus either upon these *institutional* factors (i.e., the structure of moral norms with their accompanying sentiments and sanctions), or upon the "psycho-

<sup>1</sup> Condensed from the statement read when the paper was delivered.

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social" interactions through which norms are inculcated. The latter approach, however, involves a relative lack of attention to the functional interrelationships of status systems themselves. Differing modes of socialization are not only *associated with* various status systems but this socialization is to a significant degree oriented to, and *integrated with*, these functional interrelations. The relation of the kinship unit to social stratification will serve as an example. "The family" is a unit of social solidarity and in certain relations to other groups is *identified as a unit*: for some purposes all members are "treated alike." The *initial* status of the child is always that of his family. For this and other reasons, the whole tendency of the family is to transmit its class position to the child, and this tendency is bound up with the very existence of the family as we know it.<sup>2</sup> There can be little doubt, for example, that our "small family" system is functionally related to high social mobility and to the widespread pressures for social ascent.

Mr. Davis has presented a description of differences among social classes.<sup>3</sup> This descriptive approach, however, fails to make specific the relation of differing modes of socialization to the social structure as a whole. The mechanism whereby a status system (or, more generally, a social order) is maintained and perpetuated is that of the cultural patterning of attitudes (affects) in the direction of conformity with the going system of positions and by the establishment of emotional reactions against violations of the appropriate patterns. Through the process of socialization in family, clique, school, playgroup, and so forth, the institutions of a society are perpetuated in their personality correlates. Certain aspects of this phenomenon have been referred to in terms as seemingly diverse as Freud's "Super-ego," Durkheim's "moral obligation," George Herbert Mead's "me," and Kardiner's "basic personality structure."

In a highly integrated society, the clusters of attitudes culturally sanctioned as appropriate to various social positions are *reciprocally* accepted, e.g., evaluations of rank tend to be accepted at all positions along the scale. In complex and changing societies, this common orientation becomes tenuous and conflicting and ambiguous evaluations appear. The family in our social structure tends to disrupt itself by actively encouraging social ascent. The fact that training appropriate to the *initial* status of the child is therefore not appropriate to his later real or desired position sets up strains of considerable proportions. This is a crucial problem relative to Mr. Davis' discussion of the school in relation to stratification. Whether or not the goal of raising all "lower classes" into "middle classes" is accepted is a matter of value judgment, but as the preceding remarks imply, not all of the consequences of such a process may be desirable in terms of other social values. Certainly present classes are based largely (although by no means entirely) on occupational achievement and certainly the nature of the occupational structure is such that only a few positions are open at the "top." Indeed, it is in the nature of a system of stratification that persons are subject to *differential* evaluation.<sup>4</sup> Hence, the higher ambition is in general, under conditions of limited opportunity, the higher will be the level of mass frustration. This is a different matter, of course, from that of the *criteria* of rank.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. C. C. North, *Social Differentiation*, 257-258, Chapel Hill, N.C., 1926.

<sup>3</sup> The criteria used in specifying classes are not explained. At least three major bases for this delineation may be distinguished: (1) the symbols and criteria of rank; (2) associational patterns; (3) evaluative consensus in the relevant social system. The last is particularly important since societal integration is so largely on the level of evaluation. When the actual rank-order of evaluation is placed against (1) and (2) above, it is possible, by means of comparative studies, to isolate modes of variation.

<sup>4</sup> See T. Parsons, "An Analytical Approach to the Theory of Social Stratification," *Amer. J. Sociol.*, May 1940, 841-862.

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Here is an area of tension between the universalistic tests of personal qualities and achievements and the particularized criteria of "race," birth, group membership.

It has been stated that social class relationships are "extensions of intimate clique and family relationships." Undoubtedly, there is an interlacing web of clique relationships which spreads throughout the social system, but clique, friendship, kinship and caste relations are in certain respects different from class positions *in so far as* these latter are oriented to a competitive order in the occupational structure. In particular, caste and kinship patterns are *ascribed*<sup>5</sup> in relation to biological reference points. All the relations mentioned above are functionally diffuse rather than specific as are occupational patterns. They are *particularistic* relations,<sup>6</sup> i.e., within broad limits, they are oriented to *who you are* rather than to *what you have* or *what you do*, or can do. Evaluations of rank based on occupational achievements as a dominant criterion are more nearly ruled by universal tests. No better place to observe the strains engendered by lack of integration between the norms of achieved versus ascribed statuses, between universalistic versus particularistic criteria of status, is to be found than in the case of Negro-White relationships. Evaluations on the basis of personal achievements and qualities, even when associated with the culturally accepted symbols of rank, tend to be blocked by the caste barrier. The result is the emergence of two relatively autonomous systems of class.

The "lack of motivation" of the lower-class child in our educational system illustrates the fact that class and caste controls are much more subtle and go deeper than any mere question of "formal opportunity." Differential expectations of behavior and differential channelization of desires account for considerable stability in rank-position even in a formally open class system. A fundamental field of research lies in the analysis of status-mobility in terms of the ambiguous and conflicting normative definitions which are known to be associated with certain types of class circulation.

Specific analyses of various emotional patterns in their social contexts are beginning to fill in one of the major gaps in sociological knowledge. The paper discussed here has made an informative and suggestive contribution to this developing area of research.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. the discussion by Ralph Linton, *The Study of Man*, 113-131, New York, 1936.

<sup>6</sup> See T. Parsons, "The Professions and Social Structure," *Social Forces*, May 1939, 457-467.

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## WHAT ARE SOCIOLOGICAL PROBLEMS?<sup>1</sup>

GEORGE A. LUNDBERG

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AS A PARTIAL ANSWER to the question posed by the title, I shall examine three projects recently completed or under way. Although there is also much other excellent work going on, these projects are especially clearcut examples of what some sociologists today consider sociological problems. They are also examples of what seems to me a profitable method of approach to such problems as they are related to the development of sociological theory. The first is a very limited and specific problem; the two others are of increasing broadness of scope pointing toward more comprehensive sociological theory.

*Stouffer's Theory of Mobility and Intervening Opportunities.* The sociological aspects of the distribution and movement of people in geographic space long has attracted the curiosity of students. A vast amount of folklore and commonsense knowledge has accumulated and is in daily use. Every real estate broker and storekeeper knows something about the behavior of people in this regard, nor is it necessary to review the general hypotheses or theories on which ecologists are largely agreed. Rather, I will review a brilliant attempt at verification of one of these theories by rigorous scientific methods—the respect in which sociological theories are at present weakest. I refer to the study presented by S. A. Stouffer before the 1939 meeting of the American Sociological Society.<sup>2</sup>

The specific problem which Stouffer set himself was to discover *the way* in which distance operates to determine the distribution of people's movements. Obviously, distance operates in many ways. The broad generalization that "most people go a short distance, few people go a long distance" still leaves unanswered the interesting sociological questions as to who does each under stated conditions and why. A mere catalog of all the individual answers that might be made to this question would yield little of general scientific interest unless these various answers can be generalized under some concept or concepts which will serve as an organizing principle. This principle should be of such generally valid character as to apply to such disparate examples as the movement of one man from one place to another to commit crime and the movement of another to marry a particular spouse. Both of these cases and an indefinite number and variety of others thus become merely *special cases* of an explicit sociological law. Consider, for example, the triumph, from the scientific point of view, of a field of knowl-

<sup>1</sup> A condensation of the essay presented to the Division on Social Theory of the American Sociological Society, Chicago, Illinois, December 27, 1940.

<sup>2</sup> Samuel A. Stouffer, "Intervening Opportunities: A Theory Relating Mobility and Distance," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, 5: 845-867, Dec. 1940.

edge in which events as "different" as the flight of a bullet, the falling of a feather, and the swing of a pendulum are understood through the same unifying principle or law of physics, under which each of these unique events and a multitude of others are considered merely as special cases of the same law. To find such unifying principles governing social phenomena is surely the sociological problem *par excellence*.

We approach this task in sociology as in other sciences first with an hypothesis or a theory, but to be scientifically valuable, these *theories must be so stated as to be susceptible of verification in particular concrete cases*. It is in this respect that most past theories have been defective. As Clark Hull has said:

... scientific theory in its best sense consists of the strict logical deduction from definite postulates of what should be observed under specified conditions. If the deductions are lacking or are logically invalid, there is no theory; if the deductions involve conditions of observation which are impossible of attainment, the theory is metaphysical rather than scientific; and if the deduced phenomenon is not observed when the conditions are fulfilled, the theory is false.<sup>3</sup>

Now, how did Stouffer approach his problem with these considerations in mind? First, he introduced as a basic organizing concept to account for the general tendency toward certain types of spatial patterns of population, the theory of *intervening opportunities*. Secondly, he deduced by rigorous and operational logic what one would expect to find in a particular case if the theory is valid. Thirdly, he painstakingly subjected the theory to the most objective and thorough empirical test *in a particular case*.

It is unnecessary to give a full account of Stouffer's procedure, since his paper is readily available. This too brief summary also must omit the important reservations and qualifications with which the author has carefully hedged both his procedures and conclusions. Bearing this in mind, I begin with a brief quotation:

The theory here proposed and studied empirically assumes that there is no necessary relationship between mobility and distance. Instead, it introduces the concept of *intervening opportunities*. It proposes that the number of persons going a given distance is directly proportional to the number of opportunities at that distance and inversely proportional to the number of intervening opportunities. Another way of stating the same hypotheses is that the number of persons going a given distance is directly proportional to the percentage increase in opportunities at that distance.<sup>4</sup>

Then he states the theory in a simple mathematical equation.

Obviously, a crucial question in the application or testing of this theory is the definition of "intervening opportunities." Stouffer has recognized this. It is here that a summary is most likely to do him injustice because of the

<sup>3</sup> C. L. Hull, "The Conflicting Psychologies of Learning—A Way Out," *Psychol. Rev.*, Nov. 1935, 42: 512-513.

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, 846. The reader is urged to read pages 847, 856, 865-867, for a more complete statement.

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great care and ingenuity with which he has dealt with this point. What Stouffer says about the definition of "intervening opportunities"<sup>6</sup> will be true of all sociological definitions if they are to be scientifically precise and useful. For many decades, John Dewey has emphasized the speciousness of an arbitrary distinction between what we know and the methods by which we know it. The instrumentalism of Dewey here merges with the view which is increasingly taken for granted in modern contemporary science.<sup>6</sup> This fact, so admirably illustrated in Stouffer's paper, is also the reason for the great significance of Dodd's work, to be mentioned later.

It is not my purpose to defend the theory proposed. I merely call attention to it as an excellent example of how one sociologist has defined a sociological problem, formulated a general theory regarding it, and then proceeded to verify it rigorously in a particular case. The empirical data submitted by Stouffer confirms his theory with a degree of precision that is astonishing. Extensive further test is, of course, necessary before the more general validity of the theory can be asserted. Stouffer's work is not just another study of mobility in Cleveland; its real significance is methodological and theoretical, i.e., scientific. Its local and practical aspect is the merest incident and byproduct as compared with its broader scientific implications. By virtue of its attention to an explicit statement of theory, unmistakable definition of terms, and objectivity of verification, the study gives a possible system and backbone to future studies of this kind, which in time might result in a comprehensive body of systematized and verified knowledge regarding patterns of population distribution and movements in geographic space. Without such attention to theory, definition, and verification, innumerable studies may be made in the future as in the past on this general subject, without yielding any of that growing increment of tested theory which, when verified, constitutes scientific fact.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> *Op. cit.*, 846-847. "The definition as used cannot be completely understood except in terms of the unfolding statistical operations" (page 865).

<sup>6</sup> "It may be further noted that the distinction between the object investigated and the instrument of investigation as two essentially different elements of a given experiment is not very essential from the positivistic point of view, but is merely a matter of convenience. What is immediately experienced (the "Erlebniss" of the positivists) is a combination of the two; the object, an aggregate of atomic or molecular systems, is never experienced by itself while statements about its constitution and behavior are being verified; and this, for the positivist, is the deciding factor. The trend of modern atomic physics, moreover, is such that it is very difficult, during the act of observation, to separate the object of observation from the observing instrument; the act of observation consists rather in an interaction between the two. The fact that both classical and quantum laws must be used in the description of any given experiment does not assure an independent existence to the object either, since without the instrument, certain features of whose behavior follow classical laws, it is impossible to verify the quantum behavior of the object of investigation." See A. V. Bushkovitch, "Some Consequences of the Positivistic Interpretation of Physics," *Phil. of Sci.*, January 1940, 7: 100-101.

<sup>7</sup> The recent studies of F. Stuart Chapin should be cited in this connection: "Design for Social Experiments," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, Dec. 1938, 786-800; also, "An Experiment on the Social Effects of Good Housing," *Ibid.*, Dec. 1940, 868-879. See also, the admirable article by Delbert C. Miller, "Morale of College-trained Adults," *Ibid.*, 880-889.

I turn now to a somewhat different undertaking but one which recognizes the same essential pattern of inquiry as applied to a much more comprehensive project.

*The Cross Cultural Survey.* Anthropologists and ethnologists have been accumulating for many years a vast body of information chiefly regarding so-called simpler peoples. Sociologists as well as other social scientists have drawn heavily on this material for support of various theories they have put forward. The trouble has been that each author has tended to select what he needed to support his position, whereas the scientific method calls for just as much consideration of negative as of positive data. Serious scientists, earnestly trying to find from ethnological sources, the weight of evidence on a given theory, usually found an apparently hopeless disagreement among ethnologists according to the cultures with which they happened to be most familiar. If the discouraged scientist thereupon decided to survey the evidence for himself, he was confronted with a vast collection of descriptive literature in a form which did not permit a valid determination of general fact or even a preponderance of evidence on any point whatever. In short, this material in its present form has three conspicuous defects: (1) lack of a scheme of systematic classification; (2) lack of a well defined vocabulary insuring that similar phenomena would be called by the same name by different ethnologists studying the same or different cultures; and (3) lack of the general guiding influence of an explicit theory around which data could be organized meaningfully. These faults render this vast material largely useless for refined scientific use.

Recognizing this, a group of social scientists in the Institute of Human Relations at Yale organized what is known as the Cross-Cultural Survey. George P. Murdock has recently described this project.<sup>8</sup> Again, the reader must consult the published report to get its full significance. Suffice it to say that (1) a standard system of classification was formulated for the arrangement and use of the material to be collected, and (2) descriptive data on nearly a hundred cultures have been abstracted, classified, and filed. The practical value to scholars of such an organization of hitherto highly diffused and unorganized material is apparent, but far more important for my present purpose is the theoretical possibilities and objectives of this project. On this point, Murdock says:

... It is organized so as to make possible the formulation and verification, on a large scale and by quantitative methods, of scientific generalizations of a universally human or cross-cultural character. Sociologists and most other social scientists regard the establishment of generalizations or "laws," i.e., verified statements of correlations between phenomena, as their primary aim, but anthropologists tend to shy away from theory, as Kluckhohn has pointed out, and to confine themselves to historical rather than scientific interpretations of their subject matter. Nevertheless it seems premature to conclude that anthropology cannot be made a science

<sup>8</sup> "The Cross-Cultural Survey," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, June 1940, 5: 361-370.

until, using all known safeguards, we have made at least one serious and systematic attempt to formulate scientific generalizations about man and culture which will withstand a quantitative test. Anthropology has many objectives. That envisaged by the Cross-Cultural Survey is not intended to supplant the others, nor does it lay claim to greater importance. It is simply regarded as legitimate, promising, and opposed by no insuperable theoretical obstacles.

The plan rests, at bottom, on the conviction that all human cultures, despite their diversity, have fundamentally a great deal in common, and that these common aspects are susceptible to scientific analysis. . . .<sup>9</sup>

Murdock submits a list of seven basic assumptions which it is proposed to test. Any number of other or additional assumptions or theories could, of course, similarly be formulated and tested. I am not concerned with the particular assumptions set forth in Murdock's paper but rather with the procedure by which he proposes to test their validity. Space permits only the briefest summary:

The first methodological step will be the logical elaboration of hypotheses. From whatever source derived, . . . the hypotheses will be subjected to rigorous logical analysis and worked over into a series of basic postulates and testable theorems. . . .

The second step will be the verification of the theorems. A postulate can stand only if every theorem derived from it checks with the facts; if even a single one fails in this test, the postulate falls. The verification will be quantitative. . . .

The third step will be a critical analysis of the results from an areal or distributional point of view. . . . The fourth step will be a detailed examination of all exceptional or negative cases.<sup>10</sup>

This is one of the most promising statements of a scientific research program ever made in the social sciences. Its conformity to the procedure by which the notable triumphs of the other sciences have been attained needs hardly to be pointed out. Nor is this any accident. It was one of the fundamental purposes of the Institute of Human Relations to promote a closer relationship not only between the social sciences but between all the sciences. It has taken some time for this purpose to find concrete expression, but it is strikingly apparent in this project and the proposed methods. Numerous influences must be credited with this result. Not the least among them is the influence of one of the foremost of living psychologists, Clark Hull, who was originally trained in the physical and biological sciences. Largely through his efforts, the misconceptions about behavioristic psychology which still haunt some social scientists have almost disappeared from the Institute. This does not mean that the opponents of this view have been ignored, "abolished," or refuted as "wrong." It merely means that it has been possible to show that all of the things contended for by case-methodists, psychoanalysts, mentalists, and the defenders of the qualitative are readily translatable into a symbolism more suited to scientific manipulation. It is an experience sufficiently unique to merit comment, however, that at the

<sup>9</sup> *Op. cit.*, 364.

<sup>10</sup> *Op. cit.*, 369-370.

Institute a person of my views, for example, may talk on the same day with complete mutual understanding to prominent exponents of the case method, psychoanalysts, psychologists, anthropologists, and sociologists, without becoming embroiled in any argument at all about quantitative methods, operational definitions, the meaning of energy, correlation, the definition of knowledge as a form of organic response, and other such questions which often intrude into the written and spoken communications of sociologists. Of greater importance is the promise which this intellectual atmosphere of the Institute holds, not only for profitable formulation of sociological problems, but also for their solution. The Cross-Cultural Survey of the Institute of Human Relations is my second example of the scientific formulation of sociological problems.

*Dodd's Systematic Sociology.* Some of the difficulties that will be encountered in the program of the Cross-Cultural Survey will be anticipated by all who are familiar with concrete scientific work of the type contemplated. The classification of cultural materials, for example, will immediately raise the problems of objective and meaningful definitions of categories. This need will be most apparent in the proposed testing of hypotheses. The deductive operations from postulates and theorems will be successful largely to the degree that explicit statement and rigorous definition of terms is possible. The contemplated testing of hypotheses, to an increasing degree, will call for research of the type illustrated by Stouffer's project. Such studies as Stouffer's and the Cross-Cultural Survey are, of course, entirely compatible and complementary. Thus, the Cross-Cultural Survey might properly undertake that further testing of Stouffer's hypothesis—the need for which he has emphasized. In any case, the Cross-Cultural Survey, in the course of the verification of its stipulated assumptions inevitably will become involved in the problem of more adequate selection and definition of sociologically significant behavior segments which are today denoted by some common terms of folk language. In conclusion, therefore, I want to call attention to a study which in many ways resembles the Cross-Cultural Survey but which has devoted most of its attention to the definition of categories and the testing of their objectivity. I refer to the work of S. C. Dodd.<sup>11</sup>

Dodd's study was inspired largely by the same situation which suggested the Cross-Cultural Survey. That is, he was impressed by the plethora of vagrant and unrelated studies of social phenomena, many of them of great individual excellence but frequently bearing upon no explicit hypothesis or theory whatever.<sup>12</sup> Accordingly, Dodd undertook the task of classifying

<sup>11</sup> Stuart C. Dodd, *Dimensions of Society*, New York, 1941. (Delayed by the war but will appear in the autumn.) For a preliminary statement, see "A System of Operationally Defined Concepts for Sociology," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, Oct. 1939, 4: 619-634; also, "A Tension Theory of Societal Action," *Ibid.*, 56-77.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. G. A. Lundberg, *Foundations of Sociology*, 101-102, New York, 1940.

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these diverse materials under a system of operationally defined, comprehensive, mutually exclusive, precise, and parsimonious categories. Instead of the ethnological material with which the Cross-Cultural Survey chiefly is concerned, Dodd collected some 1500 examples of studies of social behavior in the form of graphs, maps, formulas, and paragraphs, which epitomized a great variety of studies and their interrelationships. Included in his collection of materials are all the materials of this kind which appeared in seven principal sociological journals for the years 1920-1936, and all of the quantitatively stated data from a dozen textbooks of sociology, statistics, and other social sciences, including such representative books as *Recent Social Trends*.

To reduce the selective bias in what is necessarily a sample of material, if a book or journal was used at all, *every* graph, table, etc., occurring in it was included. Such data are, of course, at present available for only a negligible proportion of all relevant social behavior and even the best of the material is highly irregular, discontinuous, and otherwise defective. Nevertheless, it affords at least illustrative data indicating the trend of inquiry and enables us to project ourselves for theoretical purposes, as Dodd has done, into a period when such data and indices will be very much more general and much more adequate than at present. It should be kept in mind that in assembling his samples of data, Dodd has been doing, in his own generation, what Spencer and Sumner did in theirs and what the Cross-Cultural Survey is doing with respect to ethnological data. That is, Dodd has selected from contemporary research material a great variety of samples of human behavior to serve as the types of data which an adequate sociological system must cover. The difference is that while Spencer, Sumner, and others dealt mainly with individual cases, Dodd deals for the most part with classes of such cases, already partly generalized. As this type of data becomes increasingly adequate, through such studies as Stouffer's, increasingly broad and comprehensive, as well as increasingly accurate, generalizations will become possible.

The extensive and varied material thus collected was next classified according to a scheme which differs somewhat radically from the conventional classifications of social phenomena found in textbooks of sociology and elsewhere. The reason for this is that Dodd's system aims rather to improve methodology systematically than to state immediately a system of generalizations about the behavior of societal phenomena. It is a systematic way of expressing societal data and not, directly, a system of the functionings of societal phenomena.

There are two things about Dodd's work which will greatly disturb the conventional sociologist. One of them is the symbols which he has found it necessary to adopt, and which, as I have argued elsewhere, tend to become necessary as the greater precision of scientific expression is sought.<sup>13</sup> Almost

<sup>13</sup> Cf. *Foundations of Sociology*, Chap. 2.

as disturbing to some will be the absence in Dodd's book of the familiar classifications of the material of sociology as found in introductory textbooks. That is to say, although such familiar concepts as "the family," "delinquency," "race," "disorganization," etc., are included and defined, they are not themselves regarded as functional categories for scientific purposes. Dodd's system classifies material according to the operations involved in the observation and definition of them (after the manner of the mature sciences) rather than in terms of their so-called "content." It should be noted here that a great many of the current classifications of social data have been dictated by the conveniences of current social work and administration rather than by the purposes of science. Both are justifiable, but they are not necessarily the same. Such categories as "the family," and "urban" and "rural" sociology, for example, are of the former type. Family behavior becomes for scientific purposes merely illustrative as special cases of a great variety of general social processes such as aggregation, distribution, duration, change, cooperation, conflict, etc., and of the organization of these activities into patterns, or functioning structures. This abstraction and generalization of *common aspects* of a great variety of phenomena is, of course, what concerns every mature science and sociologists from the beginning have been struggling in this direction. For example, Dodd's categories coincide to a considerable degree with those contained in Eubank's summary of the main categories of sociological theory.<sup>14</sup> Nevertheless, it doubtless will be shocking to many to find Dodd's charts and tables classified not according to whether they deal with American, European, or Chinese data, not according to whether they deal with crime, agricultural production, public health, war, religion, etc., but according to whether the particular aspect of a situation described is an illustration of a particular case of cooperating, accomodating, ameliorating, competing, etc., to use some of the concepts already common in sociological discourse. This dissection of concrete situations into more or less abstract aspects for the purpose of analysis is, of course, the common practice of every science. As Dodd has said:

Physics textbooks do not study "thunderstorms" all in one place. The principles of sound waves in thunder will be studied where sound is studied with operational techniques for such phenomena whether manifested in thunder or in an oratorio. The principles of electric charges are elsewhere grouped and the principles of light in another section, regardless of whether it occurs in lightning or in a searchlight. These principles may be combined to explain the thunderstorm as a whole, or they may be combined by the engineer to build a subway. But the principles are best studied as grouped by similarity of operation, not by content of application. Sociologists are still too much interested in social work, in *immediate* application of theory to societal situations, to realize fully that a longer perspective requires putting aside applications and first building up a body of several hundred concepts and principles which

<sup>14</sup> E. E. Eubank, *The Concepts of Sociology*, 78, Boston, 1932.

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are operationally defined by their statistical form (i.e., formulae) and general to any societal content. This is what this volume attempts to do.<sup>15</sup>

Dodd's work, then, does not submit at this stage a set of postulates from which theorems and corollaries about societal phenomena can be deduced. The equations which constitute the system are descriptive rather than calculative. They do not in themselves permit solution for unknowns without further data. The system rather aims to describe in operationally defined terms social situations, *any and all situations, as observed*:

It takes whatever data the observer records, good, bad, or indifferent, and describes in definite symbols the operational degree of precision of those data, tells how they may be classified and prepares them in standardized and parsimonious form ready for further manipulation, to discover deeper relationships in those data.<sup>16</sup>

In short, Dodd has confined himself for the present mainly to the first undertaking of the Cross-Cultural Survey, viz., the classifications of cultural materials and the operational definition of all categories used in such a classification. The details of that classification are, of course, beyond the scope of the present discussion. Suffice it to say that out of 332 terms in Eubank's "Selected Catalog of Terms Used as Concepts of Sociology as Found in the Literature of Sociological Theory,"<sup>17</sup> 23 percent have been precisely redefined by descriptive equations and 87 percent have been expressed operationally with an adequacy varying with the degree to which objective techniques (i.e., scales, etc.) exist for determining that which those terms denote. Three quarters of the list recommended as a standard set of sociological concepts by a committee of the American Sociological Society have had their definitions or descriptions improved in objectivity, precision, and measurability by Dodd's equations.<sup>18</sup> All of this is achieved through an ingenious compounding and combination of sixteen basic concepts, including what Dodd has called the four principal dimensions of social situations, viz., time, space, people, and their characteristics, together with twelve mathematical concepts for expressing aggregations, classifications, and correlations, as well as the four fundamental operations of arithmetic.

Finally, having worked out the principles of classification and applied them to the 1500 cases of sociological materials, the objectivity of the sys-

<sup>15</sup> *Dimensions of Society*, 11, New York, 1941. It may be remarked that while physicists do not study thunderstorms "as a whole" according to the above illustration, meteorologists do, and only by so studying not only thunderstorms but "whole configurations" of weather are weather predictions made. This is the old problem of the "general" as compared with the "special" sciences, e.g., physics *vs.* meteorology, *vs.* engineering, etc., biology *vs.* bacteriology, *vs.* zoology, *vs.* medicine, etc. Dodd proceeds on the assumption now quite common among sociologists, I think, that sociology is the "general" social science. See *Foundations of Sociology*, 92-98.

<sup>16</sup> *Dimensions of Society*, 18.

<sup>17</sup> *Concepts of Sociology*, 39-43, Boston, 1932.

<sup>18</sup> *Op. cit.* Chap. 12.

tem was experimentally tested by two other persons. The reliability of the classification was found to be from 93 percent to 99 percent depending upon the degree of precision required and the classifiers' familiarity with mathematical forms of expression. This is the only case known to me in which a proposed system of classification of sociological materials has been subjected to a test of similar rigor with results of such high reliability. Its fruitfulness as a tool of research in the advancement of sociology as a science can be determined, or course, only by its role in future research. A major consideration in that future of sociology, as of all science, however, unquestionably will be the comprehensiveness, parsimoniousness, precision, and the objectivity of the concepts with which it attempts to carry on. These characteristics of the concepts of a science are themselves the measure of the degree to which thought and knowledge itself have achieved the characteristics mentioned.

I have introduced this brief and inadequate account of Dodd's work because it seems to me strikingly complementary to the other two studies discussed. Far from representing an alternative or contradictory theory or method of procedure, it is almost an integral part of each of the others. The excellence of Stouffer's study, for example, rests largely upon the precision and operational definition of the terms in which he cast his problem. In this statement of his problem, Stouffer developed for his own purposes and his own case, definitions exactly of the type that Dodd has attempted to develop for a large list of other sociological concepts. In view of the resistance to any restatement of sociological terms in any symbols other than familiar folk words, it is worth noting that in spite of Stouffer's effort to avoid such expressions as far as possible in his theoretical statement of concepts and methods, he is nevertheless compelled to caution the reader that the general verbal formulations of his definitions "cannot be completely understood except in terms of the unfolding statistical operations." I suspect that as the Cross-Cultural Survey proceeds with its excellent program both in the formulation of its theorems and in their verification, they will have to set up numerous projects like Stouffer's. They will then have to wrestle with precisely the problem which Stouffer calls the hardest part of his study and to which Dodd has devoted himself.

In short, I find in the three projects reviewed a most interesting case of three people or groups of people of the highest competence working upon somewhat different but entirely complementary and supplementary aspects of an undertaking which proceeds from the same epistemological postulates and logic and according to a common method, all of them identical with those of the other sciences. The results, I am confident, will be the best answer to those who prefer in sociological investigations to rely chiefly upon a moribund dialectic. Projects of the kind reviewed will, I think, absorb the attention of an increasing proportion of sociologists, especially among the rising generation.

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*Conclusion.* I have reviewed three illustrations of how some men today define sociological problems and proceed with their solution. The methods employed necessarily rest on certain assumptions regarding the nature of knowledge, the nature of data, and the validity of certain processes of manipulating and reasoning about the data. I have set down in Part I of my *Foundations of Sociology* what I believe are these postulates, corollaries, and methods of reasoning. I have contended further that they are the same as those upon which all scientific work proceeds. I have supported that contention by ample citations from the works of accredited spokesmen as to what are the *present* accepted philosophical foundations of natural science.<sup>19</sup> Some sociologists find certain difficulties in these assumptions and express skepticism of their productivity and consequently, I suppose, of the type of research I have described, which unquestionably proceeds on the assumptions referred to.<sup>20</sup> That is the privilege of critics, but I do not find in their writings any explicit statement of what alternative postulates and methods they prefer and which they think will be more useful. I do not say that such alternatives cannot be stated. I merely say that in the whole literature of sociology, I do not find an explicit statement of such alternatives except in the publications of certain Catholic sociologists.<sup>21</sup> I have considerable re-

<sup>19</sup> It is necessary to emphasize that I am talking about the philosophy of post-Einsteinian natural science and not about the philosophy of science of the nineteenth century. It quite correctly has been observed by some (e.g., P. A. Sorokin, *Amer. J. Sociol.*, Mar. 1940, 795-796) that my position does not conform in some respects to certain nineteenth century conceptions of scientific theory. It has been erroneously assumed that this constitutes in some way a refutation of the views I have expressed. The following quotation from E. T. Bell (California Institute of Technology), may serve to clear up this misapprehension: "The *fundamentals* of the science which our century inherited from its predecessors have been *modified*, now slightly, now quite perceptibly, till our outlook on the physical universe today bears but little resemblance to that of only thirty years ago. Great and striking as these advances are, there has been another, more rapidly developed since 1930, which has been slowly gathering momentum for all of 2300 years, which is of far deeper significance for 'truth'—or Pilate's query—than any of the radical advances of science of the past thirty years. Being more fundamental, more radical, and simpler than any of the spectacular advances in science, naturally this new advance has escaped the notice which its far-reaching importance merits. Yet it is of profound significance for all theorizing and truth-seeking, scientific or other." *The Search for Truth*, 7-8, New York, 1934.

<sup>20</sup> Murdock is explicit (as is Dodd) on this point as regards objections to the theory of knowledge as a form of organic response. Speaking of his discussion of culture as "ideational," Murdock says: "From the point of view of behavioristic psychology, of course, an idea is merely a habit of a special sort, a tendency to react with implicit linguistic or symbolic behavior rather than with overt muscular responses. The underlying mechanisms e.g., of learning, are similar if not identical. Fundamentally, therefore, our fourth assumption should be subsumed under our first—that culture is learned—as a special case thereof. In view of the importance of symbolic, especially linguistic, behavior in man, however, it has seemed advisable to segregate the ideational point for separate exposition." *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, June 40, 5: 366.

<sup>21</sup> E. J. Ross, *Fundamental Sociology*, Milwaukee, 1939. The author sets forth the following postulates as "self-evident" or "satisfactorily established by experts in other fields." "The Catholic sociologist . . . does not regard sociology in the narrow positivistic sense, and in his work he presupposes the following, which he considers to be satisfactorily proved by philosophy, by historical events and documents, by revelation, and in other ways:

1. That God exists, who is the Creator of all things, man included;

spect for the frankness and consistency of the latter, for they recognize, at least, the necessity of stating explicitly a set of substitute postulates if one does not like those of natural science.

To be specific, if the postulate of knowledge as a form of organic response is objectionable, (a) what is a preferable substitute and what are its methodological implications? (b) What are the corollaries of this substitute as it affects concrete methods of inquiry? The latter is the only connection in which I have dealt with epistemological problems and have defended the assumptions and reasoning of natural science as being applicable to the social sciences. I have not denied and I do not need to deny that for certain *other* purposes, personal and esthetic, other postulates may not be preferable, at least to some people; but the purposes of science are not served by the personal convictions or "understandings" of the scientist himself. He must be able to communicate to others *how he knows* what he claims to know. Failure to realize and deal with this crucial difference between scientific and much other knowledge is perhaps at the bottom of most disputes about methods.

When someone comes forward with a tangible proposal of alternative postulates and methods, profitable discussion might be undertaken. It would be still better to undertake specific and similar problems from the two or more points of view to see which yields more effectively and efficiently the type of knowledge sought. Again, I call attention to the fact that I have recognized that possibly one set of assumptions may be most fruitful in yielding to some people certain kinds of personal and esthetic knowledge, whereas another set may be necessary for the impersonal and verifiable kind of knowledge which constitutes science.

I admit that some of the epistemological problems with which some theorists struggle with such earnestness are unquestionably crucial problems in the framework within which they elect to pursue them. I merely point out that in other frameworks, and notably that of natural science, these problems become what Bridgman has called meaningless questions.<sup>22</sup>

2. That Christ, the Son of God, established the Church to which He gave divine authority to guide men in matters related to their supernatural destiny;
3. That man has a spiritual soul which is immortal; hence he has an eternal destiny;
4. That man is endowed with a free will;
5. That man is not only subject to physical (necessary) laws, but also the moral law;
6. That man is a social being and has certain rights and duties which are common to all mankind." (Quoted from a review by R. K. Merton in *Amer. J. Sociol.*, May 1940, 5: 937.)

<sup>22</sup> P. W. Bridgman, *The Logic of Modern Physics*, 30 ff., New York, 1932. Take for example Znaniecki's statement that the postulate of knowledge as a form of organic response "can be substantiated only by assuming organisms-in-environment as *absolutely existing and known with absolute certainty*." (Italics mine. Unpublished paper presented at same meeting. See footnote 1.) Consider in this connection the followings statement from A. Eddington, *The Philosophy of Physical Science*, 155, New York, 1939: "It is a primitive form of thought that things either exist or do not exist; and the concept of a category of things possessing existence results

The difference of viewpoint on these matters is, I think, a common and perhaps an inevitable occurrence in the history of science. I should like to conclude with the following account of an analogous situation in another field:

One finds a similar attitude (i.e., antipositivistic) among many physicists whose career began when the quantum theory was not yet in existence; while the younger generation which has, scientifically speaking, grown up with the new ideas, almost automatically adopts some form of positivism. . . . There are some consequences of the positivistic view of physics, however, which appear not to have been sufficiently emphasized heretofore, but which, even though only dimly felt, are undoubtedly the cause of much of the opposition to the positivistic interpretation. This is the psychological fact that in this interpretation physics, and with it all exact natural sciences, become much less attractive, or one had perhaps better say, much less satisfying esthetically, to a mind conditioned by the scientific philosophy of the nineteenth century. . . . Heisenberg<sup>23</sup> has advanced the interesting view that every fundamental advance in science carries with it the giving up of the hope for a certain type of explanation; the solution, when obtained, appears disappointing and not at all the vivid and direct knowledge that was expected. Perhaps what has been said above is merely another instance of this process.<sup>24</sup>

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from forcing our knowledge into a corresponding form of thought." Znaniecki is quite right when he calls "insoluble" the questions which he poses regarding the postulates in question. He is right, too, when he says that adherents of the postulate ignore the questions he raises. That is, in my opinion, the only proper way to treat insoluble questions.

<sup>23</sup> W. Heisenberg, *Wandlungen in den Grundlagen der Naturwissenschaft*, Leipzig, 1935.

<sup>24</sup> A. V. Bushkovitch, "Some Consequences of the Positivistic Interpretation of Physics," *Phil. of Sci.*, January 1940, 7: 98, 99, 101, and 102.

## ARE THERE "PRINCIPLES" OF SOCIOLOGY?

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A CURSORY examination of course titles in departments of sociology reveals that very often "principles of sociology" is included in the curriculum—usually as one of the basic courses. Textbooks used in these courses, however, are very infrequently so titled and one examines their content in vain to find specifically designated "principles." While early sociological writers apparently felt free to set forth "laws" of sociology (most of which were called into question as soon as many empirical data were gathered), recent sociologists have become cautious to the point of implying that there are as yet no laws or even principles. Nevertheless, upon closer examination of textbooks, which state expressly no "principles" as such, there seems to be a high degree of agreement or implicit consensus regarding numerous principles.<sup>1</sup> In some cases, of course, "principles" are expressly referred to (e.g., Ogburn and Nimkoff's<sup>2</sup> "principle of cross fertilization" of culture or the "principle of continuity" of cultures, etc.) but in no textbook is there a consistent development of the subject matter in terms of a framework of related principles *stated as such*. It has appeared to the writer for some time that a number of principles are actually agreed upon by virtually all sociologists, each, however, being so overcautious lest he appear methodologically naive that in writing books he refrains from an express statement of the "principles of sociology." Academically as well as in its applied aspects, the subject would gain respect if its basic generalizations were stated in brief synoptical form so that they could be examined in the light of the empirical data pertaining thereto. At present, text materials are so written that the student is often confused by what appears to him to be a "vague" concoction of concepts, "studies," and textbook writers' "filler" in the form of "interesting illustrations" but without any specific statement as to what is being illustrated. The discipline which claims eventually, if not now, to be a science states few if any fundamental generalizations or "truths" of which it is apparently sure enough to set them forth as tentative principles. The sociological perfectionist usually counters that unless and until we have something more "definite" we should refrain from stating "principles."<sup>3</sup> What is frequently overlooked is that to wait for finality of

<sup>1</sup> The term *principle* is used here in a very general sense. Webster's dictionary defines it briefly as a "fundamental truth" regarding some phenomenon or group of phenomena, involving usually some relationship between phenomena.

<sup>2</sup> *Sociology*, New York, 1940.

<sup>3</sup> Lundberg's stimulating and penetrating discussion of "Sociological Laws," 113 ff., in his *Foundations of Sociology*, New York, 1940, should be studied carefully by anyone interested in sociological principles or laws. In the absence of sufficient research to validate what he apparently regards as real sociological laws (i.e., statements of statistical probabilities of occurrences under stated conditions), we shall have to rely *ad interim* on "tautological" statements



truth is foreign to the very essence of science; all scientific knowledge is inherently tentative and is "true" only within a particular space-time referent. Thus, there seems nothing inherently inconsistent between the position taken in this paper and that taken by the sociological perfectionist who of course is quite free to modify or delete any preceding principle as soon as he has the necessary empirical basis for so doing.<sup>4</sup>

The point of view taken by the writer, then, is (a) that sociology cannot expect to gain status as long as it remains a "principleless science"—a discipline which is apparently so unsure of itself that it hesitates to state unequivocally its fundamental propositions and (b) that there is now sufficient agreement upon a number of basic principles so that they can be set forth, labelled as such, and the corroborating evidence stated. To this end, we shall (1) list eighteen "principles of sociology" upon which we think there is already such a consensus. (2) No brief is held for their statement as here set forth. They are presented as "nominations from the floor." (3) Nor is it maintained that these eighteen principles are the *only* principles or even the *most important* ones. *There are doubtless many more, and some probably more basic than any of these eighteen.* All that is claimed is that they represent a start, that they call up the issue, and that if they are incorrect, they invite demolition. (4) To save space, the data and researches which support each principle will not be cited. It is assumed that they are common knowledge among sociologists. (5) "Sociology" will be construed rather generally and no apology is made for trespass into the domains of cultural anthropology or sociological psychology. (6) Concepts which have wide currency will be employed without definition in the statement of principles. (7) Some of these "principles" may appear to be obvious, but probably only so to sociologists. Intelligent laymen and beginning students of sociology regard some of them as startling innovations. Other sciences use elementary and obvious principles, e.g., "matter can be neither created nor destroyed."

Do sociologists agree, then, that the following are among the "principles" (used generally to include "hypotheses," "truisms," "laws," and "generalizations") of contemporary sociology to be used for *direct instructional purposes* in the *introductory course* in sociology?

1. When groups of people live in prolonged association, they develop and enforce standardized overt behavior patterns and ideological systems. ("Culture," "the superorganic," "the social heritage.")

2. Cultural phenomena can be studied by the scientific method. What the de-

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and truisms which are better than none. This seems especially important *to the beginner* in sociology who needs his attention focused on the relatively few basic principles of the subject. Otherwise he may emerge with a collection of half-understood concepts and a few quaint startling "facts" and the facetious observation that "sociology is the study of that which we already know stated in language (concepts) which we don't understand."

<sup>4</sup> Lundberg appears not to disagree with this view if I understood him correctly. See *ibid.*, 136 and 152 in his discussion of one of MacIver's "laws," although his view differs from mine in that he believes that "most of these laws are not in their present form susceptible of empirical verification." My position is, that we need principles which *can be* empirically tested, and that some such principles (perhaps "laws") are now existent.

tached observer may call "myths and superstition" is real to the person who regards it as "true" and as such, it has objective reality.

3. Some cultural practices are physiologically injurious to the people practicing them but are approved nevertheless.

4. Single biophysiological "needs" have widely divergent culturally approved modes of overt expression in different cultures.

5. The concepts of "right" and "wrong" are intra-cultural definitions and do not have intercultural applicability.

6. Logically inconsistent cultural patterns may and do coexist.

7. Every known people is ethnocentric.

8. The geographic (biophysical, "natural") environment does not determine what cultural practices will prevail; it does preclude certain practices but always permits numerous alternative adjustments.

9. Culture changes either by the addition or by the loss (rarely) of traits.

10. Culture changes at unequal rates at various times, in various areas, and in its various parts.)

11. Culture history is not marked by regular sequences of stages; the concept of stage is an artificial "construct" of the student of cultural history created only for purposes of study.

12. "Progress" is a cultural definition subject to the same content variations in time and space as are other cultural ideologies.

13. Man in all cultures is parasitic on culture; he could not now survive biologically without it.

14. The biological being ("the individual") is not "human" and can become so only by association with other humans.

15. Behavior regarded as "natural" and "human" is an intercultural variable subject to the same time, place, and content variation as other cultural definitions.

16. Abilities and capabilities (as distinct from potentialities therefor) are culturally defined and acquired.

17. "Society" and "individual" are inseparable except as abstractions; they are the discrete and collective aspects of the unity "human life"; neither exists without the other.

18. At each historical time, different degrees of complexity are found among the cultures of peoples belonging to the same race.

It is suggested that we need an American Sociological Society sponsored set of principles to be considered as basic to the introductory course to accompany the very useful set of concepts which was compiled some time ago. Together they should go a long way to demonstrate that there does exist an integrated "body of knowledge" called sociology (whether one cares to call it a "science" or not is not wholly relevant) upon which the professional sociologists agree (It is alleged that we "don't agree upon anything!") and which will give some idea to intelligent persons concerning just what it is that we do agree upon. Such an outline of principles would serve well as a focus or group of foci for the organization and presentation of the descriptive data and hypotheses of sociology.

Finally, this is not to be regarded as anything but a beginning—a pointing of a problem thought to be worthy of more discussion in the journals and in the conventions of sociologists. If the hoped-for discussion emerges, it is probable if not certain that the resultant consensus regarding "principles of sociology" will bear little resemblance to the above list.

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## AN EARLY AMERICAN THEORY OF THE STANDARD OF LIVING

L. L. BERNARD

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IT MIGHT seem surprising to find a Mississippi planter and lawyer back in the eighteen-forties and fifties writing intelligently and fundamentally about the standard of living, even placing his finger upon the essential elements to be considered and insisting over and over again upon the paramount necessity of an adequate standard, not only for whites, but also for Negroes. But such a person there was, and his name was Henry Hughes, who published the first book in the world to be entitled "sociology," and who quite modernly divided the subject into two aspects, theoretical and practical.<sup>1</sup>

The first end of society, he says, is the existence of all.<sup>2</sup>

This end is primary, capital, necessary, over-riding and supreme. All other ends are secondary, subordinate, and collateral. Subsistence ought to be warranted to all. Everything ought to be stopped till that is done. None ought to want the necessities of life. . . . Want is a high wrong; and starvation, murder to which every man in the community is accessory. Existence is the right of all.<sup>3</sup>

Deficient wages are the cause of want or poverty, he says,<sup>4</sup> and they must be made adequate. Excepting an imperfect economic system or an erroneously planned government, which may lie back of and produce inadequate wage payments, this is the only cause of poverty.

Hughes classified poverty functionally under three main headings, taking as his criterion the results of poverty rather than its cause. Evidently he uses this sort of a classification rather than the causal one because he is deeply concerned with the effects of social causes and by emphasizing the effects he hopes to create a sufficient public opinion to demand the removal of the causes.

There are three kinds of want [he says] (1) Unhealthy Want is that which causes unhealthiness. . . . It is from a deficiency of necessities for health of body. (2) Criminal Want is that which causes crime. . . . It is from a deficiency of necessities for health and strength of mind. (3) Mortal Want is that which causes mortality. Of these three kinds, the consequences are (1) Crime, (2) Disease, (3) and Death.<sup>5</sup>

It is the duty of society to eliminate, not merely to alleviate, all three of these forms of want or poverty.

An economic system which does not, as far as a system can, eliminate such want is . . . imperfect. This is its duty. For want wrongs. It is licentious. It is against liberty. It is disorderly. It is less than justice to some; and more than justice to others.

<sup>1</sup> Henry Hughes, *Treatise on Sociology, Theoretical and Practical*, Philadelphia: Lippincott, Grambo and Co., 1854.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 47.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 81.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 122.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 122-123.

Subsistence is what is always just. The moral theory of any economic system is the ASSISTANCE of all for the SUBSISTENCE of all.<sup>6</sup> Subsistence is fixed by nature; assistance is variable by art. Its variation, its adaptation, must be sufficient; because it is a matter not of choice but of duty. It is a duty of society. . . . Subsistence is the right, whatever be the duty, of all.<sup>7</sup>

Speaking of the present free labor system, as he calls it, he declares that it does not adequately protect the laborer.

The system is without warranties. . . . Its wages may accidentally be so high that capitalists will strike, fail, or circulate; or so low that laborers will strike, starve, or migrate. Laborers, working, able to work, and willing to work, may in this system be reduced to want.<sup>8</sup>

He goes on to point out the consequences of this poverty which, under our system, may handicap the laborer even in the midst of plenty. He says, This may be unhealthy want. They [the laborers] may not have sufficient necessities either to prevent or cure sickness. They may catch disease and starve for medicine. Nor this alone. They may be subject to criminal want. The obtention of their necessities may be crimes and misdemeanors. Lean laborers may turn to fat felons. Workmen in want may make peace-breakers in plenty. Nor this alone. Wages may vary below both unhealthy and criminal want. Laborers may suffer mortal want. This is simple starvation. It is an atrocious wrong. To permit one, is to commit the other. When society permits a man to starve, it commits the foulest possible crime. In this respect such a society is, then, not morally evil merely: it is morally heinous. It is a live murder-machine. It is an organized homicide. It kills its own children.<sup>9</sup>

Surely these are no uncertain words. It is evidently the belief of the author that there is no shortage of the means of subsistence in society. He is clear that he thinks the first care in production should be to see that everybody produces.<sup>10</sup> Society is not obligated to feed the poor and the hungry without a reciprocal obligation of these classes to labor for this subsistence. Under a properly regulated government, a properly organized society, "All classes are obliged to work. This general obligation is moral. The state is its obligor; and everybody its obligee."<sup>11</sup> It is true, of course, in our type of loosely ordered society, that laborers often are not able to find work. The capitalistic system in this sort of society is inadequate to provide work for all, because neither the supply of labor nor that of capital is properly regulated or adequately adapted to the needs of the situation.<sup>12</sup> Proper regulation of both labor and capital, both of the supply and of the use, is repeatedly emphasized by this writer as a means to secure an adequate subsistence and support for all.<sup>13</sup> The adjustment of labor and capital in order to avoid idleness,<sup>14</sup> strikes,<sup>15</sup> and want, and to secure the maximum service in goods

<sup>6</sup> Hughes never cites any other writer and it is therefore impossible to determine definitely the sources of his data and opinions, but this sentence sounds like a paraphrase of Saint-Simon.

<sup>7</sup> Henry Hughes, *op. cit.*, 123.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 144.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 144-145.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 98.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 165.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 127-129.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 98, 177, 183, 193 ff., 204, 213 ff., 261.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 129, 281-283, 285, 287.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 110, 285, 287, 290.



and satisfactions to all is also repeatedly advocated, and methods for such adjustment are discussed and described.<sup>16</sup> While these proposals are interesting and bear a close relation to our theme, they are so detailed and extended that a clear discussion of them would carry us beyond the intended limits of the present paper.<sup>17</sup>

While all must work in a properly ordered society in order to secure and guarantee the subsistence of all, the obligation is to be enforced differently upon different classes. While all should be morally obligated to labor, it will not be necessary to obligate all civilly. It even would be inexpedient and unjust ordinarily to require the capitalists or employers to work by law.<sup>18</sup> The fear of loss unless capital is properly employed is sufficient to keep the employers at work. He says,

Capital is naturally industrious. It enforces on the capitalist the obligation to labor; it is self-enforcing. Idle capital is loss; the capitalist loses its profits. If idleness is criminal, idle capital mulcts the capitalist for the crime. Loss of profits is a fine. Capital enforces its own duties. If in cumulation of this enforcement more is needed, it ought to be applied.<sup>19</sup>

Capitalists are also intelligent and will perceive their self-interest and be sufficiently motivated by it.<sup>20</sup> The manual labor classes, however, are not intellectual and can not be depended on to pursue their own best interests.<sup>21</sup> They must, therefore, be guided and even required by the state to make their proper and sufficient contribution to the means of subsistence and to public welfare.<sup>22</sup> In return for this civil compulsion to labor, the manual laborer must be guaranteed a normal standard of subsistence.<sup>23</sup> The author does, however, recognize that there may be cases in which an intelligent self-interest will not prove a sufficient motive to insure the labor of the employer. In such a case, he also must be required civilly to do his part.<sup>24</sup> All must work in order that all may exist. The proper rule is,

Consumption for all, from production by all. Idleness, mendicancy, and vagrancy, ought therefore to be eliminated. They are wrong. Idleness is a crime, and the dam of crimes. No subsister ought to be an idler. Everybody ought to work. Every man should be either a mentalist or a manualist. This should not be the State's intention only; it should be the State's obtention; . . . not its legislation, but its execution.<sup>25</sup>

Along with the obligation of everyone who is capable of labor to work goes also the right of everyone to a just share in distribution.<sup>26</sup> A just share "ought never to be less than a comfortable sufficiency of necessities for health and strength. Whatever is the maximum, that is the minimum."<sup>27</sup>

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 98 ff., 107, 162, 173, 177, 179, 182, 191 ff., 200 ff., 231, 261, 282-284.

<sup>17</sup> An analysis of these proposals will be published elsewhere.

<sup>18</sup> Henry Hughes, *op. cit.*, 165.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 195, 281-282. <sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 265, 279, 232-233, 288.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 87-88, 93, 173, 192, 265. <sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 196 ff., 204, 219, 281.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 195. <sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 204. <sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 281.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 120 ff., 148 ff., 179 ff., 201 ff., 214, 287-289. <sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 124.

Since distribution is properly through wages, this just minimum share in distribution implies a doctrine of minimum wages, and the author either states or implies it repeatedly.<sup>28</sup> While the author has no doubt as to the ability of society, or of the economic system of society, to provide everyone with a normal subsistence, he quite properly gives necessary articles of consumption the right of way over luxuries.<sup>29</sup> The working hours, as well as the standard of subsistence must also be fixed in order to insure justice to the manual workers.

The State makes the ordinances of work and wages. . . . They must conform to law, and not vary below the standard. For the quantity of work . . . civilly ordained, the wages civilly ordained are a warranted comfortable sufficiency of necessities for the health and strength of the whole class, during the efficiency and inefficiency of all.<sup>30</sup>

While the author emphasizes the obligation of all to work in order that they may share in the subsistence provided for all, he recognizes that there are certain persons and even classes who cannot produce as much as they consume. He says,

Subsistence is the first end of society. This is the subsistence of every member of society. It is not the subsistence of a part. It is not the subsistence of a class. It is the subsistence of every class; or a comfortable living for everybody. Members of society are divided into two classes. This division is economic. One class are those who can earn their subsistence: the other, those who cannot. In the economic system there is therefore a class of (1) Efficient. These are such as can labor. They either manualize or mentalize. There is also a class of (2) Inefficient. These do not work. They are disabled. This disability may be accidental or essential; temporary or permanent. Inefficient are those disabled by youth, age, sickness, infirmity of mind, bodily hurt or deformity, and absolute want of work.<sup>31</sup>

Elsewhere he adds imbeciles and dotards to these types of inefficient.<sup>32</sup>

The author emphasizes over and over again the right of all to subsistence, whether they can work or not; but their obligation to labor, if there is capacity for such effort, is equally persistently urged.

The due of all is necessary subsistence. This is a comfortable sufficiency of necessities for health and strength. It is the right of every member of society. It is not the right of efficient only. It is the right of both efficient and inefficient. For, the obligation of all classes to labor is not unilateral; it is not one-sided only. The laborer is an obligee to society; but society also is an obligee to the laborer. The duty of the laborer is labor; the duty of society, subsistence. One is the consideration of the other; and both are obligatory. Labor is due to society, and is the consideration which issues from the laborer. Subsistence is due to the laborer, and is the consideration which issues from the society. This reciprocal obligation is nothing more than economic allegiance. Its construction and interpretation are in everything, like that of the other societary allegiances.<sup>33</sup>

But, one might ask, why is society obliged to support those who cannot

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 142, 144, 152, 156, 161, 168-169, 202-3, 273, 275, 284, 287.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 125, 138, 169.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 152.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 140.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 149.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 141.

work if subsistence is the social reward for labor performed? The author has not overlooked this seeming inconsistency in his theory. He has an answer, whether one accepts it or not. People do not live as individuals. Society is essential to the very existence of people. Each must of necessity aid the other; else none could survive or progress.<sup>34</sup> Hence arises such relations as class solidarity and allegiance and social obligation. He says,

The laborer's consideration is not the subsistence of himself alone. It is the subsistence of himself and family. These, first. Nor of these alone. He works for the subsistence both of himself, his family, and his class. For everybody owes a duty to his class. Each laborer is bound to his classmates: there is, more or less, a class-fellowship. Nor is this all. Every laborer works not only for himself, his family, and class; but for society. Life is the right of all and the duty of all. There must, therefore, be mutual assistance for mutual subsistence. Everybody must help. Men must be so far bound together as to warrant a comfortable livelihood for all.<sup>35</sup>

How shall the actual standard of living be determined on the basis of these obligations and according to the theory of Henry Hughes? The moral basis for its enforcement, as we have just seen, is very broad, as broad as social obligation itself. But the moral-social obligation is a general and abstract principle to the effect that all have a right to existence and that society, or their classes, or their families, must provide them with the means thereto. Are there any more concrete standards by which the volume and the content of this right to existence as applied to individual cases can be determined? Are there criteria by which the administrator (the social worker, we should say) can apply the principle in practice? There are:

In economic systems are therefore three standards. The first is (1), the standard of Justice. Its end is societary. The second is (2), the standard of Subsistence. Its end is systematic. The third is (3), the standard of wages. Its end is departmental or distributional. The standard of justice is never below the standard of subsistence; because all have a right to live; and society is the executor of the right. The standard of wages may or may not be the standard of justice. In a perfect economy, it must be; because wages ought to be just. Justice ought to govern distribution.<sup>36</sup>

This statement of the case is again too general. Obviously he is still in the stage of the formulation of preliminary principles intended to govern the concrete determination of the standard as it is to be applied by the administrator. The term or principle that now requires further analysis is clearly the second, the "standard of subsistence." This is fixed by justice and made possible—if it *is* made possible—by wages. Here it is clear that he sees rather clearly the distinction between a standard of living and a plane of living.<sup>37</sup> Justice determines the standard, which is systematically or scientifically arrived at; while wages authorize or make possible the plane, which is opportunistically or accidentally arrived at.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 175-176, 179, 209.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 141.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 123.

<sup>37</sup> See L. L. Bernard, "Planes of Living and Standards of Living," *Social Forces*, 1928, VII: 190-202.

What has he to say in detail about the standard of subsistence, or of living? He evidently has two standards in mind, a minimum and a maximum.<sup>38</sup> The minimum "ought never to be less than a comfortable sufficiency of necessities for health and strength."<sup>39</sup> In greater detail, he says,

The distribution, therefore, to a class ought to be, in the minimum, a comfortable sufficiency of necessities. Whatever is its maximum; this ought to be its minimum. However the tribute to the class may vary above this; however large it may be; it ought never to be below: it ought never to be less. All should be warranted their minimum. It should be realized for the whole class; not for efficient only; but for both efficient and inefficient. Each class ought to have for all in it: food of sufficient quantity and quality, raiment for warmth or decency, and habitations fitted to the seasons. The sufficiency of these should be comfortable: for less than comfort in them is want. Such a comfortable sufficiency is the minimum tribute to any class. That is the least share. It ought to be realized to all. Otherwise, the first end of society is not realized. But this is wrong. It is injustice; it must not be.<sup>40</sup>

Here is the old tripartite set of elements in the standard of living: food, clothing and shelter. These are still the basis of the minimum efficiency standard. They are intended to insure health and strength, the two absolute essentials to a good manual laborer. That much all manual laborers must have in order to be produce and earn their keep. "The standard of justice wages now is at the standard of comfortable sufficiency, and to lower it would be an economic loss."<sup>41</sup> Would the author go beyond this minimum efficiency standard which gives assurance of a productive manual laborer? Yes; he recognizes the productive value of a standard of living that exceeds a mere comfortable sufficiency of food, clothing, and shelter for health and strength. He recognizes a distinction between subsistence-wages and progress-wages.<sup>42</sup> The former are the minimum and are intended to insure standard productive efficiency.

For these wages, the ordinance (prescribed) work of efficient, is that of a simple day-laborer, during the hours and days prescribed by law. Any work other than that is by private contract. If a (manual laborer) works over the hours and days prescribed by law, he must be duly paid. Night-work by a day-laborer is therefore duly recompensed in currency or consumables.<sup>43</sup>

The worker may use these additional wages for his improvement or pleasure, but not for dissipation, because this disposition of funds would be rendered impossible in a properly organized society.<sup>44</sup> Skilled labor should of course receive higher wages than manual laborers. Their wages are normally progress-wages rather than subsistence-wages and should be devoted to the improvement or progress of the recipients.<sup>45</sup>

While the author does not attempt to define quantitatively a maximum efficiency standard of living as distinguished from a minimum efficiency standard, he does discuss it in considerable detail in qualitative terms.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 195 ff.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, 273.

<sup>39</sup> Henry Hughes, *op. cit.*, 124.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 125.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 157.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 141-142.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 273.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 115.



But of wages, [he says] the elements are not economic and hygienic only. They are political. The political system contributes to every man; every man ought therefore to contribute to it. . . . The greater the value of the laborer, the greater the tax rated. To increase this value is hence the State's interest, as well as the capitalist's.<sup>46</sup>

How may this increase in the value of the laborer be achieved? By adding education, esthetic values, morals, and religion to the items in the standard of living, in addition to those of food, clothing and shelter, already specified.

Other things being equal, an educated skilled-laborer is more profitable than a simple [manual laborer]; and an educated simple-laborer, more profitable than an uneducated. Of this profit, the amount from education may be more or less. Whatever its amount, the capitalist (Employer) is economically enforced to gain it,

and therefore to reward it with wages.<sup>47</sup>

It is even more to the interest of employers to have contented laborers. (Contented cows give more milk.)

Of perfect wages, another element is the esthetic. This is for the production of enjoyment; and the reduction of pain. But a pleased laborer is more profitable than one displeased. Content is productive; discontent is consumptive. Only happy laborers are orderly; only orderly, lucrative. Esthetic necessities are therefore due economically from the capitalist (employer).<sup>48</sup> [Likewise] . . . Moral and religious progress must be duly produced; capital for this is necessary. Two elements of wages are therefore the moral and the religious. But moral and religious laborers are economically desirable. They are valuable. The interest of the capitalist is syntonistic with the moral and religious progress of the laborer.<sup>49</sup>

Here then is the justification for a standard of living above the bare minimum efficiency standard. It stimulates production and is profitable to the employing or capitalist class. Hughes had a very favorable opinion of the benevolence and efficiency of the capitalist class, more or less in keeping with the prevailing opinion of the day, and possibly derived from reading Saint-Simon, who, like Hughes, wishes to make the capitalist class supreme in the management of the state.<sup>50</sup> Hughes is also thinking largely of Negro slaves, or warranted manual or simple laborers, as he calls them, when he discusses the standard of living at the minimum efficiency level. But his sociological theories, including those on labor and living standards, were supposedly constructed for any properly regulated society, and not for a slave holding society alone. His conception of a properly regulated society is also much more closely related to the present Fascist systems than to our own. His principles may therefore be taken as general abstract principles meant to apply to any properly organized and regulated social system.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, 198-199.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, 157.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 199-201.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 200.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 93, 98, 105 ff., 137, 153 ff., 160 ff., 191, 218 ff., 280 ff.

## INCOME AND SOCIAL PARTICIPATION

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IN THE SPRING of 1940 a door-to-door canvass was made in Franklin, Indiana, to determine the organizational affiliation of the adult section of the population. Schedules were obtained covering 190 households including 139 men and 187 women in the income class receiving less than \$100 per month, and 195 households including 190 men and 192 women in the income class receiving \$100 per month or more, making a total of 708 individuals in all. Questions were asked concerning the formal and semi-formal groups to which the men and women who were family heads belonged, the holding of offices or committee chairmanships, and in the case of some groups the regularity of attendance.

The difference between the organizational habits of the two segments of the population was striking.

TABLE 1. PERCENTAGE OF MEMBERSHIP IN FRANKLIN, INDIANA, ORGANIZATIONS BY INCOME CLASSES AND SEX, 1940

Type of Organization	Under \$100 per Month		\$100 or Over per Month	
	(139) Men	(187) Women	(190) Men	(192) Women
No Organization	25.7	19.5	3.1	4.2
Church	66.9	80.7	82.1	87.5
Fraternal	25.9	15.5	60.0	20.8
Service Clubs	2.0	2.0	21.6	15.6
Recreational	6.5	15.0	38.4	57.8
Patriotic	5.0	6.9	13.1	17.7
Political	6.5	6.4	12.1	9.4
Cultural	0.0	12.8	6.3	28.6

By "type of organization" is meant a classification under which membership in a church, a Sunday school, and a church choir would be denoted as membership in but one type of organization, while membership in a church and in a lodge would indicate membership in two types.

"Service clubs" refers to Rotary, Kiwanis, Tri Kappa, and the like; "recreational" includes both the Country Club and informal card clubs; "patriotic" includes the American Legion and its auxiliaries, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, etc.; "political" refers not to parties but to ward clubs, Young Republican or Young Democrat organizations, etc.; while "cultural" is used in the commonsense meaning of esthetic, and includes study clubs, book review clubs, professional societies, and the like.

*Membership.* Table 1 reveals that the percentage of men in the income class of less than \$100 per month having no affiliations at all was eight times as great as that of the men in the higher income class, while the percentage of women having no affiliation was almost five times greater. In every type

of group without exception—church, fraternal, service, recreational, patriotic, political, cultural—membership on the part of the lower income class was markedly lower. The nearest approach to equality of membership was in the church, where 66.9 percent of the men and 82.1 percent of the women of the lower income class were members, as compared to 80.7 percent of the men and 87.5 percent of the women of the upper class; but even here the apparent near approach to equality is voided by the fact that only 35.3 percent of the men and 45.0 percent of the women of the lower class<sup>1</sup> attended church services as often as once a month, as compared to 61.1 percent of the men and 70.8 percent of the women of the upper class.

The women were more active organizationally than the men. All women averaged 3.2 memberships each and all men 2.4 each. The women of the \$100-or-over class averaged 4.1 memberships and those of the lower class, 2.2; the men of the upper class averaged 3.1 and the men of the lower class 1.5 each.

Individuals of the upper income class not only joined more but more varied organizations than did those of the lower class. Table 2 shows that, both sexes together, only 34.4 percent of the lower class belonged to more than one type of organization (usually that one was a religious group) while 72.5 percent of those in the upper income class belonged to more than one type of organization.

TABLE 2. PERCENTAGE OF PERSONS IN FRANKLIN INCOME CLASSES HAVING MEMBERSHIP IN DESIGNATED NUMBER OF TYPES OF ORGANIZATIONS

Income Class		Number of Types of Organizations					
		0	1	2	3	4	5
	Num.	Pct.	Pct.	Pct.	Pct.	Pct.	Pct.
Under \$100 Month	326	20.2	45.4	21.8	9.2	3.4	0.0
\$100 Month and Over	382	3.9	23.6	28.3	25.7	13.9	4.6

*Leadership.* The disparity in leadership, defined as the holding of an office, membership on boards of control, teaching of a Sunday school class, or acting as chairman of committees, was even greater than the inequality of membership.

The men in the lower class held an average of only .08 leadership positions each, while the men in the upper class held an average of .35 positions. This is four times as much leadership whereas the membership is only slightly more than twice as much. The difference in leadership between the women of the two groups was large but not as great as that of the men.

<sup>1</sup> Throughout this paper, "upper" and "lower" class of course merely means upper and lower income class as here defined.

Women of the low income class averaged .11 leaderships while those of the upper class averaged .28 leaderships.

*Influence of Factors Other than Income.* One is never sure in such comparisons as this that other factors than income are not also at work in creating differences; in fact, one ordinarily can be quite sure of it.

Those who lived in owned homes averaged higher in number of memberships and much higher in number of leaderships, in the case of each income class. In the upper class, home-owning men averaged 3.4 memberships as compared to renting men's 3.3, and home-owning women averaged 4.4 as compared to 3.8. In the lower income class, home-owning men averaged 2.1 memberships as compared to 1.5, and home-owning women averaged 3.0 as compared to 2.2 for renting women. Home-owning seemed to make more of a difference for the lower income class than for the upper. It had a greater effect upon leadership than upon membership, in the cases of both classes; the 58.4 percent of home-owning men in the upper income class held 69.4 percent of the leadership positions held by that class, and the 47.8 percent of home-owning men in the lower income class held 77.8 percent of the leadership positions of that class.

Home-ownership itself reflects some degree of financial difference. Education is perhaps less closely linked. Within each income class, and particularly within the upper, the average number of memberships and leaderships per person increased with educational rank.

Eighty-six college men of the upper class averaged 4.1 memberships; 74 high school men averaged 2.7 memberships; and 27 grade school men averaged 2.1 memberships. Leaderships in the same order averaged .61, .31, .11. Sixty-five college women of the same income class averaged 5.5 memberships, 97 high school women averaged 3.4, and 30 grade school women averaged 2.8 memberships. Leaderships averaged .39, .27, and .06. An exception occurs in the case of the men of the lower income class. Here 17 college men averaged 1.4 memberships while 47 high school men averaged 1.6 memberships, but the usual trend is resumed with 65 grade school men averaging 1.4 memberships. Leaderships are .24, .06, and .09, the grade school men exceeding the high school men in this respect. The women of the lower income class run true to form, however; memberships for 21 college women averaged 4.6, while those for 72 high school women averaged 2.3 and for 91 grade school women, 1.7. Their leadership average was .29, .11, and .08.

*Implications.* The implications of these findings are not pleasant for the lover of democracy. In 1937, the last time a thorough analysis of incomes was made in Franklin, the families receiving \$100 or more a month comprised but 35 percent of the total. If that proportion was true in 1940 when this survey was made, these findings indicate that 65 percent of the 6264 people living in this typical farmers' town are rather completely dominated in their recreation, politics, religion, patriotism, culture,—every phase of



their organized living—by the remaining 35 percent. Whether such a differential in association is desirable or not is a matter for debate; but the existence of the differential makes it obvious that the people of Franklin do not form one group in the sociological sense. Further, the sociologist holds that human nature is acquired by association with others; this study raises the question as to whether such a differential in association indicates that a majority of the people of Franklin are barred from the complete realization of personality.

## THE EMOTIONAL BACKGROUND OF MARITAL DIFFICULTIES\*

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IN THE POPULAR MIND, marital difficulties and psychoanalysis are almost synonymous. There is a widespread belief that the majority of individuals who consult a psychoanalyst come because of conscious dissatisfaction with marriage. If for "conscious dissatisfaction" is substituted unconscious dissatisfaction with the marital state, the popular belief is correct, for no matter how diverse the symptoms which the psychoneurotic patient presents to the psychoanalyst, closer scrutiny always reveals some psychosexual dissatisfaction. A marital relation in which the ideals of the man's or the woman's conscious personality are realized while at the same time their diverse instinctual needs also find adequate expression is the goal for which men and women are striving in marriage. Yet it is increasingly evident that a large percentage of men and women either cannot marry or, if marriage occurs, can find little happiness in it. Their discontent may find expression in illness, unfaithfulness, psychosexual difficulties such as frigidity and impotence, psychoneurotic or even psychotic manifestations such as depression, delusional jealousy, or alcoholism. Anyone who goes through the case records of any psychiatrist or psychiatric clinic will immediately be struck by the frequent coincidence between an engagement or marriage and the onset of the psychosomatic, psychoneurotic, or psychotic disorder for which the patient is consulting a physician. The patient may be completely unconscious, or more or less conscious of a causal connection between the marriage and the illness.

One striking example of the desperate measures which an individual unconsciously took in order to preserve the illusion of a perfect marriage comes to my mind. A married woman of forty was sent by an internist who had been treating her for spastic colitis. In the course of the treatment, he had been struck by something "queer" in her personality. The woman came to the psychiatric consultation with a very sweet, fixed smile on her face. She protested immediately, before any question could be asked, that she had no need of psychiatric help since her marriage was an absolutely ideal one. When the psychiatrist made only a nonargumentative neutral reply to this statement, she continued her story. She had been married some fifteen to twenty years. She had wanted a child very much, but her husband did not. Of course she did not mind at all, she was sure she did not care whether she had a child. Throughout the last ten years of her marriage, she had had various illnesses which were always diagnosed as nothing wrong—or functional—in character. Five years ago, her husband became impotent—which she

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also did not mind in the slightest. Their relation was of such a high character that she did not feel any deprivation. But people, women in the neighborhood, were beginning to talk. She saw them when she went to the grocery store and she heard them saying that she was unhappy with her husband and that he was unfaithful to her. She, however, knew that her marriage was ideal. Her attitude throughout the interview was a provocative one, daring the doctor to attack her consciously believed attitude of complete marital happiness. The rage unconsciously felt by this woman because of frustration of her own feminine needs had first found autoplasmic expression in her illnesses. These illnesses eventually became insufficient as a defense against the complete instinctual frustration which she was experiencing as a result of her husband's impotence. It had become necessary for her to project her feelings into the minds and mouths of other women. In her delusions, she both escaped her own unhappiness and denied her husband's impotence by feeling he was unfaithful. Probably physiological factors made necessary the new and more desperate defense of a delusional jealousy. The patient was forty years of age and time was against her, for her productive childbearing period would soon be at an end. With the menopause, that which is called in German *Torschluss*, panic overwhelmed her; in other words, a feeling of desperation that soon any realization of the wish to have a child would be biologically impossible.

In 1905, Freud's *Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie*<sup>1</sup> was published. The conclusions of these concise essays have since that time received repeated confirmation by data from many disciplines besides the psychoanalytic one and the ideas propounded by Freud are utilized either knowingly or unknowingly by workers in many fields. Stated briefly, Freud traced the evolution of the sexual drive in a human being as manifested in that individual's emotional relationships. For the new born baby, the need to be fed, to be warm, and secure is paramount. The baby is indifferent to the person, male or female, who satisfies his dependent needs as long as there is no frustration of these needs. The goal of the infant is the satisfaction of his hunger and the infant himself is the center of his emotional field. With the growth and the development of locomotion, the emotional field of the child widens, certain restrictions of training are imposed on him, and in order to avoid punishment or rejection by the person upon whom he is dependent (and the withdrawal of love is probably a much more dreaded punishment than any formal disciplinary measure), he accedes to the demands of the environment. This is the first step in consideration of any object or person outside himself. The child's emotional attitude has still many aspects of a bargain. It is as if the formula were, "If the mother or

<sup>1</sup> Sigmund Freud, *Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie*, Leipzig und Wien, Verlag Deuticke, 1905; English, *Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex*, Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Co., New York and Washington, 1930.

nurse will continue to shower me with love, I will stop soiling myself or breaking things." If the bribe which the child must give to his environment is not too large, in other words, if the mother is not too demanding and restrictive and if the child receives sufficient love to compensate him, he will then be able to take that most difficult of all steps in emotional development: to give a love which implies tenderness and true consideration for the object of one's love. The direction of the emotional drive is now away from himself towards a person who is recognized as distinct from himself. Such a need eventually finds expression in the relation between a man and a woman in which sexual love—the giving and receiving of love—is expressed both biologically and emotionally in the wish of the man to give to the woman a child, and of the woman to receive and give back a child to the man, and of the shared wish of both individuals to care for their child. Freud pointed out that there are many points at which the individual is unable, either because of endogenous or exogenous factors, successfully and fully to make the next step in normal emotional development, and that even in the most mature so-called "genital" human being, traces of his earlier emotional development always remain—just as remnants of biological evolution are always discernible in the animal. There is, in other words, no such animal as a completely adult human being. There are only approximations to such a mythological superman or superwoman. Each man or woman is a unique admixture of the many partial drives which constitute the total emotional energy of that individual. Certainly if there existed an individual entirely genital in character and free from all traces of earlier pre-genital traits such as receptiveness, possessiveness, or retentiveness, exhibitionism, and curiosity, that individual would have a sorry time adapting himself to society and social organizations. His chances of survival would be most doubtful. It is not the existence of pregenital traits in any human being which is important but their quantity and predominating influence in the total personality.

What is apparent to a psychiatrist is that all the developmental and constitutional weakness and flaws of a human personality are put to a severe strain and test in the long pull of a marital relation. Those flaws which most commonly make their appearance in marriage can be briefly stated.

1. *The Unconscious Wish to be Dependent.* For a man whose early life has been one of spoiling by an indulgent mother, the responsibilities of marriage will become very much of a burden. For such an individual, marriage with a motherly woman may be successful until her attention is in part diverted from her husband to her children. Then he may turn from her and under the guise of an extramarital sexual interest, seek a woman who will gratify his dependent needs in an irresponsible relation. For a woman who wishes unconsciously to be a child, caring for a home and children will often pro-

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duce great tension which finds expression in irritability, psychosomatic disorders, or in psychosis.

2. *A Destructive Hostile Attitude toward the Marital Partner.* In casual sexual affairs, destructive feelings can often be successfully masked but in any permanent relation, the disguise of love will soon be torn off and the rage which is the real bond between two individuals becomes all too apparent. Any outsider viewing the marriage of a man and woman whose relation is essentially hostile in character, will exclaim, "How can they stand each other; he is terribly cruel to her, and she's a martyr who makes everyone suffer." It is exactly because of the outlet for unconscious destructive feelings combined with punishment for the hostility each inflicts on the other that such a marriage survives in the face of all rational reasons for its dissolution. When, however, the psychic equilibrium of either individual is altered, the desire for freedom from such a hateful relationship will be spontaneously felt. If the need of either one is merely to protest by means of divorce against the destructive and self-destructive feelings which find their satisfaction in the particular marriage, such a protest on the part of the more mature ego-attitudes of the personality will probably be temporary in nature and following divorce, the destructive forces will again gain ascendancy so that the next choice of a love object will be another individual both cruel and martyr-like in character.

3. *Sexual Guilt May Exist as a Result of Unduly Repressive Measures in Childhood or of Unusually Intense Heterosexual Temptation* by a forbidden person (father or brother, mother or sister), or as a result of both these conditions. Since unconscious guilt over sexual feelings exists in an overwhelmingly large majority of the members of civilized society, its existence may account for many marital difficulties. Psychiatric experience reveals that the guilty feelings which were defined in the individual as a child may become clearly evident only after marriage. Frigidity, which is a common psychosomatic disturbance in women of all classes, is found to arise out of feelings of guilt and consequent fear of sexual relations. A lack of complete responsiveness on the part of the woman in marriage is disturbing not only to her but also to her husband, for he considers her incapacity for complete pleasure as an indication of some inadequacy in himself. With this, as with other pathological manifestations, a vicious circle of emotional interreaction between the man and woman is initiated.

In the normal individual, the choice of a marital partner will be determined by both rational conscious interest in, and an unconscious perception of, complementary emotional suitability of the given person. Too often, however, a chance resemblance of the man or woman to some individual who has previously been of emotional significance is the determining factor. There is a total disregard of many character or personality traits which will eventually prove distasteful. Many a man has married a woman because in

some physical detail she resembled his mother, sister, or one of the objects of his childish affection; many a woman has found herself married to a weak, helpless man, the opposite in character and temperament of the father who had disregarded and rejected her childish love. Disappointment will be experienced in such a marriage and rage felt against the partner who is unjustly blamed for the disillusionment.

The reasons or rationalizations given by such individuals to explain their disappointment may be trivial and unimportant, since disillusioned husbands or wives actually do not know that they never have seen the actual total personality of their object choice. Such a person as they believed to exist, existed only as an unconscious fantasy of their own, not as a real human being. On the other hand, to choose a marital partner purely because of conscious personality traits, disregarding the emotional character of the loved person, will lead to equally great unhappiness unless one is fortunate. These "rebound" marriages in which the conscious personality factors of shared tastes and intellectual interests determine the choice of a marital partner are common in psychiatric practice. Let me give an example. A young professional man, ambitious and self-centered, always chose a woman who devoted herself entirely to him. These women treated him just as his mother had done earlier in his life but they, unlike the mother, eventually resented his lack of any real consideration for them. After many unsatisfactory affairs and one marriage which ended in divorce, some realization of his immature demanding attitude began to dawn on the man and he deliberately chose as his second wife a beautiful, brilliant, and self-centered woman, an individual who was a feminine counterpart of himself. Within a few months the man and his wife were both dissatisfied with the relation. In his attempt to deny his own egoistic demanding attitudes, he had married a woman with very little tenderness, one incapable of giving him even the normal quantity of mothering, since she herself wished to be the admired one, always receiving but never giving love.

*Summary.* Unconscious emotional factors play a more important role in the maintenance or dissolution of marital happiness than do conscious factors, although conscious factors may be used as rationalization for dissatisfaction. A quiet gentle man who unconsciously wishes above all things to be mothered will remain with a wife who wishes to mother him even though consciously he is revolted by her vulgar obscene talk and behavior. He is unhappy, but he feels less unhappy than he would be without her. In a marriage between two relatively normal individuals, happiness and satisfaction are the result of both conscious and unconscious suitability of the two personalities.

## CURRENT ITEMS

**A Communication.** This letter is a supplement to a long communication Mr. Price has presented to the Executive Committee and to the Committee on National Affairs. This brief statement is printed so that members may be thinking about the problems raised and perhaps express their opinions to one or both of the Committees mentioned.—R.B.

Inasmuch as national or local measures which may be taken in connection with the present national "Emergency" may have consequences for sociologists in their professional capacities as well as in their capacities as citizens, and inasmuch as sociology does presume to offer clarifying views of human situations such as those affected by the Emergency, may it not be well for sociologists to consider, discuss, and act upon such questions as the following?

1. Since *individual sociologists'* research and investigation projects are being sent to different national organizations for sponsorship, to different foundations for financial support, to different offices of the nation's military and nonmilitary services for adoption, etc., would it not be well for one of the A.S.S. committees or some social science advisory body to try to act as a clearing house in the interests of eliminating unneeded duplication, of calling attention to gaps, etc.?

2. Since military men or other government officers without sociological training cannot legitimately be expected to sense and define various important problems for sociological research in connection with the Emergency, should our appropriate A.S.S. committees close to relevant fast-moving events (e.g., our Research Planning Committee), take the initiative in undertaking the delination of such problems for the benefit of interested government officers, research agencies, sociologists, etc.?

3. Since the National Roster of Scientific and Specialized Personnel has thus far not secured data from graduate and collegiate students who have graduated in recent years and in the opinion of their former teachers or other "superiors," are qualified to participate in the services anticipated for "scholars," if not to substitute for the latter at many points (and thus permit the "scholars" to continue present important teaching or research), should we suggest to the Roster that it include such persons, and to the Planning Board that the army be induced or urged to secure from *draftees* and *reserve officers*, similar data, and that the two sets of data be used in relation to each other?

4. Since many questions of *policy, program, and executive action* in the government services including the military services hinge upon opinions as to social occurrences, traits, relations, conditions, etc. (e.g., the imputed opinion that army boys out from under former (primary group) controls go to houses of prostitution near army camps only in cases where they had formed the habit at home) (e.g., *re morale*), should our A.S.S. Committee on Participation in National Affairs endeavor to contact government services or outstanding parties discussing salient questions of policy, program, etc., where it seems that sociology has relevant findings or conclusions, and to put these at the disposal of such services or parties?

- 5., 6., etc.

Some sociologists may think that the Society's present committees are already empowered to take such action in behalf of the Society. Others say they are not so empowered. Some contend that the Society's members must express their opinions more specifically so that those committees, and especially the Executive Committee, may know what the Society wishes, and *speedily*. Obviously the relevant discussions

at the Chicago meetings were brief and preliminary and did not ramify into numerous definable alternatives. Manuscripts with critical comment on that subject run the risk of classification as destructive, needless, controversial. Editorial advisors who have had a part to play in the action already taken by the Society are not liable to favor further critical explanations of that action. Editors and advisors may be right; they may not. But, *let us now* be realistic. If we, the membership of the Society, want the different sides of various alternatives (e.g., as to 1, 2, 3, 4, above, and other issues) open to the Society discussed *in open forum in our journals*, why not write a postcard immediately to President Stuart Queen and say so? And why not ask that, after such discussion, and after later letters sent by nondiscussants, there be sent us a comprehensive questionnaire to poll the membership's opinions and mandate? After all, this "Emergency" may have untold importance and implications for us.

MAURICE T. PRICE

*University of Illinois*  
*February 22, 1941.*

**Error.** In the April issue, Benedict S. Alper ("Forty Years of the Juvenile Court") was indicated as being associated with the Massachusetts Child Council. This error was wholly mine since Mr. Alper's manuscript contained no reference to the Council. I merely thought I knew what wasn't true. The Council makes no objection (it really should be glad to have its name associated with such an excellent article) and Mr. Alper doesn't care—except he doesn't want anyone to think that he claimed connection with an agency for which he has not worked for some time.

Personally, having great admiration both for the Council and for Mr. Alper, I think my error redounds to the credit of both parties; only the third party, myself, has anything to be ashamed of—and I am. I don't like mistakes and I like them least when I make them.—R. B.

**Vacancies.** At one time the *Review* attempted to list members who were available for positions. This was discontinued because we never heard of anyone getting a position because of such listing. Now, however, in view of the possibility that vacancies may be created by the draft, it has been suggested that a listing of such vacancies might render a service both to the various departments with depleted staffs and to younger men seeking positions.

Therefore, any department may describe briefly the number of men needed, the nature of the positions (including stipends) and these vacancies will be listed here. It might be a good idea for all graduate departments to be listed with the number of graduate assistantships, scholarships, and fellowships (with stipends and duties) that are available. This would give many students help in making up their minds about where to apply, would give the departments more applicants from which to choose, and possibly have some influence in standardizing the stipends and duties of graduate assistants who frequently are more or less exploited and reduced to the status of academic sweatshop laborers under the rationalization that they are being given a "great opportunity."—R.B.

**Honorary Member.** Earle Eubank received the following cablegram from London on February 12, 1941:

Have just received your letter of election honorary membership American Sociological Society. Am very honoured by this manifestation and confirm with greatest satisfaction my acceptance. Please convey my sincere gratitude to all my colleagues of the American Sociological Society.

EDWARD BENEŠ

#### ANNOUNCEMENTS AND MEETINGS

*American Council of Education* has made provision for Workshops in Education during



1941 at Northwestern University, July 21 to August 15 (Kenneth L. Heaton); Peabody College for Teachers, June 6 to July 12 (John E. Brewton); Stanford University, June 23 to August 1 (Alvin C. Enrich); Syracuse University, June 4 to July 2 (Harold E. B. Speight); the University of Chicago, June 23 to August 29 (Ralph W. Tyler), and at the University of Michigan, July 5 to August 1 (Harvey L. Turner, Lansing, Michigan).

These workshops are designed especially for teachers of teachers and all have a somewhat different program. Those interested should write to the men in parentheses above or to the Commission on Teacher Education, 744 Jackson Place, Washington, D. C.

**American Sociological Society.** Everett W. DuVall and Albert Cohen represented the Society at the 45th Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Political and Social Science which was held in Philadelphia on April 4 and 5. The general topic of these meetings was "Defending America's Future."

**American Youth Commission** has published *Youth Work Programs: Problems and Policies*, by Lewis L. Lorwin, and *Color and Human Nature: Negro Personality Development in a Northern City* by W. Lloyd Warner et al. These will be reviewed soon but in the meantime can be purchased for \$1.75 and \$2.25 respectively. J. K. Folsom's *Youth, Family and Education*, at \$1.75 should be mentioned along with M. M. Chambers' *Youth Serving Organizations*, \$2.25. Chambers deals with 320 such organizations. These reports were all prepared for the A.Y.C. under the sponsorship of the American Council on Education, 744 Jackson Place, Washington, D. C.

**The Antioch Review, A Progressive Journal of Social Significance**, appeared with the spring 1941 issue. It is a very attractively printed quarterly at \$2.00 per year, edited by J. Donald Kingsley and a board of six, Box 35, Yellow Springs, Ohio.

It seems to be conceived as a forum for the discussion of democracy. "He who does not now speak out assists in the degradation of the democratic doctrine as surely as the outright exponent of totalitarianism . . . . We believe in democracy so strongly that we think it should be enormously extended . . . . We believe that the social role of the intellectual in our time is to employ ideas to further democracy . . . ."

Those who feel the need for clarifying their ideas about democracy or believe that writing or reading about democracy will save it (or discover it) or who like the discourse of intellectuals who also are clever writers, will get their money's worth.

Sidney Hook gets his hooks into the poor mangled forms of Messrs. Hutchins and Adler. These boys sure can take it—I hope; at least, they are getting plenty these days. Perhaps their dogmas are so dogged that their cortical centers are dulled and they think every knock is a boost. Or perhaps they forgive their enemies who "know not what they do," being mere children of "naturalism," the Hutchlerian euphemism for Devil. However, if their power were as great as their passion, I'd hate to be around. The way of the heretic always is hard when saints are in the saddle. I think Hutchlerism is as dangerous to the life of the mind as Hitlerism is to the life of the flesh.

Paul Bixler pays his disrespects to "The Professor as a Radical"—a piddling fellow more interested in specific research than in public policy. Interest in minute research often has the appearance of refusal to accept the dangerous responsibility of social leadership. However, the professor seems to be improving—to be poking his timid nose out of the Ivory Tower to which he retired as the art-for-artsakers who built it deserted its esoteric calm for *Fortune* and the Library of Congress.

This issue contains nine articles and no book reviews. Articles by A. E. Morgan, Granville Hicks, John Dewey, Max Lerner, D. W. Petegorsky and E. C. Lindeman are promised soon.—R.B.

**The Committee on Conceptual Integration** has set up three committees to guide its activities: Future Organization and Policy, Dwight Sanderson, chairman; Definition of Definition, Hornell Hart, chairman; Definitions, Earle Eubank, chairman. Those who are interested in the work of the C.C.I. should communicate with Albert Blumenthal, secretary-treasurer, Maryville, Missouri. The dues are 50¢ a year.

**Eastern Sociological Society.** The April issue contained an incorrect item due to the fact that the editor got his tenses crossed. The other information was essentially correct. It is now

true that the meeting was held on April 19-20, 1941, at the Biltmore Hotel, Providence, Rhode Island.

The program was organized under the following heads by the indicated chairmen: Reports on Research (13 projects) J. H. S. Bossard; Sociology of War, Willard Waller; Personality and Culture, Kimball Young; Centennial of Lester F. Ward, Bernhard J. Stern; Personnel Practice and Status, Mildred Fairchild; The Motivation of Sociological Research, Charles H. Page. Maurice R. Davie delivered his presidential address, "Theory and Practice in Social Science," at the annual banquet at which time Margaret Mead showed moving pictures and talked about "Dance and Trance in Bali" (This should have packed 'em in). Eighteen formal papers were read and discussed.

**Educational and Psychological Measurement**, Volume I, Number 1, appeared January 1941, at \$4.00 per year, G. Frederic Kuder, editor, Box 766, Alexandria, Va. It devoted 95 pages to nine articles and nine pages to abstracts and notes. Those who are interested in measurement of individual differences will find valuable material in this new journal. It is published quarterly by Science Research Associates, 1700 Prairie Avenue, Chicago, Illinois.

**General Semantics, Institute of**, will hold its Second Congress August 1-2, 1941, at the University of Denver. Papers proposed for presentation should be presented to Alfred Korzybski, 1234 East 56 Street, Chicago (two copies of the manuscript and two of a 500 word summary) by June 15. All other correspondence should be addressed to Elwood Murray, University of Denver.

During the first week of October, 1941, there will be a Symposium on General Semantics at Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois.

A special intensive seminar will be conducted by Alfred Korzybski at Pennsylvania State College, August 11-22, 1941. This course will carry two hours of graduate credit. Correspondence should be addressed to Emmett A. Betts, Penn State College.

**Mexican Horizons** announces four two-weeks' seminars to be held at 229 Avenida Alvaro Obregon, Mexico City, D. F., June 30-July 12, July 14-July 26, July 28-Aug. 9, and Aug. 11-Aug. 23. The cost is \$30.00 which pays for the transportation on the six field trips (about 900 miles). The seminar consists of six lectures by well known Mexican and American scholars with six related field trips. Those interested should send \$5.00 registration fee to Maria Bransford Heitner, at the above address.

**Michigan Sociological Society** met March 14, 1941, at the University of Michigan. Seven papers were read and discussed, including a luncheon address by L. L. Bernard, "Some Latin-American Sociologists." Richard C. Fuller was chairman. The M.S.S. is considering fusion or closer affiliation with the Ohio Valley Sociological Society.

**Mid-West Sociological Society** held its fifth annual meeting at the Hotel Kirkwood, Des Moines, April 17-19, 1941.

The program consisted of 36 papers and discussions organized by President C. W. Hart under following heads and chairmen: Theory and Research, J. M. Gillette; Social Psychology, C. Arnold Anderson; Rural Sociology, David E. Lindstrom (3 sessions); Social Research, Noel P. Gist; The Family, Harvey J. Locke; Public Opinion, H. M. Hughes; Political Sociology, L. H. Brown; Social Research, C. D. Clark; Educational Sociology, M. W. Roper; Institutional Sociology, Ernest Manheim; Population, C. T. Pihlblad; Sociology and Social Work, B. E. Youngdahl.

At the dinner meeting on Friday, E. B. Reuter spoke on "The State of the Discipline."

The Student Sociological Association also held sessions at the same time.

**The National Probation Association** has set up a committee to honor the hundredth anniversary of the probation movement which was accidentally started by John Augustus in Boston in August, 1841. Chief Justice Hughes is Honorary Chairman of this committee consisting of almost one hundred outstanding leaders in the probation field. The principal purpose of the Centennial Committee is to promote, by publicity and conference, the extension of probation and parole. It is hoped that local agencies will cooperate in this program. Advice and information can be obtained from the association at 1790 Broadway, New York.

**Ohio Governor's Committee on the Follow-up of the White House Conference on**

**Child Welfare.** The first meeting of this Committee was held in Columbus, Ohio, April 2-3, 1941. Governor John W. Bricker appointed a large committee representing all the welfare agencies in Ohio. C. C. Stillman, of Ohio State University is chairman of the Executive Committee, ably assisted by Hannah Trotzman as secretary who also is secretary of the Ohio Welfare Conference. This body, and the Ohio Child Welfare Planning Committee, are two of the agencies most active in the program.

The first meeting was divided into three sections, Welfare, Health, and Education which made recommendations. It remains to be seen whether this Committee ever gets any further than the recommendation stage. Such efforts frequently end in much edifying talk and little effective action.—R.B.

**Ohio Valley Sociological Society** held its third annual meeting in the Administration Building at Ohio State University, April 25-26, 1941. Seventeen papers were read and discussed. Abstracts of all the papers were published in the May *Ohio Valley Sociologist*.

The students association met at the same time in an adjoining room. Four papers were presented and discussed. Roberta Spencer of Wilberforce University was president.

C. R. Hoffer of Michigan State is the retiring president. The following officers were elected for 1941-42: E. H. Sutherland, Indiana University, president; Fred Zorbaugh, Oberlin College, vice-president; John F. Cuber, Kent State College (Ohio), secretary-treasurer; F. E. Lumley, Ohio State University, editor of *The Ohio Valley Sociologist*.

About 125 attended the annual dinner at which L. L. Bernard spoke on "Recent Discussion in Social Psychology," E. H. Sutherland on "The White-Collar Criminal" (new material—on the utility industry), and Pres. C. R. Hoffer, on "The Local Community and Social Control." The paid membership of the O.V.S.S. is now about 150.

**The Open Road** is again conducting field trips to various parts of America. Various universities sponsor trips in their regions. The courses usually last five or six weeks and college credit may be obtained in some instances. Costs are on a nonprofit basis.

This year trips are planned to study Southern conditions; Minority Cultures of Colorado and New Mexico; Great Plains and Rocky Mountains; T.V.A.; Community Relations in Connecticut and Pennsylvania.

Particulars may be obtained from The Open Road, 8 W. 40 Street, New York.

**Parent Education, The National Council of, Bulletin of**, February, 1941, 30 pp., mimeographed, contains an informative analysis of the "Flint Program of Community Recreation" by J. K. Folsom and about 20 pages of digests and reviews of articles and books in this field. The publication office is at Vassar College.

**Propaganda Analysis, The Institute for**, is now furnishing packets of materials (about 25 pieces) for analyzing propaganda. A recent packet deals with the controversy over progressive education and the Rugg textbooks. Another deals with Communism and Fascism. They may be obtained from the Institute's offices, 211 Fourth Avenue, New York, for one dollar each.

**Psychodramatic Institute** will hold a summer session at 259 Wolcott Avenue, Beacon, New York, from June 23 to August 30. This session is primarily for students and teachers in education, psychology, psychiatry, and allied subjects. The fee is \$200, or the five weeks course may be had for \$100. Room and board at the Institute may be had for \$17.50 a week if desired. The Registration fee is \$5.00.

Any one interested in sociometry and psychodrama may become a member of the Psychodramatic Institute. The annual fee is \$5.00. This entitles the member to attend all open sessions at the New York center, at the therapeutic theatre, and elsewhere. It also includes a year's subscription to *Sociometry: A Journal of Interpersonal Relations*, now under the editorship of George A. Lundberg. *Sociometry* probably has a more distinguished editorial board than any other similar journal in America: John Dewey, Adolph Meyer, Wesley C. Mitchell, George P. Murdock and Gardner Murphy. Its contributing editors consist of twenty-three nationally known persons, among whom are such sociologists as Becker, Chapin, L. S. Cottrell, Folsom, C. P. Loomis, R. S. Lynd, Stouffer, Waller, and Zeleny.

**Public Affairs Committee.** Pamphlet 54, *Defense and the Consumer*, by the Institute for Consumer Education of Stephens College, Columbia, Missouri, shows that sound defense must



include careful regulation of the prices and products of everyday life. If military defense production gets out of hand so that the standard of living falls, democracy may win an empty or even a tragic victory. Harriet Elliott's Consumer Division is probably more important than a lot of agencies that make the headlines oftener. If we get guns and lose bread and butter, if we win victories and get millionaires, if we win a war and lose a democracy, it would be one of the ironic tragedies of history.

Pamphlet 55, *America's Factories*, by Maxwell S. Stewart, is based on *The Output of Manufacturing Industries, 1899-1937*, by Solomon Fabricant, published by the National Bureau of Economic Research. The study was made under a grant from the Falk Foundation. From 1899 to 1937, the increase of output was 276 percent, 3½ percent a year, which is more than twice the rate of population growth during the same period. Automobiles increased 180,100 percent and cigarettes 4226 percent during the period. Carriages and wagons decreased 95 percent, locomotives 79, linen goods 44, and eight other products also declined. The number of gainfully employed workers in industries has remained about the same since 1913.

In 1899, there were about 1½ automobiles produced for every man employed; in 1937, there were 10. This is more or less true of all production. There has been little correspondence between the increased productivity per man and the wages received per man. The study does not go into this aspect of the problem very much. It would appear to be worth study. What is the trend with relation to productivity and income per worker? To regularity of employment? While prices have dropped as output has gone up, have they dropped enough to keep the economic system in balance?

These pamphlets may be had at 10¢, or less in quantity, from the Public Affairs Committee, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York City—R.B.

*Race Relations, Institute of*, will hold its 1941 meeting at Westtown School, Westtown, Pennsylvania, July 6 to July 26, 1941. Applications should be in by June 21. Students who want credit (\$5.00 extra fee) in the Wharton School and Graduate School of the University of Pennsylvania should register through the Penn Summer School. Others should write to 205 12th Street, Philadelphia. The noncredit fee is \$75 for the three weeks' course. This covers tuition, room, and board. Ten dollars of this must be sent with the application, the remainder on the opening date.

Three sociologists well known in this field, Charles S. Johnson, Francis J. Brown, and Donald Young, are on the staff. Other specialists in this field, also well known, are Bruno Lasker, Otto Klineberg, and John Collier.

*Research Council on Problems of Alcohol* conducted a "Symposium on Alcohol" at the Philadelphia meeting of the A.A.A.S. About 10 papers were presented. The March 1941 issue of the *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol* carries a rather extensive report on this Symposium.

*The Southern Sociological Society* held its Sixth Annual Meeting in Atlanta at the Biltmore Hotel on April 4-5, 1941. The program consisted of 21 papers with formal and informal discussion. They were organized under the general headings: Race and Culture; Public Welfare and Social Work; The Community; Teaching of Sociology; Population; and Social Research. In addition, E. A. Ross gave a short paper of fifteen minutes on Friday night concerning his early recollections of sociology. It was an excellent paper of reminiscences and thoroughly enjoyed by the group. The main speakers at the dinner session were Stuart A. Queen and Carl C. Taylor.

For 1940-41, the Society had 255 members and a registration of 225 at the Atlanta meeting. The elected officers for 1941-42 were: William E. Cole, University of Tennessee, president; L. M. Bristol, University of Florida, first vice president; Forrester B. Washington, Atlanta School of Social Work, second vice president; Coyle E. Moore, Florida State College for Women, secretary-treasurer; Leland B. Tate, Laura Ebaugh, and Harold Hoffsommer, members of the executive committee; and E. T. Krueger, Vanderbilt University, representative on the executive committee of the American Sociological Society.

The Southern Sociological Society's Committee on Research, Dorothy Dickins, chairman, published a 39-page mimeographed summary of research in the South. The projects are classified as "completed" or "in progress" under the following heads: Methods of Teaching and Research; Public Welfare and Social Work; Region, Community, and Neighborhood; Per-

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sonality, Marriage, and the Family; Race, Cultural Groups, Social Differentiation; and Government, Politics, Citizenship. A rough estimate shows the number of projects to be somewhere between 175 and 200, with Region, etc., leading, closely followed by Race, etc., and Government, etc., a poor sixth.

*Southwestern Sociological Society* met at the Baker Hotel, Dallas, Texas, April 11-12, 1941. Twelve papers were read and discussed under the general topics: Teaching Sociology in a Changing Culture, Social Standards in a Changing Society, and Current Social Research. Ten papers were presented by students in their section.

The following officers were elected for 1941-42: William H. Sewell, Oklahoma A. & M. College, president; Albert E. Croft, University of Wichita, vice president; J. K. Johnson, East Texas State Teachers College, secretary-treasurer; O. D. Duncan, Oklahoma A. & M., associate editor of the *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*; Mattie Wooten, Texas State College for Women, and Rex D. Hopper, University of Texas, were elected to the executive committee.

Two members of the Society were also elected to important officers in the Southwestern Social Science Association. Carl M. Rosenquist, University of Texas, was reelected as editor-in-chief of the *Quarterly* and O. D. Duncan was elected as first vice president of the S.S.S.A.

*The Twentieth Century Fund* released a report on February 4, 1941, indicating that the labor demand during the defense effort "will certainly exceed the number of unemployed persons in the labor market." The number of unemployed available was placed not far from 4,000,000 with a probable increase in employment of 6,000,000 during 1941-42. Of course, an early peace would upset these calculations. The release (and possibly the report—may be obtained from the Fund at 330 West 42nd Street, New York.

In a release of March 3, summarizing a report on *Labor and National Defense*, soon to be issued, the survey committee states "any refusal at this time by any employer to accord to labor the full rights of self-organization and collective bargaining stipulated in the National Labor Relations Act is a dangerous threat to defense production." The Committee recommended a "cooling off" period but vigorously opposed any attempt to prevent strikes by law; draft deferment to skilled workers in defense industries; extension of U. S. Employment Service; prevention of sharp rise in cost of living; and planning to meet the crisis which will occur when the defense production ends.

*U. S. Department of State.* In a release of March 14, 1941, it appears that the Inter-American Cultural Relations press service has at last discovered there is such a discipline as sociology. It finally mentions that Crawford has gone to Chile to lecture on sociology and that Barbara B. Hadley of Shelburne Falls, Massachusetts, has gone to Brazil to study sociology. Another one that may be close is Esther Mathews, of Denver, Colorado, who has completed studies in "social science" in Chile. So far, there is no evidence of a Latin-American student or professor of sociology receiving a grant for study in the United States. This is little short of a cultural relations scandal and shame. The Inter-American Cultural Relations people apparently lack knowledge of what is happening in both North and South America.—R.B.

#### NEWS FROM COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES

*Columbia University.* Princeton University Press will publish in the early fall, *Medical Progress and Social Change* by Bernhard J. Stern. The preparation of the book was facilitated by a grant from the Committee on Research in Medical Economics, of which Dr. Michael Davis is chairman.

*Duke University.* John P. Gillin, of Ohio State University, has been appointed to the newly established associate professorship of anthropology in the department of Sociology effective September 1, 1941. He will be in charge of the further development of teaching and research in anthropology. He has been connected with a number of archaeological expeditions in Algeria, France, Spain, Switzerland, and Germany and has been in charge of several anthropological expeditions to Guiana, Ecuador, the upper Amazon, and the American Southwest. During the past year he has been engaged in research at the Institute of Human Relations at Yale University.

During 1941-42, E. R. Groves of the University of North Carolina will conduct a seminar on marriage and the family.

Paul A. Root, of Southern Methodist University, will teach in summer school. Other courses will be given by H. E. Jensen, H. Hart, and E. T. Thompson.

**Hofstra College**, Hempstead, L. I. Joseph S. Roucek will be the leader of a round-table on "World Revolutionary Forces" at the Northwest Institute of International Relations which meets at Reed College, Portland, Oregon, June 15-25. He will then teach the summer session and postsession at the San Francisco State College.

**Indiana University**. A conference on Family Relations was held April 11-12, 1941. Among the speakers were E. B. Reuter, E. W. Burgess, A. C. Kinsey, and Frank Vreeland.

**Iowa State College**. Zetta Bankert has been added to the teaching staff.

**University of Kansas**. D. Appleton-Century has announced for early publication *New Social Horizons* by Seba Eldridge.

Harper and Brothers has published a complete revision of *Social Disorganization* by Mabel A. Elliott and Francis E. Merrill (of Dartmouth).

**University of Michigan**. Theodore Newcomb, of Bennington College, has been appointed associate professor. He will have charge of courses in social psychology.

Harvey J. Locke, of Indiana University, is to give courses in the 1941 summer session in Social Psychology and Collective Behavior.

Hans Speier, of the New School for Social Research, will give a course in Social Classes, and one for graduates entitled Public Policy in a World at War.

McGraw-Hill has published *The Integration of American Society: A Study of Groups and Institutions* by Robert C. Angell.

The American Book Company has published *Crime and Its Treatment* by Arthur Evans Wood and John B. Waite.

Harper and Brothers has published *Delinquency Control* by Lowell J. Carr.

**Milwaukee State Teachers College**. John Teter has been added to the staff.

**University of Missouri**. The following books have been published recently by members of the department: *Urban Society*, rev. ed. Noel P. Gist, L. A. Halbert, by Thos. T. Crowell; *Secret Societies: A Cultural Study of Fraternalism in the United States*, Noel P. Gist, by University of Missouri Studies; *You and Your Superstitions*, Brewton Berry, by Lucas Brothers.

Forrest D. Kellogg, who has done graduate work in sociology at the University of Iowa, has been added to the staff.

**New York University**. Alfred McClung Lee has been appointed Publications Director of the National Public Housing Conference, 122 East 22nd Street, New York.

**Northwestern University**. E. R. Mowrer is the editor of a new sociological series for F. S. Crofts and Company.

**University of Pennsylvania**. William Rex Crawford has been granted a leave of absence for the spring semester of 1940-41 and the fall semester of 1941-42. He has left for the University of Chile (Santiago) as exchange professor under the sponsorship of the Division of Cultural Relations of the United States Department of State.

Albert H. Hobbs has been appointed instructor in sociology.

George K. Brown, part-time instructor, has joined the teaching staff of St. Lawrence University, Canton, New York.

Rex A. Skidmore, Harrison Fellow in Sociology, has been appointed assistant instructor.

Thorsten Sellin has been appointed chairman of the department. His monograph on *The Criminality of Youth* has recently been issued by the American Law Institute.

**Oklahoma A. and M. College**. William L. Kolb, who has been a teaching assistant for the past two years at the University of Wisconsin, has been appointed instructor. He succeeds William C. Loring, Jr., who resigned to take a position with the Defense Housing Commission in Washington.

**Reed College.** Joseph S. Roucek of Hofstra College, Hempstead, Long Island, will be the leader of a roundtable on "World Revolutionary Forces" at the Northwest Institute of International Relations, which meets here June 15-25.

**South Dakota State College.** Walter Slocum has been appointed professor of sociology and assistant rural sociologist at the Experiment Station. Mr. Slocum has worked two years on the South Dakota Planning Board.

**Vassar College.** Ruby Jo Reeves, of Texas State College for Women, has been appointed instructor for the year 1941-42.

**Yale University.** The department is sponsoring a university committee to study the social aspects of housing. This is by request of the U.S.H.A. Mr. Davie and Mr. Bacon represent the department; two economists; a public health man; and an architect complete the committee.

The Graduate Sociology Club has had the following speakers during this semester: E. R. Embree, "The Negro in American Democracy"; Walter White, "The American Negro in Pursuit of his Rights"; E. E. Muntz, "The Educator's 'Rights and Duties' in the Process of Rational Selection"; and Leland Jenks, "Imperialism and a Concept of Dominance."

*Folkways* sold 1275 in 1930, 1271 in 1931, 1033 in 1940—"never a best seller and has never stopped selling" (W. L. Phelps). The publishers say, "It has been a grand book," but I doubt if they mean what I mean when I say the same thing.—R.B.

# BOOK REVIEWS

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*A Study of History.* By ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE. Vols. IV-VI. London: Oxford University Press, 1939. Pp. ix+656, vi+712, vi+633. \$23.00.

In the first three volumes<sup>1</sup> of this comprehensive work, Toynbee analyzed the growth of twenty-one historical civilizations; in the volumes before us he continues his task by tracing the patterns of decline. He informs us that at least two-thirds of the entire study is now complete. And although the present war may obstruct his attempt to round out the final conclusions, we may feel certain that the major premises now lie before us.

In his earlier volumes, Toynbee indicates that as civilizations reach their nadir, they pass into a "time of troubles" when internal conflicts rend the organic unity characteristic of their growth. He now amplifies his position by showing that the "time of troubles" is an integral part of a larger whole. When decline sets in, it evidences itself through the two stages of "breakdown" and "disintegration." The former has an andante tempo, the latter an allegro. Breakdown consists of three steps: a failure of creative power in the minority, a withdrawal of "mimesis" among the majority, and the consequent loss of social unity. Then disintegration takes place in a three-fold pattern also (though some variability is allowed here): rout, rally, and relapse. The rout consists of wars between parochial states, the rally is the formation of a "universal state" or empire that brings a temporary peace of the sword (*pax oecumenica*), while in relapse the civilization is conquered from without or dissolves in an interregnum (in the case of Egypt this period of petrification lasted for some two thousand years). All this is carefully and ably documented for the various civilizations under consideration, though the Hellenic is obviously the point of departure, constituting a kind of unconsciously accepted norm. The author is careful to point out that none of these stages has a predestined time span (cf. table in Vol. VI, p. 327).

Recognizing the uniformities of the process, Toynbee tries to reconcile the cyclical view of change with the dynamic view by employing the analogy of the wheel that repeats its turning but continually traverses new ground. Social change is a "major irreversible movement borne on the wings of a minor repetitive movement" (Vol. IV, p. 36). The social scientist will perhaps think it unfortunate that the minor movement is empirically verifiable while the major one is couched in terms of a Bergsonian élan that can be suggested and intuited but not discovered by scientific means. In Toynbee's eyes it is a metaphysical implicate. If this position can be philosophically established it will remove one field of sociological study from empirical investigation—for good or ill.

Another contention is that a civilization in growth is ninety percent mechanized, but in decay one hundred per cent. Though it may follow many patterns of possible growth, it traces only one major course of decline. Instead of many challenges it now has only one and it exhausts itself in a series of unsuccessful efforts to respond to it.<sup>2</sup> We wonder in passing

<sup>1</sup> Howard Becker reviewed the first three volumes of this work in this journal, Vol. II: 548-550, 1937.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. the ingenious analogy of Penelope's web. Vol. VI, p. 322.

how Toynbee arrives at the statistical figures of ninety and one hundred percent and conclude that they are only speculative. What is even harder to understand is the assertion that civilizations in growth are "intelligible fields of study" but in disintegration are not coherent in the same sense (Vol. V, p. 339). This raises a question about the validity of his generalizations in the latter field. Pursuing the point further, one would suppose that the greater uniformity of the disintegrating period would signify a *more*, not *less* intelligible field of study.

In his view of social groupings and institutions, Toynbee takes a macroscopic rather than a microscopic view. He does not descend to the more familiar levels of the family, the neighborhood, or other primary groups—unless one excepts the nascent church. He fails to note the importance of urbanism in spreading the habitual behavior of secondary contacts. He gives little attention to sex in its biological, cultural, or demographic significance, and the same is true in his disregard of economic and scientific institutions.

In the field of cultural conflict and acculturation, the author speculates daringly. To use his figure, a growing society emits a white light of influence, blended of three elements, the cultural, political, and economic—and the external society imitates the dominant pattern voluntarily. But as the society which is dominant undergoes disintegration this composite is diffracted into separate rays of radiation, the economic travelling at the highest velocity, the political next, and the cultural (non-material culture) slowest of all. The outer barbarians adopt the economic and technological practices of the dominant civilization and gradually turn them against a society already weakened from within. With the use of these technological and military aids, the barbarians increase their power with every fresh invasion while they exhaust the civilized society more with each attack (Vol. V, pp. 197 ff). Toynbee also portrays vividly the dilemma of the intelligentsia belonging to a conquered race, and although he does not employ the term "marginal man," his denotation is precisely the same. Space does not permit a discussion of Toynbee's contributions in the field of social psychology, his descriptions of "schism in the soul" and his interesting types of archaism, futurism, detachment, and transfiguration. They are illustrated in profuse detail in the fifth and sixth volumes.

It is hard to appraise a work of such vast scope and genuine erudition. Those who are accustomed to homogeneity of treatment will find it full of blurred outlines—it is at once a scientific study, a philosophy of history, a mine of apt quotations, a consideration of "social problems," and a prolegomenon to a theology. It has no genre. The author has made his own mold and is not to be fettered with those of others. In the accomplishment of his monumental historical task, Toynbee has found it necessary to come to grips with sociological problems without the equipment that the social scientist could furnish him. He shows little acquaintance with the labors of Pareto, Durkheim, the two Webers, Wiese, or Thurnwald. With this knowledge his task would have been much lighter and far more adequate. But it must be remembered that if Toynbee had waited to assimilate

sociological theory before beginning his historical researches, he might never have brought his work to fruition. The cause for astonishment is that he has forged his own tools with such consummate success. Whatever shortcomings his study may have in the way of mature sociological theory, it is nevertheless a genuine contribution to that theory.

The axiological frame of reference with which Toynbee begins is also foreign to the secular scientist, but this does not invalidate the empirical elements which are solidly established, whatever one thinks of their philosophical or theological framework. It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that when our Western society turns the corner, we may have an entirely different view of these presuppositions. It was not a theologian but Nietzsche, the devil's advocate, who once remarked, "My whole objection to the whole of English and French sociology still continues to be this, that it knows only the decadent form of society from experience, and with perfectly childlike innocence takes the instincts of decline as the norm, the standard of sociological valuations." Like Nietzsche, Toynbee fails to show how the values of science are to be preserved in the new revaluation which is to be expected when "transfiguration" arrives. Perhaps that is a failing common to all dynamists or those who hold to a "philosophy of life" rather than of reason.

Toynbee is careful not to make any prophecies regarding our own society. He asserts that we have not gone far into decline because Western civilization has not yet reached the "universal state." It would be interesting to know whether he would admit that the Nazi totalitarians might constitute this state in the future and whether in opposing it, Britain is not engaged upon a forlorn hope.

In conclusion it might be remarked that a one-volume edition of this work for undergraduates and the general reader would fill a real need—a book in which the interminable digressions, the lengthy citations and monumental detail of proof could be telescoped into reasonable length. If such a project is ever developed, it should include maps for each civilization—an aid to the reader so noticeably absent in the first six volumes. The present edition has an excellent index, however, broad in scope and carefully cross-referenced.

RICHARD A. SCHERMERHORN

*Baldwin-Wallace College*

*Die politischen Religionen.* By ERICH VOEGELIN. Stockholm: Bermann Fischer, 1939. Pp. 64.

Voegelin recognizes, as do many other social scientists, that we are living in a period of profound social crisis. He takes the position that it is largely a result of radical secularization, and that it can only be cured by a religious reawakening. The political intellectuals, he claims, fail to realize the depth and nature of this crisis. But he does not set himself up as a religious leader, nor does he preach. He analyzes the religious elements in current manifestations of political collectivism.



One of the chief reasons for misunderstanding concerning political religions derives from the symbolism of our main concepts about politics and religion. These concepts are colored by Western notions of church and state, and of special types of each, religion as "salvation and prophetic" religion, and state as the modern national state. But even the Western notion of the state as an association possessing absolute legitimate power (sovereignty) leads, upon reflection, into essentially religious questions concerning the source of legitimacy. The concept of religion is especially hard to grasp for persons in Western culture because we live in a time of segmentalized religious groups and experiences. Voegelin differentiates other-worldly and inner-worldly religion, as Weber has done, and points out differences in their respective solutions of the problems of meaning, the meaning of life, suffering, and death.

By way of background, he analyzes a type case of political religion, choosing the reign of Ikhnaton in Egypt as his example. He presents a well-founded account of the background and development of this type, as well as of the forces leading to its disintegration. Two very important reasons are suggested in relation to this latter problem. The old priesthood had been suppressed and had not been integrated with the new orientation; it, together with the military forces, was the leader of reaction. But also, the cult of the folk had been suppressed and the new religious orientation under Ikhnaton had failed to meet the religious needs of the masses; it contained no personal ethics and no solution of personal problems of life, suffering, and death.

Voegelin then analyzes types of symbolism which integrate political power and religious orientation, considering: *hierarchy* (as a way of legitimizing authority, with its apex in the supernatural), *ecclesia* (the development of a religiously and politically conscious community), *spiritual* and *temporal* (splitting the ecclesia, and resulting tension between the parts), *apocalypse* (dynamics and the role of charismatic leadership, constituting a background for the apocalyptic dynamics of modern political religions, which have even taken over the specific symbolism of the *three* realms or empires), *Leviathan* (the Commonwealth as an inner-worldly *ecclesia*, and development in the direction of secularization). More recent tendencies have led toward the development of inner-worldly religion and of myths for the effective integration of the masses.

In relation to modern problems the essential step, taken in the symbolism of *Leviathan*, was the "decapitation of God." The folk, in a mystical sense, becomes the ultimate source of legitimacy, and the *leader* is the "carrier of will and action" of the folk. And, as in the case of Ikhnaton, God (in this case the "folk") speaks only to the leader. A plebiscite is not an act of will and decision by the folk, but a ceremonial manifestation or expression of the folk.

Thus, the life of men in political communities cannot be sharply marked off as a profane sphere and considered in terms of legal forms and power structures alone. It is always built into the structure of a total orientation, involving religious elements, whether it is considered as a lower level in a hierarchy or as itself of sacred quality.

Following the tradition of Weber and Scheler, Voegelin has helped to deepen our understanding of the forces that move our contemporary crisis of civilization.

RICHARD HAYS WILLIAMS

*University of Buffalo*

*March of the Iron Men: A Social History of Union through Invention.* By ROGER BURLINGAME. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1938. Pp. xvi + 500. \$3.75.

This book undertakes to explain the history of America up to 1865 on the basis of inventions successively made and used, with some account and illustration of these, their social causation, more famous makers, and difficulties as well as effects. So the goal is the social explanation of history; the raw material, so to speak, is facts of technologic history; and the method, which should be that of social science, cannot be, because the author seems to possess no such science. Furthermore, from a purely technic raw material one cannot make a sociologic product, for social events have more causes than just invention. For instance, the vast feminist movement has far more causes than the invention of the sewing machine. Again, the author says on p. 412, that the machine age made possible the employment of the incompetents previously on charity, and, on the other hand, he talks of the idyllic labor supply in the early American factories. He seems to think that the interpretation of history is a branch of literature, and hence anyone competent to sling English is competent to interpret history; whereas we know this as a particularly tricky and difficult field of social science.

Nonetheless the book will be of considerable interest and use to social scientists for the author slings English very agreeably, the theme is rather novel and consistent, the technologic history is abundant and fairly sound, the documentation excellent, and there are extensive classified bibliographies and a reference list of events and inventions (partly uncritical). The social interpretations may just be taken as suggestions for thought. There are plenty of technologic errors, to be sure, for the field is too vast for any man's mastery; we must write from books, which in turn are full of errors, and we can thank Burlingame for having used in general the best specialized modern secondary sources. His history of the steam engine is exceptional in being very defective; for instance, he says with almost all the books that the engine was invented to pump out coal mines, whereas the first steam engines were all remote from coal, and chiefly in the tin and copper mines of Cornwall. The author has used my *Inventing the Ship* to some effect, but could have followed it further, e.g., to replace the imaginary picture of the *Savannah*; and he needed much more the companion volume, *The Sociology of Invention*. Some heroes of American invention, especially Franklin, Fitch, Oliver Evans, John Stevens, are well handled; Shreve's real invention of the Mississippi steamboat in 1816 is forgotten, and Morse is well deflated, leaving little but the indomitable energy which was his real contribution to the telegraph, though one might add his truly excellent portrait painting. Not only all the famous inventions of the period, but some others are discussed that have more importance than people think of—such as gas light-

ing, the friction match, soda water, the revolver, and interchangeable parts. Altogether it is a very useful reference and study book, for the social scientist who can roll his own interpretations.

S. C. GILFILLAN

*University of Chicago*

*Sumner Today. Selected Essays by William Graham Sumner.* Edited by MAURICE R. DAVIE. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940. Pp. xxvi+194. \$2.50.

"Sumner's penetrating clarity of vision, his detachment, his broad and sympathetic grasp of human affairs, give an ageless quality to his work." This sentence with which Julius C. Peter, president of the William Graham Sumner Club, introduces this interesting volume is an indication of the sentiment of affection and piety that has grown up around the name of William Graham Sumner, not only at Yale University but in the minds of grateful students of his works in other parts of the country. This sentiment of piety, which seeks to preserve his memory attaches rather to the character and the personality of the man than to his works. The fact is that not everything that Sumner said can be regarded as ageless. Contrast the words of Evans Clark's comment in the paper entitled "The Influence of Commercial Crises on Opinions about Economic Doctrines." Clark says: "The sharpest impression I get from reading Dr. Sumner's address on 'Commercial Crises' is its incredible antiquity." Some of these notions, along with the conditions under which they were written, are now of only historical interest.

But the principles for which Sumner fought so vigorously remain and, considering the contentious nature of the man and his problems, it is remarkable that so large a number of the ideas which he contributed to sociology and social science have remained as much alive today as they did at the time they were written. Among these are the papers on "War," "Rights," "The Scientific Attitude of Mind," and the papers entitled "Purposes and Consequences," and "The Absurd Effort to Make the World Over."

Sumner's most important contributions to social science, so far as they are presented in this volume, seem to have been the papers in which he sought to lift sociology out of the field of scholasticism in which it was born, and give it the character of an empirical science, that is to say, a science dealing with things in a dynamic world, rather than ideas in an ideal system.

Compton says that Sumner's statements in regard to the nature of science are characteristic of the early states of the development of science. "It brings to mind," Compton says, "the botanist who observes all manner of flowers and plants. What seems to me most important is that we should aim to get knowledge of realities, not of phantasms or words."

This suggests, what seems to me to be the fact, that Sumner's contribution to sociology was mainly in the field of social taxonomy. He was almost the first, I suspect, of the students in the field of sociology, to regard cus-

toms, institutions, and moral codes as data, things to be analyzed, classified, explained, rather than "evaluated," that is, praised or condemned.

I believe that Sumner would be the last man to regard his contributions to social science as "ageless"—at least ageless in the sense that his ideas were to be preserved as embodied in the form in which they were originally presented. Rather he would want the scientific spirit which animated him and the insights with which he reenforced that spirit to continue to inspire students and encourage them to further discoveries in the field in which he worked.

ROBERT E. PARK

*Fisk University*

*Essays in Sociology.* Edited by C. W. M. HART. Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 1940. Pp. viii+95. \$2.00.

In honor of an anniversary and in anticipation of some expansion of its work in sociology, the University of Toronto invited five sociologists (including two of her own), to give a lecture each on this—to Torontonians—new and strange subject. The running theme is the relation of sociology to the other social sciences. Park goes still further afield, for his paper, *Physics and Society*, contains observations on the relation of the physical sciences to society, if not to sociology. He at once indicates the peculiar subject matter of sociology and takes a deserved thrust at physical scientists when he says that while societies have existed without science, none have existed without sentiments. The paper also contains a good statement of Park's now familiar scheme of the various orders of human relations.

Dawson's paper is a good resumé of the rise and accomplishments of that kind of sociology in which he himself has been the Canadian pioneer—the sociology which studies "the family, ethnic groups, communities, regions considered as constellations of communities, and social institutions."

Talcott Parsons, in a closely reasoned paper, develops the theme that economic behavior is a phase of institutional behavior. The "rational pursuit of self-interest" may do well enough as an assumption for the traditional kind of economic analysis, but such analysis leaves important areas, even of economic behavior, out of consideration. The reviewer would like to add a point which Parsons, perhaps out of professional delicacy, did not develop; that the so-called institutional economists have need of the sociological system of concepts if their work is to be anything more than history or unsystematic description.

S. D. Clark, in "Economic Expansion and the Moral Order," coordinates Canada's social history with her expansion into the west. I doubt whether readers will admit that he has proved his thesis that the general lines of Canadian social development have been determined by the forces of economic expansion, with political forces acting as qualifying factors.

C. W. M. Hart in "Some Obstacles to a Scientific Sociology," finds the obstacles to be the traditional psychologists and liberal sociologists who are unable to abandon their assumption that man is a free, rational being. He points to the Freudians and the functional anthropologists as the

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pioneers in a kind of social observation in which values and sentiments—the non-rational aspects of human behavior—are accepted as the basic data. Admitting a large part of Hart's criticism, we might remind him that the fundamental concepts in sociology (interaction, mores, attitudes, primary group, to mention but a few) have arisen from the attempt to draw into the field of observation and analysis the very aspects of human behavior which he would have us observe. It is true that Sumner writes as though he were enraged at finding people so illogical; but we may well, from our later and superior vantage-point, forgive him his illogical rage, since he arrived at such a logical conclusion.

EVERETT CHERRINGTON HUGHES

University of Chicago

*Enciclopedia României*. Ed. by PROF. DR. DIMITRIE GUSTI. Vol. I: *Statul* (The State); Vol. II: *Tara Romaneasca* (The Roumanian Land). Bucharest: *Asociatia Stiintifica pentru Enciclopedia României*, 1938-1939. Pp. xii+1052; xv+755.

The influence of Dr. Gusti's sociology, which has received well-deserved attention in this country, has won further recognition in the planning, preparation and editorship of the first two of the promised six volumes of *The Roumanian Encyclopedia*. This impressive work reminds us, in a way, of the sociological approach of the Hoover Research Committee's *Recent Social Trends*, while pointing out the fundamental difference between the aims of Dr. Gusti and Dr. Ogburn. The latter, if I judge correctly, was primarily interested in the problems of sociological pathology as a result of our technological changes. Dr. Gusti is here less interested in social problems and more in the description of Roumania's actualities. From this point of view, *Recent Social Trends* is not a record of national life as is Dr. Gusti's *opus magnum*, which covers an astounding number of subjects, from history, population and geography to the political, administrative, economic, and judicial structure of Roumania and her educational, social, and agrarian policies. The extent of the work is indicated by the fact that Volume I has been prepared by 63 collaborators and Volume II, which describes adequately, if succinctly, all counties and cities of Roumania, by 44 co-authors, most of whom are specialists in their fields and often well known beyond the borders of their homeland. Dr. Gusti's Introduction deals with the steps which have led to the realization of his plan for the *Encyclopedia*. It makes very interesting reading, because it shows not only what obstacles a sociologist has to overcome in order to attain his aims, but how brilliantly plans can be carried out in a country which the popular mind has often considered "less civilized." To make the story short, Dr. Gusti began to evolve his plans immediately after the World War. By 1930 his Sociological Institute was ready to give effective assistance with the full cooperation of King Carol II, its active President, and the several Royal Foundations. From the very start, Dr. Gusti departed from the universalist ideas of d'Alembert and Diderot and the scheme of a universal encyclopedia with alphabetical headings in favor of a national record expressing not the essence of an epoch

but that of the life of a whole people and depicting the manifold aspects of a state as they emerge from thousands of meticulous monographic researches undertaken over a number of years.

The result must receive our enthusiastic commendation. No one can read this publication in a short time, nor can the whole as yet be envisaged from the examination of the first two volumes. We must, therefore, reserve a final judgment until the publication of the other four volumes, on national economy and economic organizations, and national culture and cultural institutions. But so far as can be judged now, Dr. Gusti's latest achievement is a model of sociological research and planning which will be extremely helpful to sociologists hoping to carry out similar syntheses in their respective countries. The only important omission here is that of a study of the Roumanian minorities abroad. Innumerable photographs, charts, diagrams, maps and bibliographies will prove of interest even to the casual reader.

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

*Hofstra College*

*The Economic Life of Primitive Peoples.* By MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1940. Pp. xl+492. \$4.50.

In his preface Herskovits makes the objectives of his book perfectly clear. "The aim of this book is to present some of the available information concerning the economic life of primitive peoples, to consider some of the questions in economic science that are susceptible of examination through the use of these data, and to suggest lines of attack which may be profitably defined for future research in the field of comparative economics."

Once and for all, Herskovits disposes of the still too prevalent notion that the economics of primitive man are radically different in kind from our own. His material shows convincingly that everywhere preliterate groups have organized systems of production, exchange and consumption; that everywhere there are regulations defining the ownership of material goods. He hastens to say, however, that there are significant differences between literate and preliterate economies, and that these are attributable to one outstanding difference, namely, the presence or absence of the *machine*. Because of the machine, the so-called modern economies manifest a greater degree of specialization of labor, and a greater emphasis on the market and the medium of exchange as a measure of value and a resultant greater complexity. Machine economies, he adds, are also characterized by a few unique institutions, like the business cycle, the creation of artificial scarcity of goods, and the setting up of the sale of goods for profit as an end rather than as a means.

The bulk of the book is taken up with a descriptive comparison of selected examples of such economic categories as production, exchange, and consumption, in a large number of preliterate economies. While Herskovits is undoubtedly one of the first anthropologists to use economic categories consistently and with understanding, the question inevitably arises whether such economic categories should be used to classify fragmentary and widely varying data, or whether these categories should be used as tools for the

analysis of a few completely described economic systems. Nowhere in the book do we get a well-rounded description of a functioning economic organization that would stand comparison with another. Even on the descriptive level, a few well-chosen, completely described, economies would have satisfied the curious more than a complex array of unrelated parts.

The question becomes even more serious if one asks, "Why were these comparisons made?" Even the so-called orthodox economists describe a more or less hypothetical *laissez faire* economy not for itself, but in order to discover the underlying forces governing changes in prices, profits, wages, rent, and interest rates. A few well-chosen economic systems might have been compared, (1) as to the interdependence of the various parts in different types of functioning economies; or (2) by showing the influence of the adjustment to physical environment on the other parts of an economy. Since differences between literate and pre-literate economies are explained as due to the influence of machine technology, is it not similarly possible to attribute variations in primitive economies, let us say, to a specific type of hunting technology, to specific techniques of agriculture, or to pastoralism?

"The consideration of questions in economic science" is not particularly fruitful. The controversy about primitive communism vs. individualism has worn so thin that it is no longer worthy of serious consideration. The discussion of environmental and economic determinism is not exhaustive, and these theories still need further discussion in the light of recent field material. Similarly, the discussion of the third objective is somewhat vague, and fails to offer concrete suggestions for future research in the field of comparative economics.

KALERVO OBERG

*United States Department of Agriculture*

*Punishment in the Philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas and Among Some Primitive Peoples.* By GEORGE QUENTIN FRIEL of the Order of Preachers. Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1939. Pp. 308.

It is with a certain amazement and uneasiness that the reviewer turns from the title to the perusal of this book. What could be the relation of the profound medieval religious thinker to the lower nomads of America and Asia? Is there any affinity between European civilization in the beginning of the fourteenth century and the social, economic, and moral conditions of the tribes inhabiting northern Siberia or Tierra del Fuego?

Thomas Aquinas has formulated a famous philosophy of natural law; and it certainly was the purpose of the author (albeit he defends himself from such an implication) to prove that the main traits of this philosophical system can be found in the legal or moral practice of many primitive tribes. "Some of the primitive ideas of punishments," he contends, "are quite similar to Saint Thomas' doctrines concerning the essential notes of penalty" (p. 289). In another passage the author justifies his paradoxical parallel with these words: "... We have a veritable wilderness of statutory laws. But what we need today is a philosophy of penalty, a philosophy that will

attempt to solve the problem, not by filling in chinks in the already gaping apertures of the social order, but which will propose right remedial measures. In order to do that we must go back and study the nature of man as he is and not as a sentimental philosophy would wish him to be" (p. ix).

The author discusses carefully and at length the nature of punishment, the grades, the purpose, and the methods of punishment as approved by Thomas Aquinas. In conformity with his times the great philosopher sanctioned the death penalty for adultery and the rape of a cloistered nun, sanctioned the mutilating penalty of blinding, the torture, and flagellation. To him it was not illicit to keep a person in prison "as a precautionary measure in order to avoid some evil" (p. 59). "This is especially true in the case of the crime of heresy. A known propagandist of heretical teachings may be jailed so that he will not be able to spread his evil doctrines" (ibid.). The reviewer mentions these few points to show that the great thinker of the sixteenth century was still a child of his age. We turn away from the killing of the heretic, whether he is religious or a political dissenter, and cannot accept the doctrine: "It is far graver to corrupt faith through which life is sustained. Wherefore, if counterfeiters and other malefactors are immediately and justly put to death by secular princes, far more justly can heretics . . ." (p. 65). It may be that Thomas Aquinas would have changed his mind in learning that we do not hang counterfeiters anymore.

In a suggestive part the book raises a real problem of social history. It is the section which deals with the non-human agencies of penalty. According to the author they comprise the so-called automatic sanctions, God as the law-giver and punisher, and punishment after death (pp. 139-160 and 230-282).

In reflecting on the tremendous widening which this ideology gave to the efficacy and virtue of the criminal law, we see how restricted has become the arsenal of our detective and punitive means, in spite of patrol cars, police radios, and lie-detectors. Thomas Aquinas believed in some sort of automatic penalty. It was not the intuition of the primitive tribes which fancies that sin or offense brings ill fortune, drought, illness, death. It was a higher form of belief, although the common root is easy to recognize. He thought that "every sin has a concomitant penalty which accompanies the sin itself. This concomitant penalty is the remorse of the conscience for the inordinate soul is a penalty to itself" (p. 142). And besides this remorse of conscience the offender is by physical or metaphysical necessity punished by the loss of divine grace and disturbance of his psychic faculties, and through this disturbance the loss of peace (p. 300).

If we add to this intrinsic penalty the sanctions which are dispensed by high, superior, or supreme beings and enlarge the sphere of punishment beyond this shortlived temporal world into the space of eternity, we see that this system would be much more efficient than our poor and limited penal practice. However, the history of crime during the Middle Ages, as far as we know it, does not show that this philosophy of natural law possessed a higher virtue than our rather timid positivism.

Although the reviewer does not accept the thesis of the book, he has en-



joyed thoroughly the stimulation of many facts which have been gathered by the author. Obviously the idea of an automatic penalty stems from the stage of mankind in which most of its social relations were ruled and explained by magic connections. The broken oath fell upon the perpetrator because the elements involved in the ceremony of taking an oath, water, iron, stone or fire, were believed to be full of secret powers of retaliation. Later, higher beings, for instance the Erinyes, took the place of magic substances, and finally in our modern world superior or supreme beings have ceded the seat of the judge to fallible human beings. Only the curse remains as a last remnant of the magical origins of punishment, and a primitive belief still arms the poorest of the poor: beggars, women, blind people and the forlorn who are in need of help and hospitality with this imaginary weapon.

All these objections do not affect the excellent presentation of Thomas Aquinas' doctrine and the careful collection of ethnological materials, but the reviewer cannot see how the burning social problems of the machine age can be solved by the prescriptions of the Middle Ages or the empirical recipes of lower nomads.

HANS VON HENTIG

*University of Colorado*

*Essays in Polynesian Ethnology.* By ROBERT W. WILLIAMSON. Edited by Ralph Piddington. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1940. Pp. xlii+373. 10 plates, 2 maps. \$7.00.

The first half of this book comprises the last of the notes on Polynesian institutions compiled by the late R. W. Williamson from explorers' accounts, adding to his well-known half dozen of volumes on Central Polynesian society and religion, material on a few special institutions including the Arioi of Tahiti, and the kava ceremony of the west.

The second half of the volume is Piddington's own contribution. It is an important one, dealing with the worth of ethnology to historical reconstruction, and with the worth of the latter as a scientific aim. To begin with, he attacks the classic belief that the divergences within Polynesian culture were due to there having been at least two different waves of original immigrants, a belief which has been subscribed to by students of races as well as ethnologists. His is the alternative hypothesis (which surprisingly has hardly ever been stated) that, given a single original Polynesian immigration, there were enough factors (in the form of differing environments, individual inclinations and so forth, all of which is obvious enough) making for internal change to have produced the differentiation of historic times. He does not consider all proponents of the "two-strata" theory, and selects Handy as his special victim. Piddington disparages the comparative method of seeking parallels in culture traits, and shows weaknesses in Handy's use of them; he confines himself in his own treatment to a few features such as the Arioi, the chieftainship, and the status of the god Tangaroa, ably showing that there existed in Polynesian society known forces (as well as ordinary social needs) which would have caused differentiation and the appearance

of special traits. However, his attention is so fixed on the errors of Handy and others that motes in his own eye pass unnoticed. In drawing strict lines between his own stand and the older one, he fails to consider the possibility that the original immigration may not have been as simple as he seems to suppose.

Piddington is of course a "functionalist," and an avowed and militant one, outdoing his masters. His excellent study of an important problem in Polynesian history is prefaced and summarized by a tart impeachment, both of the methods he himself uses, and of historical questions as having more than the merest claims on the attention of an ethnologist. Any student who is not perfectly sure of the applicability of his research to immediate problems is going to feel severely admonished by Mr. Piddington. If his purpose is to put the quietus to attempts to reconstruct history from ethnographical data, particularly in Polynesia, he is not likely to succeed. He is more likely, ironically, to put new life into an old discussion. His book in any case is to be praised.

W. W. HOWELLS

*University of Wisconsin*

*Ethnologische Studien an Indonesischen Schöpfungsmythen.* W. MÜNSTERBERGER. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1940. Pp. xii+244. Gld. 5.

This is a study of the distribution of cosmogonical ideas in the western part of the East Indies. The author undertakes a historical reconstruction of the diffusion of the basic elements in the creation myths of several selected peoples in the area. His approach is eclectic, principally a combination of *Kulturkreis* method, Freudian interpretation, and the more or less standardized symbolic system of folklore specialists. He deserves credit for carrying none of these to an extreme, although personally I do object mildly to certain of his presuppositions concerning early waves of migration into Indonesia (taken over, with minor alterations, from the *Kulturkreis* school) and to some of his flights of Freudian fancy. Moreover, Münsterberger has a disturbing habit of making broad generalizations about the mental processes of "archaic" man as distinct from those of "modern" man.

Any book of this sort is subject to a fundamental, almost inevitable, weakness in that it presents theories derived from study of the distribution of a single trait complex, with little attention to other cultural patternings. In this particular case, furthermore, physical and linguistic correlations are sadly lacking. It seems to me that any theories thus evolved should be phrased in more tentative terms than the present author is disposed to use.

Despite the foregoing critical remarks, I believe that the volume should be of considerable value to ethnologists and others interested in mythology and folklore. It deals with an area of the world little known to American scholars because most of the pertinent literature is in Dutch; it treats a subject that lies close to the heart of all cultural structures, man's conception of his universe and its origin; and, finally, while original and stimulating, it lapses only occasionally into errors of discrimination and balance.

RAYMOND KENNEDY

*Yale University*

*Geschichte und Kultur des Incareiches.* By HEINRICH CUNOW. Amsterdam: Elzevir, 1939. Pp. xvi+208.

This book is based on Spanish chronicles rather than on the results of information gained from excavations directed by Tello, Uhle, Varcancel and certain American universities. It is of interest, first, because the author, a moderate Marxist, contradicts the orthodox Marxist theory of Incan communism by emphasizing certain elements of private economy in their life; next, because he stresses the importance of the pre-Incan Quetchuas and Chimu civilizations and proves that the unity of Incan administration—recently exaggerated by the otherwise meritorious French investigator, Baudin—consisted chiefly of a unified system of levying tribute on conquered tribes. Moreover, the book may be of importance in considering the question of the proper method of explaining the appearance in the Andes and in old Asiatic civilizations of similar phenomena, whether that should be attributed to foreign influence or to parallel independent development. He presents new material to prove the existence of totemism in regions where the llama had been domesticated but he does not seem to see the essential point: that this development from totemism to animal husbandry is, as was proved in German and Spanish publications of the writer of this review, the same process, essentially, in Asia and in the Andes, yet independently effected. The material may be of value, nevertheless, for modifying the exaggerations of certain modern adherents to the theory of migration, and for the accentuation of the fact that if in two regions in the world the same factors are operating together the same development may appear as a separate spontaneous result.

PAUL HONIGSHEIM

*Michigan State College*

*The Maya and Their Neighbors.* New York and London: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1940. Pp. xxiii+606. 22 plates, 40 figures, map, 11 tables. \$6.00.

*The Chorti Indians of Guatemala.* By CHARLES WISDOM. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1940. Pp. xiv+490. 12 photographs, 12 figures. \$4.50.

*South of Yesterday.* By GREGORY MASON. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1940. Pp. x+401. 3 maps, 53 photographs. \$3.00.

*The Maya and Their Neighbors* is a collection of thirty-four essays by as many authors dealing with anthropological problems of the Maya area and regions to the north and south. The volume is intended to offer a summary of current opinion on the field of Middle American anthropology. The essays are grouped into the following sections: 1) The Background of the Maya, 2) The Maya, 3) The Northern Neighbors of the Maya, and 4) The Southern Neighbors of the Maya. Geographically, the discussion ranges from the Andes to north and east of the Rio Grande, with attention focused on Middle America. Problems of physical anthropology, linguistics and ethnology are covered, but the emphasis is on archaeology. In scope, there is a range from problems in hemispheric setting and areal surveys to technical studies

of Maya epigraphy, astronomy, architecture and ceramics. In the concluding essay Kroeber ably summarizes these contributions and places them in the broader setting of American anthropology as a whole. A very extensive and valuable bibliography concludes the volume.

This book fills a long felt need for the assemblage and synthesis in one volume of the accumulated knowledge of Middle American anthropology; these essays make new contributions to that body of knowledge as well. The work is of great importance to Middle American specialists and to all Americanists, and is also of interest to students of culture in general.

Wisdom's book is a very complete ethnography of the Chorti-speaking Indians. Their habitat is east-central Guatemala, where they have lived since the Conquest and probably before that time. Linguistically they belong to the southern Maya group (of Yucatan, British Honduras and northern Guatemala). Except for an isolated group across the border in British Honduras, the Chorti occupy a continuous area. The larger towns within this area and the territory surrounding it are occupied mainly by *ladinos* (those who are culturally not Indians). A few Indians live in the towns and work as day laborers. They are, of course, the least "Indian" (and least respected by Indians). The Chorti themselves are wholly independent of the *ladinos*, aside from obtaining from them cloth, matches and a few other items. Except for attendance at church and less regular use of the schools, the Indians are unaffected by the non-Indian town culture.

The Chorti are primarily a maize-growing, agricultural people. Their territory is highland and lowland but their staples, maize and beans, are grown everywhere. In addition, they raise crops suitable to local conditions which they trade among themselves. There are also handicrafts, such as the making of pottery and textiles, each with its area of specialization. Marketing and exchange among the Indians are of considerable importance to the local economy. Processed sugar, tobacco, and some manufactured goods, are sold to the *ladinos*.

Wisdom describes the whole round of Chorti life: agriculture, manufacturing, trade, food preparation and storage, division of labor, political and social organization, medicine, and religious activities. The description is given primarily in terms of ideal patterns with a minimum of case materials. Aside from statements that there are exceptions, there is little indication of the range of behavior within the patterns outlined. The account reads well and easily but to a certain extent lacks life and the perspective one would get from a less idealized picture. This is perhaps more than one should ask from a *first* account of any people, but since it seems to be true that even the most conservative groups do not adhere completely to the ideals of their social pattern, knowledge of the extent of divergence is important.

*South of Yesterday* deals with Maya archaeology in Yucatan, British Honduras, Honduras, and Guatemala, and with the Goajiro and Kagaba Indians of Colombia and the archaeological remains of the extinct Taironas of Colombia. The book is, in a sense, a hybrid, since strictly professional chapters alternate with quite popular sections.

The Maya material includes an account of an aerial archaeological survey

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over Yucatan, Guatemala, and British Honduras, a summary of some archaeological features of the east coast Maya, and a chapter on equipment for jungle archaeology. In the Colombia section of the book the author looks for traces of the Tairona Indians, whose skillful gold-working, among other achievements, was often reported in early Spanish documents. He searches for such traces both in the archaeological remains attributed to the Taironas and in the culture of the contemporary Kagabas who now occupy the former Tairona territory. He points out a close cultural connection between the Kagabas and the Taironas, and suggests, awaiting confirmatory evidence, that the Taironas were of Carib stock which moved north along the eastern South American coast. In this hypothesis he has the support of P. A. Means. Mason also suggests a connection between the Taironas and the Chiriqui of Panama, and with the Maya of Honduras. The latter suggestion is not entirely accepted by some Maya experts.

There is an extensive bibliography, of which the most valuable part is the section on Colombia archaeology and ethnology.

*State College of Washington*

DONALD COLLIER

*Comerio. A Study of a Puerto Rican Town.* By CHARLES C. ROGLER. Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Publications, Social Science Studies, 1940. Pp. 196.

During the spring and summer of 1935 Rogler and his assistants studied Comerío, an inland Puerto Rican town. Conditions at the time of the research are emphasized, though historical material is introduced to account for the present racial mixture and for the blend of Indian, Spanish, and American traits which marks the culture. In an appendix the techniques used for accumulating the evidence are discussed. Direct questioning without other checks was found to be of limited value; "... no matter how disarming may have been the personality and the method of the interviewer and the type of question asked, the answer received often appeared to be either unreliable or incomplete." Concerning the usefulness of the statistical approach the author says: "Quantitative values were never able to stand alone; qualitative data were essential in bringing out their significance." Consequently, interesting verbatim statements of informants are frequently employed to give insight and context.

The principal determinants of Comerío life seem to be a one-crop economy (tobacco) subject to much fluctuation of price and threatened further by soil erosion, soil exhaustion, and recurring hurricanes; concentration of wealth and land ownership; a density of population six and one-half times that of New York City; one of the highest birth rates in the world and an equally impressive infant mortality rate; abject poverty, malnutrition, and related sicknesses; an attitude of fatalism growing out of these and other discouraging circumstances. In spite of certain relieving factors such as the kindness and hospitality of the people, the reader is likely to feel that he has been through a social worker's nightmare.

*Claremont Colleges*

MORRIS EDWARD OPLER

*Los Tarascos*. Monografía Histórica, Etnográfica y Económica. Trabajo dirigido por el Lic. LUCIO MENDIETA y NUÑEZ. Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales. Mexico: Imprenta Universitaria, 1940, Pp. lxxiii+311.

This work consists of ten essays by ten different Mexican writers on the Tarascan Indians of Michoacan. One contribution deals with the Tarascans in times before the Conquest. There is a general account of the people in colonial times, and there is a short article on colonial architecture of the region. Six sections deal with as many aspects of the contemporary life. The general editor of the work contributes a section of indeterminable purpose entitled "Monographic Synthesis."

The scientific worth of these pages is, on the average, low. With exceptions, the topics are treated superficially, repetitiously, and without reference to any clearly stated scientific or historical problem. Facts are diluted in verbiage, and much is written which is not worth saying. "The popular festivals . . . were of religious nature and consisted of rites, ceremonies and dances in the temples, which took place at certain dates" (li) is a not unfair example. Thirty-nine pages are given over to repetitious sketches of Indian huts and copies of each separate completed schedule reporting simple facts about housing in certain villages. There is much duplication in material presented, and in some cases this duplication shows that the same source has been differently copied or reported, as in the two statements on marriage in pre-Columbian times (xlvi, 37). The account of changes in the culture in colonial times is so vague as to be useless. The value of the chapter on race (a summary of a larger forthcoming work) is indicated by the facts that it attempts to combine cultural and biological criteria, that it presents no anthropometric data, and that it offers classification of the Tarascan Indians in terms of most of the somatic and psychological categories that the vagrant literature of the field has proposed. Historical sources are inadequately cited, or not cited at all. There is no index.

On the other hand, some parts of the book are better than the foregoing statements would suggest. The future student of Tarascan ethnology will find in this volume: a fair bibliography; a discussion of the principal historical sources; a sketch of the history of the area; a list of the principal villages which are Tarascan; information on the general outlines of the culture; and fairly specific facts on handicrafts and their localization. The reader may also catch, in these pages, glimpses of matters that may appeal to his investigative imagination. One such is suggested by the reported importance of the division of the people, in many of the Tarascan villages, into conflicting parties; conservatives (*catolicos* or *tradicionalistas*), and radicals (*agraristas*, 161, 281 ff.). This division, little studied, plays an important part in rural life in much of Mexico today. Another invitation to special study is given by the brief report of the place in the village cult of a real historical personage, a sixteenth century bishop, who has now become a sort of culture-hero in the religious ritual of the people.

ROBERT REDFIELD

University of Chicago

*Red Carolinians.* By CHAPMAN J. MILLING. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1940. Pp. xxi+438. Illustrations, bibliography and index. \$4.00.

Any reader who understands and appreciates how much labor is required to produce an authentic volume of history will be impressed by the amount of painstaking research that must have been given to this volume on an obscure and much involved subject. The book is the story of those Indian tribes in contact with provincial South Carolina which must include a large number of those whose actual homeland lay outside the boundaries of the present state. Some of these tribes such as Cusabo, Westo, or Catawba have almost, if not wholly, disappeared while others such as the Cherokee are still an important people. The chapter on the removal of the Cherokees to Oklahoma seems necessary in order to round out the story and is very interesting though it takes the reader a long way from the territorial limits of the Carolinas and the subject has been treated in more comprehensive fashion by a number of other authors. The narrative is brought up to more recent times by a brief statement of the part played by Cherokee leaders in the development of Oklahoma and an interesting chapter on the history and present situation of the Eastern Cherokees in North Carolina.

The volume is beautifully printed and bound, has a number of attractive illustrations, and an excellent bibliography and index. This is a book which is invaluable to the student of Indian relations in the colonial period of our history and which can hardly fail to interest even the casual reader.

EDWARD EVERETT DALE

*University of Oklahoma*

*A Social Study of One Hundred and Fifty Chippewa Indian Families of the White Earth Reservation of Minnesota.* By SISTER M. INEZ HILGER. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1939. Pp. xii+251. \$2.50.

This monograph is a study of the housing conditions and house types of the White Earth Indian Reservation, and the relationship of material possessions and social attitudes of the Indian families to their type of houses—tar-paper shack or frame house. That houses among reservation Indians are an index of anything is an assumption which the author does not attempt to demonstrate. This is the first of many points which show the author has little appreciation of culture values of the former or contemporary Chippewa. All housing on the White Earth Reservation, with few exceptions, is apparently so poor that the distinction made between families in tar-paper or frame houses becomes meaningless.

The study contains some excellent material, in quoted Indian attitudes and the actual functioning of some elements of White civilization, for the student of Indian reservation changes. For instance, the author gives in discussion, but not in tabular form, the effect of Church laws concerning divorce and abortion on the type of marriage and the number of illegitimate births among groups of different religious affiliations.

Field workers with Indians will question the value of information con-

cerning social and religious beliefs and activities, gathered by direct questioning and a questionnaire technique. The items of the questionnaire reveal a lack of appreciation of the necessity of studying the function of material equipment or house parts in the lives of the families before any true evaluation of their appearance can be made. The questionnaire also reveals by its classifications a strong bias from the point of view of American civilization on the part of the author. Although the state of transition from one culture to another and the evidence of acculturation or deculturation of the Chippewa are recognized, existing Chippewa cultural values are not appreciably considered. For example, Indian marriages are called "common-law" and described as unsanctioned and "without weddings and exchange of vows," although Indian marriage customs are described. An estimate of privacy or the lack of it, the use of clocks or the possession of guns as "an expression of personality" seems to show little comprehension of Indian culture past or present. This bias and opinion that American civilization is the goal for a segregated minority group, in which 148 of 150 families have to receive some form of government aid in order to exist, mar the whole treatment of the study. A re-analysis of the pertinent data would make a better contribution to the social studies of Indian reservations.

GORDON MACGREGOR

*Washington, D.C.*

*Ingalik Material Culture.* By CORNELIUS OSGOOD. New Haven: Yale University Press 1940. Pp. 511, 11 pls. \$4.00.

The Ingalik, perhaps better known as the Tena or the Khotana, are a Northern Athabaskan tribe living in villages along the lower Yukon. Like other Athabascans of the Yukon area their material culture depends largely on salmon and caribou for food, and spruce and caribou for manufacturing materials. Their manner of living, however, is probably more sedentary than that of the tribes farther up the river.

Dr. Osgood's study, which is based on field work at Anvik village in the summers of 1934 and 1937, is notable for two features. In the first place it constitutes an extremely detailed description of 339 separate items of the material culture of these Indians. The specialist in ethnography or technology will appreciate this meticulous detail, illustrated as it is by many line drawings and diagrams. Most sociologists and anthropologists, however, will be interested more in the conceptual system that the author has devised to present his material.

To begin with, he defines culture as consisting of "all ideas concerning human beings which have been communicated to one's mind and of which one is conscious," and then proceeds to subdivide this concept into three categories: (1) Ideas about objects external to the mind directly resulting from human behavior as well as ideas about the human behavior required to manufacture these objects; (2) Ideas about human behavior not directly resulting in the manufacture of objects external to the mind; (3) Ideas about ideas involving no human behavior (apart from speech) nor objects directly resulting from such behavior.



The present study obviously concerns only the first of these, and in it the author proceeds to describe each Ingalik material trait under the following heads: (1) Appearance; (2) Name (including an analysis in English of all compound native terms); (3) Manufacture: a. Material, b. Construction, c. Variations, d. Where made, e. When made, f. Maker; (4) Use: a. Function, b. Method, c. Variations, d. Where used, e. When used, f. User, g. Length of life, h. Ownership.

Such a method does result in an accurate and uniform description of the various items. On the other hand, the severe separation of the objective from the subjective results in an incomplete and artificial picture of the culture as a whole. There is little meat here for the sociologist interested in cultural change, or the anthropologist interested in the historical reconstruction of American Indian cultures. Again, there is little in this method that is helpful for the social psychologist. Students of Athabascan ethnography will thank Osgood for his meticulous description of the various material traits; but an understanding of Ingalik culture as a complete and living whole must await the publication of Dr. Osgood's promised studies of the social and ideational aspects of that culture.

ROBERT McKENNAN

*Dartmouth College*

*Penobscot Man: The Life History of a Forest Tribe in Maine.* By FRANK G. SPECK. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1940. Pp. xx+325. Map, 81 figures. \$4.00.

This is Speck's long-awaited monograph on the Penobscot. It was well worth waiting for, for it measures up to all we expected from the man who knows the Penobscot best.

Nearly the whole range of Penobscot culture is covered: tribal name and habitat; food, shelter, dress, travel, and transportation; art and recreation; social, economic, and political institutions; the life cycle. Religious beliefs and folk-lore, treated in previously published papers, are not included. The data are derived from field work carried out in 1907-14, with some follow-up in 1914-18 and 1936. They are described by the author as "documents of the thought and action of old Indians at a time when, as little more than a boy, I traveled and camped with them by day and by night, watched them and wrote down their verbal offerings drawn from experience and memory, going back to their own youth and childhood."

Documents they are that for the first time give us a revealing close-up of the daily life of these hunting forest folk, who amidst movies and mills and curious tourists, still keep much of their ancient outlook and ethos.

The work is marked throughout by sympathetic insight (and in ethnological field studies can we have insight without sympathy?), an insight that is rigidly objective, and a sympathy that never runs away with judgment. The Penobscot are fortunate to have so thoroughly competent a chronicler. Both they and science are in debt to him for this superb record of a vanishing culture.

JOHN M. COOPER

*Catholic University of America*

*Akiga's Story; The Tiv Tribe as Seen by One of its Members.* Translated and Annotated by RUPERT EAST. International Institute of African Languages and Cultures. New York: Oxford University Press, 1939. Pp. xv and 436. \$7.00.

The Tiv are a farming tribe of half a million in Northern Nigeria, better known as the Munshi. The author, Akiga, was the first of them to come under intensive Western influence and mission schooling. The book is drawn from materials on a "history" of the tribe which he gathered during twenty years. Selection, editing, and commentary, occasionally somewhat laborious, are contributed by Mr. East, Senior Education Officer, Nigeria. Akiga's is probably the most articulate and sophisticated work written by a native on his tribal culture. Unfortunately he is all too brief on autobiographic matters. His view of the culture is affectionate, understanding, and responsive. Although not a rounded monograph, the book is invaluable for intimate observations, for instance, on ridicule by already initiated companions as a force compelling youngsters to undergo painful initiations, or the elusive language spoken in witchcraft trials. The curious "anti-medicine" movements which he describes represent a unique symptom of social stress.

Not the least value of the work is that it gives an intelligent native reaction to administrative policies, sometimes with a gently ironic overtone. The most important of several Tiv marriage forms was the "exchange marriage": two groups exchanging women, e.g., two men exchanging for marriage their classificatory sisters. The British, chiefly under missionary pressure, compelled the natives to give this up for a lesser evil: marriage with bride-price arrangement. By the time the British realized the havoc they had wrought, it was late. The breaking down of exchange marriage made the young people independent of the authority of kin group and elders, and Western culture did not offer satisfactory substitutes for native sanctions. "Indirect Rule" is somewhat problematic among the so-called pagan tribes of Nigeria such as the Tiv since they never had truly functioning chiefs. Mr. East sees Christianity as the next and only hope.

GEORGE HERZOG

Columbia University

*The Social Institutions of the Kipsigis.* By J. G. PERISTIANY. Introduction by E. E. EVANS-PRITCHARD. London: George Routledge and Sons, Ltd., 1939. Pp. xxxiv+288. 18 shillings.

Students familiar with the tribal map of Africa may be surprised to learn that Kipsigis is the correct native name for the "Lumbwa" people, in the grassy highlands of Kenya. The subject of this book is therefore enough to give it an importance which will not be obvious to the uninformed shopper: there are eighty thousand Kipsigis, outnumbering the Masai, the Nandi, or any other tribe in their Nilo-Hamitic language group. Though they have frequently appeared in the literature, this is the first full, authoritative, volume devoted to them.

Peristiany learned more than could be expected in only nine months among a tribe so hostile to Europeans. His book is short, but not a page is

wasted. Data may be added by men whose longer contact enables them to learn the language, to gather anecdotes and native biographies, and to penetrate the obscurities of psychology, magic, and religion—where Peristiany admits his deficiency. But a more comprehensive work on the Kipsigis will probably never be written. An introduction by E. E. Evans-Pritchard, famous for his superb elucidation of the Azande and Nuer cultures, is the strongest possible credential; and Peristiany's tribute to two such divergent masters as R. R. Marett and Bronislaw Malinowski gives us faith in his breadth of view.

Though he says little about the cultural relationship of the Kipsigis with other African groups, he provides some good material for comparative studies. Like most of their neighbours, the Kipsigis fight with long-bladed throwing-spears, drink blood from the neck of the living ox, rate their potters and blacksmiths as an inferior caste, pay for their brides in cattle, and divide all adults into a series of age-sets, with circumcision as the starting-point for each set. True to Nilo-Hamitic type, their folk-tales and myths are meagre and unimaginative, in contrast to the lively folklore of the Bantu. Though they reckon their wealth in cattle, they differ from most Nilo-Hamites in regarding agriculture—particularly the cultivation of eleusine—as an honorable occupation.

In describing Kipsigis society, Peristiany emphasizes the importance of the territorial "village community," a group of households whose members are obliged to assist each other in agriculture and ceremonies. Other points of great interest are the "collective curse" against a criminal; the compensation demanded for the death of a man several years after he has been wounded; the husband's obligation to reimburse his wife's lover for the upkeep of the child of adultery; the theft of cattle from a fellow Kipsigis, a more heinous crime than incest; free love among the young, with brothers and sisters often sleeping with their lovers in the same hut; no pregnancy allowed before the girl's formal initiation; the "female husband" purchased by the wife with her own cattle; the profound mental disturbance in boys at initiation; the social implications of a beer party; and the vague, unformulated nature of religious concepts, in spite of the clear distinction which the Kipsigis draw between religion and magic.

Colonial rule has restricted the Kipsigis in some directions and given them new outlets in others. Their hostility toward Europeans goes back to the early years of this century, when the British confiscated thousands of their cattle because they had refused to degrade themselves by working on a road to Uganda. Warfare, and any customs tending to keep alive the old aggressive spirit, are now suppressed. Individualism is replacing the old communal attitudes. The age-set and the regiment have lost most of their control. Groups of boys are circumcised at shorter intervals than in the old days, and are consequently smaller and less cohesive. Instead of living for several years as warriors' mistresses, girls now enter wedlock soon after initiation—too young for a stable marriage. The opportunity for boys to earn money and independence for themselves by working on English farms has weakened the authority of parents and elders. Kipsigis farmers now

cultivate maize on a large scale to sell to Indians and Europeans, renting their plows from a few native capitalists.

Peristiany illustrates his book with twenty-four plates, three maps, and many line-drawings and diagrams, all very clear and interesting. Students of Africa and of human society will look forward to the peaceful days when he can return to East Africa to collect material for more books as good as this.

WALTER CLINE

*University of Minnesota*

*African Majesty. A Record of Refuge at the Court of the King of Bangangté in the French Cameroons.* By F. CLEMENT E. EGERTON. New York: Scribner's 1939. Pp. xx+348. \$3.75.

It is not easy to place this book in any of the customary categories of works dealing with peoples in out-of-the-way parts of the world. Mr. Egerton, in one place, refers to himself as "a disguised philosopher of the 'laissez-everything' school" (p. 90). He is presumably an Englishman—the book is obviously written for the American trade—who says he is not an escapist, but went to the Cameroons because "I thought I needed a purge; that, if I went to some wild place, I should be forced for a time to live as Nature evidently expected us to live" (p. xvi). Yet, in this case, the author appears to have prepared himself for this kind of experience by studying some anthropology.

In his first section, we are given an amusing account of how our writer finally reached the seat of the King of Bangangté, where he spent the larger part of the rest of his stay in Africa. Because he lived in the king's compound, his materials are weighted, and give little idea of the daily round of life of ordinary people. In addition, one must, so to speak, peer at the culture through interstices in the fabric of the author's personal experiences. The important thing about a dance, for example, is not why it is held and what is done at it, but the difficulties in taking pictures of it, and what the author and the local administrator drank after they returned, somewhat tired, after the ceremony. One gathers that the author was helped considerably by his interpreter, who had also been interpreter for Professor H. Labouret of the School of Colonial Studies of Paris, some two years before the trip reported on here.

Something of a picture of life in the royal compound is given. Such points as freedom of the king's sisters in sexual and other matters, relations between the royal master and his harem, and between the royal father and the sons who might be possible sources of subversive activities, are useful as extending the distribution of significant aspects of African political behavior. Details of proper behavior by those who come before the king are, indeed, of real value for comparative studies dealing with the retention of African patterns in New World Negro behavior. For Mr. Egerton, the problem of the missionary and of the administrator are important. He believes the former are bad for the natives, and that the latter, insofar as the French



administration is concerned, have been maligned. These discussions, however, contribute little new to a much debated subject.

In short, this book can be read with amusement, and, in the hands of a competent scholar, can furnish some materials to be put to good use. That it will make any great impression, either as a record of travel or scholarship is to be doubted; one hopes that its honest, well-intentioned writer will in time discover some job he wants to do, and then, after having acquired the necessary training, will devote himself seriously to doing it.

MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS

*Northwestern University*

*Gullah. Negro Life in the Carolina Sea Islands.* By MASON CRUM. Durham: Duke University Press, 1940. Pp. xv+351. \$3.50.

The Sea Islands have sentimental as well as historical and ethnological importance. Here, perhaps more than anywhere else in the Old South, was found the stereotyped plantation. The Negroes who today inhabit these islands have perpetuated a culture that is unique in the United States. In speech, song, customs of daily life, and all manner of ways, they represent the greatest deviants from the patterns, not only of the majority of their own group, but of the population of this country as a whole. Quite aside from antiquarian aspects of their customs, which make them so attractive to hunters of cultural curios, they are of scientific importance for the study of those acculturative processes which brought about the amalgam of African and European custom that, to differing degrees, is discernable in the behavior of New World Negroes everywhere.

The book strikes one as important rather as an example of the troubled state of mind of those who, alive to the injustices of the inter-racial situation nonetheless sense a nostalgic attachment for the "old ways" which, they feel, were perhaps a better solution of a difficult problem than its present status. It is admitted that the Negroes, as slaves, labored under many difficulties: yet the patrol system is held regrettable because instead of being "a wholesome disciplinary device," it "often degenerated into sporting expeditions at the expense of runaway slaves" (p. 260). The following passage is not atypical of the general position: it is reminiscent of certain sentiments voiced during the days of the slave-trade:<sup>1</sup>

A Carolina rice or cotton plantation was a well-organized business unit. However bad slavery may have been, it was not an unmixed evil. Regrettable as an institution and devoid of justification morally, there were nevertheless many valuable lessons and discipline learned under slavery by the Negroes fresh from savagery and barbarism in Africa. And for thousands of them their lot in life was less severe under benign masters than was their portion in their native land, where slavery also existed and where their owners practiced every barbarous and cruel device from capture to sale to foreign traders (p. 243).

It cannot be said of the book as a whole that it contributes anything

<sup>1</sup> E.g., John Snelgrave, *A New Account of Some Parts of Guinea*, London, 1724, pp. 160-161.

significant to the understanding of Negro life in the Sea Islands, its professed objective. Most of the materials are quoted from published sources; of field investigation, in the modern sense, there is none. The discussions of the origins of language and music of these Negroes are merely restatements, with approval, of what has already been the subject of severe attack. Here and there one comes on a passage that is useful, as where, for example (pp. 259-261), the patterns of cooperative labor among these Negroes are discussed. What is important is the psychological state that permits a man, writing almost entirely of the Whites of an area, to subtitle his book a study of *Negro* life. It does, in a sense, treat of Negro life; but it is Negro life as seen almost exclusively from the side of the White slave-owner. There are some interesting pages which recount the manner of carrying on mission work among the slaves; more interesting, however, is the unquestioning acceptance of the fact that the slaves took over what was presented to them.

The book is attractively printed and bound, and has some appealing illustrations. Its bibliography lists a number of items that are not ordinarily found, and will thus be of use to the scholar. The attitude it documents, however, is its unwitting contribution, and if it is read with care and insight, the materials will be of immense value to students of race relations who are as concerned with the points of view that accentuate the interracial tensions in the United States as they are with the institutionalized manifestations of the problem that constitute the surface forms of these deeper-rooted sanctions.

MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS

*Northwestern University*

*Growing Up in the Black Belt: Negro Youth in the Rural South.* By CHARLES S. JOHNSON. Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education, 1941. Pp. xxiii+360. \$2.25.

This book studies rural Negro youth in somewhat the same way urban youth was studied in *Negro Youth at the Crossways*. With admirable objectivity, both books show the tragic plight of these young people who constitute, roughly, a tenth of all the youth in America. *Growing Up* has a wider scope than *Crossways* and uses its case material as illustrative and interpretative rather than as primary data. The case studies are always definitely subordinate to the overall picture obtained by a sample-and-testing procedure.

Eight counties in the Black Belt were studied rather intensively: six cotton counties, two in Mississippi and Alabama, one in Georgia and Tennessee; two diversified farming counties in North Carolina and Tennessee. The first two are plantation counties; in one Alabama county and the Georgia county, the plantation system is breaking down; the other Alabama county is a cotton-one-crop nonplantation area; the Tennessee cotton county is a rural-urban county (cities of 25,000 or more) while the Tennessee diversified farming county is also rural-urban; the other diversified farming county (North Carolina) is rural. These counties were chosen as "typical" of about 80 percent of the rural population. Over 2000 youths

were given six tests regarding their "attitudes." Five of these tests were devised for the study: Personal Values (taken by 2250); Personal Attitudes; Race Attitudes; Occupational Ratings; and Color Ratings; the Kuhlman-Anderson Intelligence Test was also given to 1834 youths. In addition, over 500 youths and 916 of their families were interviewed.

Because of the representativeness of the sample and the carefulness of the methods, one feels considerable confidence in the generalizations which emerge. Of course, the scientific difficulties of the pencil-paper test and the interview are not overcome, but since the object was to find out how these young people "feel" and "think" on the assumption that this influences what they do and will do, the results appear to justify the procedure.

The note on "A Psychiatric Reconnaissance" by Harry Stack Sullivan adds little to the report, as was the case with his remarks in the *Crossways*. He "learned" some things which anyone who has lived in the United States should know already without making a "reconnaissance." He makes one statement which is amply justified by commonsense observation and the findings both of Frazier and Johnson, viz., "It is impossible to find much of anything that is unique or general in American Negro personality excepting only an almost, if not quite, ubiquitous fear of white people." It is equally true, though unnoted by Sullivan, that many Whites have a great fear, hatred, and contempt for Negroes. If this is the best psychiatry can do in giving us "insight" into Negro-White relations, it would seem to be a sore waste of time and money.

Space prevents extended statement of the findings. The Personal Values and Personal Attitudes Tests were designed to elicit the opinions of the young people relative to home (family, sex, marriage), church, school, recreation, work, and status. The Color Ratings and Race Attitudes Tests dealt with intra- and interracial relations. Several very sweeping conclusions can be drawn, though it must be said at once that there are many exceptions, that there are wide variations within and between the sample counties, and that these statements apply only to the portion of the rural Southern Negro under investigation as of 1940. The probabilities are that the attitudes of this segment of our population are undergoing rapid transformation because of the very unstable equilibrium of the southern social system.

These people live on less than subsistence incomes, dogged by dirt, disease, and death. Over half the houses are unpainted, unscreened, leaky shacks over 25 years old; two-thirds have open privies and one-tenth no privies at all; 98.5 percent have no refrigeration; more than half, no musical instruments; about a third, no books; less than a quarter have phonographs and radios; the median family has over six persons and the median house has 3.7 rooms. The happy carefree "darker" singing folksongs in the moonlight is a sentimental myth today—as it probably was in the ante-bellum South. The status of women is high, especially grandmothers; women often are the heads of families (32.3 percent in the Georgia county) and usually are the "responsible" ones; mothers are better liked than fathers by children (true of Whites, also). Symbols of escape from low status are common and powerful, usually centering around education, occupation, and migration.

To many, the North is the Promised Land. They want to leave the farm and get a higher status job, white-collar if possible. This is similar to the White rural youth, except the Negro percentages are probably much larger. White avoidances and hatred are pronounced; status is closely connected with color, light brown being the "best" color, with about a third of the youth rating black and white equally "bad," with yellow a close second. There is an inverse ratio of both intra- and inter-race adjustment with age and intelligence (I would guess the same is true of Whites). However, class lines are not determined by color. In all cases, the differences in attitude are marked as between sexes, regions, and classes within the Negro population. Class consciousness is more marked than race consciousness.

I would not want to make any statements about the "Negro problem" until I had read this book. It is excellently written and printed. There is a brief but enlightening "Methodological Note."

READ BAIN

*Miami University*

*The Story of the Negro. The Rise of the Race from Slavery.* Two Vols. By BOOKER T. WASHINGTON. New York: Peter Smith, 1940. (Reprinted, 1940, by arrangement with Doubleday, Doran & Co.) Pp. 332, 437. \$5.00.

The reprinting of these two well-known volumes from the original edition of 1909 will be welcomed by students of the American Negro as well as by those particularly concerned with the life and thought of Booker T. Washington. In the apparently artless and matter-of-fact writing of Washington there is concealed a wealth of shrewd observation and interpretation of the Negro and his relations with the White man which the passing of years has not rendered out-of-date. And we can believe that this quality of durability is not a little due to the assistance of Robert E. Park, gratefully acknowledged in the Preface.

EVERETT V. STONEQUIST

*Skidmore College*

*White Settlers in the Tropics.* By A. GRENFELL PRICE. New York: American Geographic Society, 1939. Pp. xiii+311.

*European Civilization: Its Origin and Development.* Vol. VII, The Relation of European With Non-European Peoples. Under the direction of EDWARD EYRE, New York: Oxford University Press, 1939. Pp. 1209. \$6.50.

*Germans in the Cameroons 1884-1914.* By HARRY R. RUDIN. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938. Pp. 456. \$4.00.

*Koloniale Gestaltung: Methoden und Probleme überseeischer Ausdehnung.* By RICHARD THURNWALD. Hamburg: Hoffman und Campe Verlag, 1939.

These four studies on modern colonization represent most valuable material for a crucial present-day problem. The second World War has brought the issue of colonization again to the fore. German national social-

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ism sees in this war primarily a clash between the rising Germany and the decaying British Empire. If such an interpretation is true, the outcome of this fight will have to be evaluated by comparing the *pax Britannica* with a *pax Hitleriana* taking its place as an organizing principle of this world after two hundred and fifty years of British rule. The control and organization of the huge colonial spaces in Africa and Asia plays an important part in picturing such a rule. No doubt different concepts of domination have decided and shaped the colonial rule of the great powers. A scholarly investigation of the history of colonization, an analysis of the emergence of new societies, a dispassionate treatment of failure and successes in organizing these colonies is an urgent task today. The problem of colonization wins an added importance due to the fact that the vast undeveloped potentialities and the huge resources of colonies may solve the burning problem of overpopulation of European powers. The conflict between the warring camps has often been simplified in the most misleading formula of the Haves and the Have-Nots, thus making the redistribution of the world's goods a moral issue. But even leaving out the moral connotations of this conflict, demographic imperialism undoubtedly represents a driving force in the world crisis today. One may even add that this second world war raging now may result in another issue for which again colonial spaces will play a most important part. The refugee problem which may concern more than twenty million people in the near future opens up the question of European settlement in Africa, Asia, and South America.

Each of the four books to be discussed has some bearing on these crucial issues. Price's study represents a valuable synopsis of the general conditions of White settlements in the tropics. This scientific approach to a much-discussed topic evaluates the failures of the White races to colonize the tropics, outlines their beginning and progress, and thus indicates adequate channels and methods for an ultimate success. After studying the nature and history of the problem of White settlement in the tropics with special emphasis on the pre-scientific invasions by the Portuguese and the British failures in the West Indies, the author also gives a few examples of a few successful White settlements in the tropics. On the basis of such illustrations, he summarizes some factors governing those settlements, especially discussing racial problems, environmental factors, acclimatization and health, diet, clothing, exercise, administrative and economic problems. This study is especially valuable for its attempt to see the scope and complexity of the problem. The one shortcoming of this otherwise well-balanced book is the fact that it does not sufficiently stress economic and socio-political problems of colonization—factors of extreme importance in the limelight of current discussions.

An even larger scope is taken by Eyre's encyclopedic study of "The Relations of Europe with Non-European People." It represents the seventh volume of the monumental study of European civilization, which, under the able direction of Edward Eyre, brought together a symposium of various experts on world history. This last volume studies the history of Europe, chiefly in its contact with non-European people and in its colonial enter-

prises. It tells largely a story of exploration and expansion by the leading states. While it thus represents an extraordinary fundus of material, it shows a definite shortcoming in the complete lack of integrated organization. No attempt is made to compare and coordinate the different colonial experiences. It might be added that important spheres of colonization are only slightly mentioned or completely ignored, while the African colonization takes by far the largest part of the study. The volume is a good illustration of the difficulties connected with symposia. The chapters vary very much in quality according to their contributors. Especially praiseworthy is the study of Père Charles: "Europe in the Far East." Very interesting for general evaluation of the issue is the introductory essay by Douglas Woodruff on "The European Frontier"—certainly the most thought-provoking contribution of the whole volume.

Most interesting in connection with recent discussions and coming controversies is Rudin's *Germans in the Cameroons*. This case study in modern imperialism represents a very thorough investigation of pre-War German colonization based upon many years of research, innumerable interviews with former German colonial officers and direct contacts with natives in the Cameroons. It is especially valuable for its detailed description of the colonial control by the different agencies of the home government and the colonial administration. It further gives a careful evaluation of the economic exploitation of the Cameroons, and the general conditions of the natives under German control. As such it will serve as an unbiased account of German colonization which since the last world war has been under fire. It may be added that the very fact that a well-trained historian attacked these most delicate issues puts the problem into the more general picture of imperialism in the modern world for which it served as an exemplary case study.

A most interesting contribution is undoubtedly Richard Thurnwald's comprehensive study on *Koloniale Gestaltung*. The well-known German ethnographer brings together in the volume his life-long experiences concerning methods and problems of oversea expansion. Apart from the introductory remarks emphasizing Germany's colonial claims and describing a former German colony (German New Guinea) in its status before and since the War, this study certainly represents a very careful and scientific analysis of the problems concerned. It warns against all the illusions of colonial control and colonial life. It represents in a very realistic picture the concrete problems of colonization in the field of economics, labor, race, population, administration and law, education, and missionary life. All these problems are seen against the background of the historical development which the author describes in following up the different variations of the great colonizing nations. Undoubtedly most interesting, though controversial, is his own conclusion concerning future colonial organizations. Its outstanding feature is the clear-cut separation between white and colored living spaces. Though it will be doubted that his suggestions will be generally accepted, it might have been wished that his very careful and balanced analysis would have

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some influence on the thoughts of leading German thinkers of "future domination" in Europe and the world at large.

SIGMUND NEUMANN

*Wesleyan University*

*The Jewish Fate and Future.* By ARTHUR RUPPIN. London: The Macmillan Co., 1940. Pp. xi+386. \$4.00.

This book provides a statistical description of modern Jewry. In addition to vital statistics, Professor Ruppín presents religious and educational figures, as well as information on occupational distribution and other pertinent economic facts. The detached third-person treatment of the Jewish people's condition veils the ethnic values evidenced by isolated adjectival inserts and chapter headings. Grist for the assimilationist's mill, even for the anti-Semite's, is presented with no more annotation than that favoring a continuation of Jewish cultural autonomy.

A signal defect in the statistical data is the failure in not a few instances to cite sources of the statistics. It is especially important to document these data, the interpretations of which are sure to be value-laden.

A limited interpretation which presages the nature of future Jewish status is afforded by the author's discussion of the role of the Jews in an economy of scarcity. It is recognized that this "scarcity-consciousness," as Professor Selig Perlman calls it, which prompted the repressive medieval guilds to score the Jewish attempts at expansion and speculation, was absent or in abeyance in the nineteenth century, when Jewish business efforts were attuned to the economic order of the day. The exhaustion of economic frontiers and the resultant constriction of economic enterprise returned the Jew to his medieval role of identifiable and disadvantaged competitor. For Ruppín, the decline of *laissez-faire* capitalism and Jewish economic ruin are synonymous. Agriculture, he holds, provides a solution only to the extent that a restricted number of Jewish farmers prepare the way for subsequent migration of Jews to urban centers near the agriculture settlement, as for example in Argentina.

The symbiotic relationship of the Jews to an unrestricting economy is evidenced by the disproportionate number of them in the fee-earning, rather than the salaried, classes. Ruppín's figures show that the Jews in New York City in 1937, and in Vienna before the *Anschluss* had from one and one-half to two times their proportion in law, medicine, dentistry, music, art, teaching, photography, etc.

Brief gestures in the direction of a social-psychological interpretation are less fortunate than the socio-economic discussion. Witness the following statement which Ruppín quotes in support of his belief that the Jews are "mentally older" than non-Jews: "F. M. Feller, in his *Antisemitismus* (Berlin, 1931) using psycho-analytical methods, arrives at similar conclusions: Among Jews there is a much larger percentage than among 'Aryans' of persons who have brought their instincts under control and are able to conduct their lives on rational lines."

Thus, the title is misleading. Aside from the two minor exceptions mentioned above, the context is little more than an impartial statistical analysis; the deductions which would warrant the inclusion of "Fate and Future" in the title are not provided. This discrepancy detracts little from the value of this good survey of facts concerning contemporary Jews.

RICHARD DEWEY

*University of Wisconsin*

*The Subjection of Woman and Traditions of Man.* By MAUDE GLASGOW. New York: M. I. Glasgow, 1940. Pp. 341.

This is a grievance-book written in an emotional and melodramatic manner. Past customs which placed women in a position inferior to that held by men are referred to as degrading, as outrages, shameful customs, and insults to women.

The book is virtually a listing of the ways in which women have been physically or socially superior or inferior to men in different times, places, and fields of endeavor. If women have held a superior place, that is because of innate superiority and no more than is due them; but if women have held an inferior place, that is because of men's maliciousness. The relative positions of men and women are not given a social setting nor viewed as part of a complete social system. The historical, environmental, economic, and religious forces that determine social organization are not discussed. Nor is recognition given to the fact that women reared in a particular social organization usually accept the attendant customs and moral codes as right and do not object to the resulting restrictions.

RUTH SHONLE CAVAN

*Rockford, Illinois*

*Women in the Community.* Edited by KIRSTEN GLOERFELT-TARP. New York: Oxford University Press, 1940. Pp. 301. \$2.50.

This book, put together by Mrs. Kirsten Gloerfelt-Tarp, Deputy Chief Inspector of Factories and President of the National Council of Women in Denmark, appeared in Denmark in 1937 and is now, happily, available in good English translation. It represents a thoroughgoing inquiry into the position of women in Denmark, where women have had for some years considerable legal and economic independence. The book is valuable for those interested in comparative studies of woman's status and achievements as well as for those interested in Danish economy.

It is a study which ought to inspire similar attempts in other countries and with the same objective—the work was produced under the Danish Association for the Propagation of Social Knowledge. Accordingly, while official statistics are thoroughly used, they are interpreted in such fashion as to make sense for readers who are not statisticians. In each aspect of the study historical backgrounds are briefly given, situations clearly presented, trends indicated, gains pointed out and shortcomings, both in law and women, freely shown to the world. The whole thing is thoughtful and discriminating; there has been a clear-eyed acceptance of facts, sometimes



tinged with humor for men as well as women; but there is evident an intention to see to it that the situation continues to improve. Needless to say, this was before the occupation by Germany.

Of the eight chapters, seven have Danish authors; the other, a general introduction on "The Revolution in the Position of Women in Recent Times," is by Mrs. Alva Myrdal, the Swedish population expert who, with her husband, has become so well known in the United States. Following that first very readable introduction comes a discussion of men and women in the population; then a discussion of women engaged in housekeeping, trade and industry; presentations of women in education, in trade unions, in social and political life follow, and the final discussions set forth the general legal status of women and their gains and hindrances under social legislation. Throughout, the progressiveness of the country is apparent but also, alas, the unreadiness of many women to take advantage of the gains theoretically, even legally, theirs. One comment that appears repeatedly concerns the lack of preparation for the long-time job and consequently the lower salaries and lower prestige attached to much of women's work.

Some delightful line drawings are used as introductions and conclusions to chapters.

GLADYS BRYSON

*Smith College*

*Youth in Agricultural Villages.* By BRUCE L. MELVIN and ELNA M. SMITH. Washington: Works Progress Administration. (U.S.G.P.O.) Division of Social Research, 1940. Pp. xvi + 143.

*Youth—Millions Too Many? A Search for Youth's Place in America.* By BRUCE L. MELVIN. New York: Association Press, 1940. Pp. 220. \$2.00.

That the problems of youth in agricultural villages are relatively insignificant compared to those of young people in other villages and on farms is apparent from this well written and substantially documented study by Melvin and Smith. Conclusions are based on a survey of youth 16-29 years old in 145 selected agricultural villages. Those included were chosen from a group of 140 that were studied in 1936 for the third time, without respect to any specific age segment of the population. More than ten thousand legal residents, in comparison with thirty-four hundred who were economically independent and no longer residing at home, were considered. They are regarded as representing villages at or above average among all villages.

The monograph is ably organized and well written. Supported by 88 tables and 14 figures the data are presented in an interesting style. Admittedly, they raise fully as many questions as they answer, but this is regarded a feature of strength rather than weakness. While many studies have been made to show the plight of farm young people as well as youth generally, this is the first of any consequence for a particular segment of the village population. Even though part of the implications from certain findings might be questioned, the study makes a significant contribution and will

stand as a usable pattern of procedure for many scientific analyses pertaining to rural non-farm as well as farm youth.

In *Youth—Millions Too Many?* the author gives a comprehensive interpretation of the entire youth situation. From several years of intensive and far-reaching research pertaining to rural youth, he offers a challenge, in fact, many challenges, to all who are concerned about preservation and further realization of the democratic ideology in America.

The general situation is well approached with first consideration given to unneeded farm youth (18-24 years of age), of which there were a million more on the land in 1935 than in 1930. Their counterpart is the unwanted city youth, those who are looking for work and struggling for places inevitably in conflict with older workers, whether employed or unemployed. Between the two is the village group most advantageously situated among the lot, but with prospects none too bright, if those in coal mining and lumbering areas as well as "across the cracks" are rightly considered. Negro youth, as "the one-tenth," receive attention.

But there are rays of hope. Youth "want to correct conditions" and thus far they have followed the democratic pattern of action. If baffling impediments in the way of young people can be removed, the course is reasonably clear. Youth will cooperate with adults. They offer no "threat to democracy unless democracy fails them." Certain paths are partially cut. Conservation of physical resources if coupled with the conservation of youth is an investment from which golden returns can be expected. Decentralization of industry and business for a closer union with rural living, further experimentation on possible combinations between agriculture and some type of machine production with a way of building ownership by workers into the process of "manufacturing," bringing school and employment together, and helping youth to help themselves—all are trails which need further blazing.

E. L. KIRKPATRICK

*American Youth Commission*  
Washington, D. C.

*Guideposts for Rural Youth.* By E. L. KIRKPATRICK. Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education, 1940. Pp. vii+167.

*Matching Youth and Jobs: A Study of Occupational Adjustment.* By HOWARD M. BELL. Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education, 1940. Pp. xiii+277. \$2.00.

*The Unemployed Man and His Family.* By MIRRA KOMAROVSKY. New York: Dryden Press, 1940. Pp. xii+163. \$1.75.

*Family Unemployment: An Analysis of Unemployment in Terms of Family Units.* By DAN D. HUMPHREY. Washington, D. C.: WPA, 1940. Pp. xvi+144.

The first two books are of no particular interest to sociologists except as they present data and describe efforts at rational control of the competitive,

*laissez-faire*, hit-or-miss, highly wasteful and socially disorganizing manner by which our youth find their way into the economic system. These books are part of the attempt being made by the American Youth Commission to bring some order out of this chaos, to give some direction to our confused and bewildered youth. The first book suggests that things are better for rural youth than for youth in general as shown in the second book. These reports do not raise the question of whether anything is basically wrong with the economic system; they assume that we must make the best of conditions as they are and improve them as we may. They both implicitly recognize, though they do not state it as strongly as I think the situation warrants, that the future of youth is the future of America and that if our youth loses or does not develop the high morale that comes from a reasonable chance to "make good," to get a stake in the country, to count for something, democracy dies.

This critical note, this casting of the problem in the frame of the probable future as revealed by present trends, this vision of what may be, contrasted with what is likely unless we break with traditional patterns and actively fashion the future, is what I miss most in these volumes. It is not enough to tinker and patch; we must conserve youth, inspire it, and implement our vision with practical programs that will give modern youth the kind of progressive, adventurous self-confidence which characterized the generations that won the west and tamed the wilderness. These youth programs are all right as far as they go—but they do not go far or fast enough to keep pace with the rush of events. Nor is it clear whither we are going. Youth has no goal so concrete and probable as a western homestead in the 70's with a reasonable hope of economic competence in old age.

The method in the first book is to tell what is being done for rural youth in certain selected communities with reference to finding jobs, education for life, recreation, religion, health, establishing homes, and various youth organizations. These are the "guideposts," but no national picture emerges. It is stated that about 10,000,000 young people aged 16-24 are rural. How many can expect to find a permanent "good" life on farms and in rural areas? What is the significance for rural youth of the mechanization of farming? Of the trend toward industrial agriculture and tenancy? Of the fact that rural areas have to educate a large proportion of the people who eventually will live in cities? Can consumer's cooperation be linked with agricultural producers' cooperation? Can rural life be made attractive enough to stem the city drift? Can decentralized industry be integrated with rural life? Can farming become sufficiently diversified to give the farmer some protection against the one-crop, finance-controlled market? Or should it be? Such questions must be answered before any guideposts can be set up that may not lead into dead-end lanes. Such questions are not even asked in this study. It impresses me somewhat as if one attempted to discover the role of wheat in American life by visiting a few fields in various states with a sharp eye for smut, fullness of heads, length of stalk, and modes of harvesting. It is a sort of cutworm's-eye view of the biggest half of the most important problem in America.

The second book is vastly better. It sets the problem specifically and presents some research undertaken to throw light upon possible solutions. It also raises some fundamental questions, the answers to which suggest radical revisions in some of our most cherished practices. Four million youth aged 15-24 and not in school are unemployed; 1,750,000 enter the labor market each year. With what preparation and prospects? The answer makes one shudder for the future of America: ignorance, daydreams, and fantasy, aided and abetted by similar attitudes of parents and the almost complete failure of the school to deal realistically with the problem. In a society where not over one-third of the workers are white-collar, five-sixths of the youth aspire to this class of work; in one state, five times as many youths wanted to enter the professions as there were professional people in the entire state; in Maryland (1930), 3.4 percent of the population were professionals, but 35 percent of the male high school students were in the academic courses which point toward professional careers (this general pattern seems to prevail all over the country); there is a deep-seated and growing prejudice against overalls, but most of the jobs call for overalls; not over 6 percent of the 25,000 high schools have guidance and placement programs and most of them are very inadequate.

This is a black picture, but there is some light on the horizon. The report had two objectives: (1) fact finding and (2) a demonstration of how to meet the needs revealed. Studies were made in Baltimore, Dallas, Providence, St. Louis, and two rural counties in Maryland and two in Kansas. The elements of a program (guidance, preparation and placement) are reviewed; the necessary research basis of a program (with some of the research) and a description of developing a community program are given in detail; this is followed by a summary and recommendations. Space prevents more than the statement that this is very important material which every good citizen, employer, public official, and educator must read if he wants to get a realistic understanding of this problem. Both books are well documented and beautifully illustrated. The Bell book has a good index; the other has none.

The third book has considerable interest for sociologists as an exercise in method. The results probably are not worth much as a basis for generalization, but they suggest many problems for further research. The method used is intensive interviews. The difficulties and shortcomings are carefully set forth; the author shows a commendable critical-mindedness with reference both to procedures and findings.

The criteria for selecting the subjects required that their parents be native-born, that the subjects be Protestant, skilled-labor or white-collar husbands, complete families, at least one child over 10, father sole provider prior to unemployment, father unemployed and on relief for at least one year. Fifty-nine families were studied by means of a carefully worked out schedule in which the questions referred to specific, concrete types of behavior. The purpose was to see how loss of role as sole provider affected the status of the husband, particularly as to his authority. The interview lasted from two to four hours. No notes were taken. The results were dictated afterwards and averaged about 35 pages in length, ranging from 25 to 70 typed pages.



At this point, I begin to wonder. I presume the questionnaire was memorized, but I wonder at the accuracy of 25 to 70 page interviews in which no notes were taken and which contain many alleged verbatim statements—at least, they are quoted. The amount of detail, as in the quotation on pages 7-9, seems incredible to me, but it would constitute only four or five pages, about one-seventh of the average interview. While the interviews could not be checked for validity, there was an effort to check reliability by duplicate interviews in five cases, four months later, the second interviewer not having read the record of the first. There were surprisingly few discrepancies.

It seems to me that such procedures will always be more or less suspect until we can get phonographic (or better photophonographic) records of such interviews. I believe a much better case can be made for life stories, written or dictated by the subject. I do not care how competent the interviewer may be—I would rather have the verbatim report of the questions and answers—and the accompanying physical and vocal gestures would be invaluable. Interviewing will never become satisfactory data for scientific analysis until this degree of accuracy and permanence is attained. If we can spend \$1000 for a microscope to look at an amoeba in a \$100,000 laboratory, we should be able to give an interviewer a dictograph or a photophonographic apparatus.

Space prevents any summary of the findings other than to mention that in only 13 of the 59 cases could loss of male authority be attributed to unemployment; matriarchal families seem to stand the depression shock better than patriarchal; husbands whose personality deteriorated showed greater loss of authority than those that showed no change or improvement (11 cases) though a man may deteriorate and still lose no authority (15 out of 22 cases did not lose authority); his loss of status was greater with older than with younger children, and there seemed to be no difference in the effect upon boys and girls. The relations of fathers and children are carefully analyzed. Obviously, with such a small sample, when sub-categories are used, the number of cases become very few and the results correspondingly inconclusive, but this is a careful and guarded intensive analysis of the interviewing technique at its best. The book is well indexed and well written.

The fourth volume is almost at the opposite methodological pole from the third. It deals with the specific but by no means simple question, What is the proportion of totally unemployed families when we have a given number of unemployed persons? also, what are the proportions of one-, two-, three-, and four-or-more-worker families completely unemployed and how do these proportions change as the total of unemployed persons rises and falls? These are important questions for the planning of relief and unemployment programs and policies. They are answered with passable accuracy by ingenious but simple mathematical procedures. The predicted hypothetical figures check fairly well with the empirical observations. The fit is better than those frequently obtained in "respectable" astrophysical or geophysical observations.

READ BAIN

*Miami University*

*Why France Lost the War.* By A. REITHINGER. New York: Veritas Press, 1940. Pp. 75. \$1.25.

Every major war has left its imprint on the age structure of European populations. The decimation of a group of young adults is apparent in deficiencies of the middle-aged after a decade or so and, still later, of the aged. The impact, however, is not limited to the age group immediately affected, for the removal of potential parents immediately depresses the birth rate and the resulting deficiency of children, in turn, appears later as a deficiency of young adults and so on up the age pyramid. Reithinger argues from this situation that the depletion of young males in the last war and the resultant deficiency of babies who would by 1940 have comprised the younger draft ages bore so heavily upon France, in comparison with Germany and Italy, that irrespective of the immediate outcome of the war, France is doomed to be "excluded from the group of great European powers" (p. 72). The situation, he claims, was accentuated by the more rapid aging of the French population which meant that both the military and the economic burden was placed upon age groups which were simply not numerically strong enough to assume this double burden. Reithinger's facts seem to be correct. His claims of causal relationships are, of course, inferential. In estimating the military significance of the situation, he fails to give sufficient weight to the fact that Germany also suffered enormous folk depletion during the last war. It is true that this depletion was less, relatively, than in France where the mortality was especially heavy among the very young soldiers and where the post-war depression of the birth rate lasted five years rather than four as in Germany, but relatively more than in England where the birth rate dropped less radically and recovered (at least long enough to produce the present generation of young soldiers) more rapidly. Furthermore, in his estimates of the demography of Germany and France as of 1940, for which, of course, accurate data were not at hand, bias is apparent. And in estimating France's "biological" strength, even naturalized immigrants are excluded and the estimate is limited to Frenchmen "of pure French blood."

DOROTHY S. THOMAS

*University of California*

*Population Policies and Movements in Europe.* By D. V. GLASS. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1940. Pp. vi+490. \$6.00.

Population policy was rapidly becoming a focus of far reaching social changes in Europe when the continent was swept by war. These developments are now eclipsed for the time but, whatever political and international relations may be established, population policy will again emerge in the post-war period as a central political issue. This issue will then be complicated and intensified by the wastage and conflicts caused by the cataclysm. Dr. D. V. Glass has rendered a monumental service to political and social scientists in providing an authoritative account of the development of population trends and policies in western Europe to the outbreak of the war. His familiarity with the German, French, Italian, and Scandi-

navian sources and with demographic statistics made Dr. Glass the one person adequately qualified for this important task; and he has discharged his responsibility with great acumen. One can turn to this work with confidence for a factual description of population programs in Europe and a critical appraisal of their effects. The student of population will also profit by the brief but incisive treatment of demographic methods in the Appendix.

The author points out that except in Sweden and Denmark and, perhaps one should add, in Germany, population policies have been evolved without any detailed study of the factors influencing decline of fertility or the way in which that decline has been making itself felt. To a large extent, therefore, the pro-natalist measures have been applied blindly. The comprehensive French Family Code, promulgated July 30, 1939, is more the result of "intuitive analysis" than of "patient research." The same is obviously true of the early Italian program. The reviewer, however, cannot agree with the author's dictum: "Unfortunately, we cannot learn much of positive value from past and present experiments." It is true that, "In one case only—Germany since 1933—does there appear to have been any marked success, and even in that single case the reasons for success are not clear nor do we know if the results are likely to be of long duration." It should, however, be emphasized that the French program in its final pre-war form had been rapidly reshaped and enlarged during the last few years. Also, the Swedish program was not designed to bring about quick changes. The measures proposed by the Population Commission, appointed in May 1935, and approved in large part by the Riksdag, were conceived not as a final plan but preliminary steps toward an integrated and far-reaching program.

The author somewhat arbitrarily limits his task to a consideration of measures designed to affect the trend of total population, without regard to qualitative objectives. This limitation is particularly unfortunate in the treatment of Scandinavian population policies where the qualitative aspects of the program are given at least equal weight, if not priority. One must, therefore, await the forthcoming book by Alva Myrdal for an adequate exposition of the philosophy and aims of Swedish population policy and its relation to the whole development of democratic institutions in Sweden. In general it may be said that, in spite of some very incisive comments on the appraisal of population policies, the treatment is primarily designed not so much to clarify theoretical issues as to provide an accurate and carefully documented record. As such, it is eminently successful.

FRANK LORIMER

*American University*

*Social and Economic Aspects of Swedish Population Movements 1750-1933.*

By DOROTHY SWAINE THOMAS. New York: Macmillan Co., 1941. Pp. xxiii+487.

This book is the first of a series concerned with the interrelationships between social and economic factors and population developments in Sweden. It is the result of research made possible through Swedish and American cooperation.



Judging from the present volume, there is reason to assume that this series, when completed, will make an extremely valuable contribution to economic-demographic literature, and that it will establish the facts, as far as it is possible to establish them through statistical research, with regard to the economic and social background of population movements in a society like the Swedish one in the era of industrialization and urbanization. This was also the era of new processes and a changed class-structure in agriculture, and the era when North America opened up for European emigrants.

That this Swedish research project is apt to reach much farther than previous research in this field is due partly to the research subject itself: the Swedish population and the Swedish social and economic development. There is no other society where social and economic development during a long period of time is as well accounted for as is the case in Sweden. For no other society, therefore, would it be possible to give such an analysis as is given in this book. Everyone who has done any work in this field, will envy those [who are working on the Swedish problems their materials. The Swedish system of population accounting has its roots in the 17th century, and provides records of the demographic history of its people for the longest period of any country in the world, including recording of immigrants and out-migrants in the individual communities for a long period of time. Furthermore the extensive demographic studies made in connection with the reports of the Swedish Royal Commission on Emigration at the beginning of this century, and lately the studies made by economists connected with Stockholm University of costs of living, wages, and national income back to the middle of the last century. This wealth of material is utilized by Dorothy Thomas in her book to throw new light upon the social and economic aspects of population movements. The results are extremely interesting, and will give inspiring and important leads for other scholars who work in the same field.

The first part of the book gives a general analysis of the Swedish population development from 1750 to 1933, and describes the agricultural development and the industrialization within which this population development took place. With regard to the fluctuations in emigration, the author reaches the interesting conclusion that the cyclical upswings in the homeland were a much more powerful counter-stimulant against the pull exerted by American business conditions than is generally recognized by American writers. Norwegian data which I have analyzed seem to substantiate this also.

In the second part is given a special analysis by types of communities for the period 1895-1933. The 2500 Swedish communities have been classified in socio-economic groups. The total population growth and its elements, and the mobility, have been analyzed for these different types of communities. The results confirm hypotheses with regard to population differentials which have previously been made, but which so far have been impossible of satisfactory verification.

The presentation of the stuff is somewhat unusual. The author has, rightly, deemed it important to give other scholars access to her valuable material, and the book is therefore heavily weighted with statistical tables.



The text presents the main conclusions to be drawn from the tables, but there are ample opportunities for the reader to make further investigations.

ARNE SKAUG

*University of Oslo, Norway*

*Studies in American Demography.* By WALTER F. WILLCOX. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1940. Pp. xxx+556.

This book by Willcox, which represents a collection of his essays written in the course of the last half century, should be viewed in the light of pioneer work of the earlier days in American demography. Well acquainted, by virtue of official association, with the inner workings of the census, the author repeatedly—and quite courageously—emphasizes both the many difficulties which arise in setting up definitions for the collection and the actual tabulation of population data, and the resulting shortcomings in the published data, specifically for comparative analysis. In this emphasis lies one of the primary merits of Willcox' writings, and it should prove instructive for the student of population.

The material for the book was drawn chiefly from the *Supplementary Analysis and Derivative Tables*—a special interpretative report of the 1900 and previous censuses, prepared under the supervision of the author for the Bureau of the Census, and from the *Introduction to the Vital Statistics of the United States* published by the Bureau of the Census in 1933 under the author's name. Supplemented by other published articles, lecture notes, and newly written chapters, the entire material was broken up in such a manner that it covers about all the topics that one may find in general books on population problems. The statistics were brought up to date, although frequently at the expense of unity in the original exposition of the earlier papers.

The book is divided into four fundamental parts (exclusive of introductory definitions of "statistical sociology"). The first part, termed "Studies in American Census Statistics," deals basically with the general increase of the population in the United States, population density, and the classifications of the population by age, sex, race, nativity, literacy, and marital condition. It likewise includes quite a detailed chapter on population of the world and its increase, a valuable chapter on the development of American census and its methods, and a chapter—somewhat inadequately treated—on prolongation of life.

The second part, called "Studies in American Registration Statistics," seems to surpass the first part in its analytic treatment of the material. It contains theoretical discussions on (a) standardization of death rates (chapters 14 and 18), and (b) birth rate and its substitutes (chapter 17). It is in the latter chapter that the author discusses the merits of the ratios of children under 5 to women in the childbearing ages over the crude birth rates as an index of fertility. To Willcox goes the credit for introducing this improved index to the population statistics of the United States. This part also includes analysis of the seasonal distribution of deaths and births, the effect of the marital status upon death rates, divorce rates (an attempt to

get at the causal factors), and a clarifying chapter on immigration, which represents a re-evaluation of the problem of immigration in rebuttal of Francis A. Walker's well-known theory on the influence of immigration upon the ethnic composition of the population.

In the last two parts, called "Miscellaneous Studies" and "Appendices," the bibliographical sketches of Graunt, Shattuck, and Billings, the analysis of China's population, and the definitions of statistics and demography are important from the demographer's point of view.

Clearly written, the book should prove valuable supplementary material for courses in population.

BERNARD D. KARPINOS

*National Institute of Health  
United States Public Health Service*

*Preface to Eugenics.* By FREDERICK OSBORN. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1940. Pp. xi+312. \$2.75.

The period covered by the existence of the American Eugenics Society has witnessed a very interesting, and probably significant, development in what may be called the "official" conception of Eugenics in the United States, for which the Society itself may be considered largely responsible. In the early years of its activity, the Society was characterized by a more or less axiomatic acceptance of the conventional Galtonian conception of Eugenics. This was derived largely from the experience of plant and animal breeders, and attempted to be a more or less practical answer to the oft-postulated question, "Why don't we do with human beings what we do with our horses and dogs and grain?" Much emphasis was laid on the superiority of family stocks, and the social importance of encouraging these stocks to interbreed. "Selective mating" was an accepted formula. It was perhaps not to be wondered at that these doctrines came to be associated, at least in the popular mind, with certain assumptions of racial superiority. Research into human genetics was regarded as almost synonymous with Eugenics although the responsibility for it was largely conceded to agencies other than the Eugenics Society.

In the ensuing years drastic changes in outlook and program have taken place. It has come to be clearly recognized that there are a number of unescapable factors that make it completely impossible to utilize the same methods in improving human quality as are successfully employed in the breeding pen or on the farm. Eugenics is now recognized as a sociological, rather than a biological, concept. Human genetics is an indispensable instrument for Eugenic achievement, but it is not in any true sense Eugenics itself. Eugenics is now recognized as one department of the science of population, and the close interdependence of Eugenics and Birth Control is now unblushingly acknowledged.

In all these developments no one has had a more influential and significant place than Frederick Osborn. Not a technical sociologist in his background, he has brought to the cultivation of the Eugenic ideal a breadth of knowledge, untiring application and devotion, and a genuine scholarly

spirit, all animated by a keen interest in human welfare. The book in hand is a consummation of his conclusions and ideas up to date, fortified by his habitual policy of referring his materials to those whom he regards as experts before he is ready to accept them as even tentatively established. His choice of the word "preface" to designate the nature of his book indicates how well he himself realizes that he is not giving a final and definitive exposition of Eugenics itself. On a broad background of carefully interpreted data concerning population, its growth and quality, Mr. Osborn builds up an approach to a comprehensive structure of Eugenics. He does not attempt to complete the edifice itself. He recognizes that there still remains to be done a vast amount of research into the nature of social values, their relative dependence upon heredity and environment, the mapping out of practical programs, and the enlistment of popular support and acceptance of these programs. As a preparation for an understanding of the magnitude, the difficulty, and the desirability of these programs this volume has no present equal.

HENRY PRATT FAIRCHILD

*New York University*

*Bevölkerungsgeschichte Italiens, Zweiter Band.* By KARL JULIUS BELOCH.  
Berlin: Walter De Gruyter & Co., 1940. Pp. viii+312. R.M. 24.

Like the first volume, this second volume by Beloch on the history of Italy's population was published posthumously by Gaetano De Sanctis—a student of the author. The first volume presented a general review of the whole problem and dealt in detail with the populations of Sicily and the Kingdom of Naples. The present volume is devoted to the Papal State, Tuscany, and the Duchy on the Po. The study is limited to the Middle Ages.

In light of modern demographic analyses, the task which the author set for himself appears simple. It consisted of estimating the populations of that period in these different geographic units. One has to admire, therefore, the author's painstaking effort, combined with a great deal of erudition and insight, in establishing these apparently simple facts. Old records and chronicles had to be carefully examined and compared in order to arrive at some reliable estimates. Only a few complete censuses of population were at the author's disposal, as most of his estimates were made on the basis of available counts of hearths (for the purpose of hearth-tax), proceeds from salt-duty, proceeds from property-taxes, etc. In many instances the author even succeeded in establishing the prevailing ethnic and social structures of the populations.

This study provides some interesting material on the old censuses of Italy: the procedures that were then applied, and the manner in which the enumerations were carried out. The historical value of Beloch's study is unquestionable.

BERNARD D. KARPINOS

*United States Public Health Service  
National Institute of Health*

*Natural Increase and Migration, Greater Cleveland, 1919-1937.* By HOWARD WHIPPLE GREEN. Cleveland, Ohio: Cleveland Health Council, 1938. Pp. 75.

*Infant Mortality and Economic Status, Cleveland Five-City Area, 1919-1937.* By HOWARD WHIPPLE GREEN. Cleveland, Ohio: Cleveland Health Council, 1939. Pp. 123.

These two volumes, prepared under the direction of one of the pioneers in the movement to provide economic and social data for small areas within a city, present basic demographic statistics for Greater Cleveland. The first volume contains for each of the 257 census tracts in Cuyahoga County the annual number of resident births, the annual number of resident deaths, the natural change, and the annual number of infant deaths from 1919-1937. In addition the population for each tract in 1920 and 1930, the intercensal change in population, the natural change, and the net migration are presented.

In the second volume, *Infant Mortality and Economic Status* are assembled statistics of infant mortality for the period 1919-1937 by census tracts. An index of economic status was constructed by grouping the number of families into ten classes based upon the equivalent monthly rental of the tract in which they lived. In addition to tabulation by individual census tracts, the data in each volume have also been tabulated for these ten economic groups.

The tables in each volume are preceded by a brief summary of the most important relationships revealed by these data and are illustrated by a large number of charts and maps. Even so, however, only a beginning has been made in the analysis of the data contained in these two volumes. An interesting example of the use to which these data can be put is the article by Stouffer in the December issue of this journal.

A more complete discussion of the procedure followed in estimating the under-registration of births and in allocating non-resident births and deaths to place of residence should have been included. This is especially true of the latter, since the number of resident births is about 7 percent less than the corresponding number published by the Bureau of the Census for the years when comparable data are available.

These two volumes represent the results of a large amount of painstaking labor and set a notable example for other cities with census tracts.

HAROLD F. DORN

U. S. Public Health Service

*Chicago Recreation Survey.* 5 vols. Edited by ARTHUR J. TODD. Chicago: Municipal Reference Library. 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940. Pp. 741 (Volume IV unpagged). Profusely illustrated: photographs, charts, diagrams, maps. \$1.00 per volume.

The survey project, results of which make up the content of these volumes, was sponsored jointly by the Chicago Recreation Commission and Northwestern University, and conducted under the auspices of the Works



Progress Administration, the National Youth Administration, and the Illinois Relief Commission.

As indicated in the Introduction to Volume I, the idea of a statewide recreational survey for Illinois originated early in 1934 with certain members of the then current governmental division, namely, the Civil Works Administration of Illinois. Through various and recurrent vicissitudes in the form of changes in governmental administrations, shut-down of appropriations, necessary redrafting of the project and a limitation of it to the Chicago area to meet a shifting realty situation, and frequent turnovers in the staff of workers, the survey somehow was kept alive. The comprehensiveness of its findings speaks eloquently of the patience and persistence with which the sponsoring groups continued their efforts under such adverse conditions.

Three considerations were kept uppermost from the beginning: "first, straight fact finding, gathering of basic data; second, conclusions and implications; third, recommendations." At its conclusion, the task was regarded by its sponsors as relatively complete because, as was pointed out by the editor, "... a survey of a great metropolitan area in full bloom must necessarily be something in the nature of a perpetual inventory, never a finished product. It must be taken as a 'still' rather than a moving picture."

Volume I of the series deals with public, or tax-supported recreation. Part I of this volume entitled "Planning and Historical Aspects of Public Recreation" contains an account of the high points in city planning with respect to public recreation facilities not only in Chicago but in other cities of the United States. Part II discusses the administrative aspects of public recreation from the standpoints of legal and financial considerations, and the general management of playgrounds, parks, forest preserves, and the like. Part III which forms by far the greatest bulk of the volume is devoted to a detailed description of specific locations making up Chicago's vast public recreation systems, supplemented by some twenty-five maps depicting their geographical distribution. Scattered throughout the volume are highly colored maps which portray the geographical distribution of ten age groups.

Volume II has to do with commercial recreation which the editor defines as "... a business organized and managed by private individuals or groups which capitalizes the leisure time of its patrons through their response to opportunities to enjoy amusements or recreation in return for the payment of admission fees. . . . Almost every known form of sport may be found somewhere or other in both public and commercial recreation programs. The difference between the two, therefore, is not primarily in the nature of the recreation provided, but in the motive, and likewise the method of financing, management, and control." Following a general discussion of the scope and significance of this phase of recreation, of its regulation, licensing and control, some seventeen categories of commercial recreation are described in terms of historical trends, extent and character of patronage, average admission fees, and so on. Many of the facts contained in the text are highlighted by the employment of charts, diagrams and maps.

In Volume III on private recreation there is an initial explanation to the effect that, again, there is considerable overlapping between this phase of recreation and those described above. As treated in this volume of the study, " 'Private' includes those agencies which derive their support in the main from membership fees, from endowments, bequests, and voluntary contributions. . . ." Church groups, social settlements, fraternal organizations, and the like, are usually thought of in this connection. Specific centers in Chicago falling into the category of private recreation are described in the content of the volume in a fashion similar to that employed in preceding volumes.

Volume IV which contains textual material only in an Introduction and in relation to photographs, maps, and diagrams, presents seventy-five community areas in Chicago in terms of two sets of maps, "one showing the zoning in each area and its relation to public recreation facilities; the second showing the location of the public facilities and major private recreational centers. . . ."

Volume V presents a summary of the findings of the survey, and recommendations related to the following aspects of recreation: planning; the improvement and use of recreation facilities; the encouragement of new types of recreational activities and wider participation in activities; the development of financial policies; the selection and training of personnel; and the control of commercial recreation.

On the whole, the survey represents an ambitious concept, particularly in the light of available facilities for its execution. The text of its findings is presented in an interesting manner, and the individual who craves minute detail will find a wealth of material in that respect. The concluding recommendations are timely, practical, and delightfully free from a wishful type of thinking. For the average reader, the excessive amount of detailed information would seem to be somewhat disproportionate to its intrinsic value, and almost one suspects that portions of it were designed to provide "busy work" for some of the individuals employed in the survey.

CLAUDIA WANNAMAKER

*Institute for Juvenile Research  
Chicago, Illinois*

*Local Community Fact Book.* Ed. by LOUIS WIRTH and MARGARET FUREZ. Chicago: Recreation Commission, 1938. Pp. 156. \$1.00.

The data presented for each of the 75 Chicago communities is pertinent for anyone interested in one or more of these areas.

Two pages are devoted to each area. A narrative describing its origin and development appears on the left half of each left-hand page and a description of the boundaries, area layout, points of interest, schools, churches, recreational facilities, registered voters, and selected morbidity rates appear under these titles on the right half of each left-hand page.

Each right-hand page includes a map of the community in one corner and a chart showing sex, nativity, and color, by 12 age-groups in another corner; and with numerous tabulations the page is quite completely filled.

The map shows the street boundaries of the area and the census tracts included in the area. The population and density per square mile in 1930 and 1934 are also shown, as well as the name of the community and its area.

Population by age, nativity and race, marital condition, country of birth, citizenship, and type of industry by sex, are shown for 1930 and the first three items by sex for 1940 in one table.

Various pertinent medians are shown on another table, such as age, size of family, rental value, and equivalent rental for 1930 and 1934 and length of residence, number of rooms, and grade completed in school for 1934. Birth and death rates and other vital statistics are shown for the periods from 1928 to 1932 and 1928 to 1933. The number of churches, schools, and motion picture theatres are included in a small table. Family data in 1930 and 1934, grade completed in school, and dwellings by type, complete the data presented.

The left-hand pages are particularly hard to read. This handicap might well have been overcome had the available space been used to better advantage.

Although the tabulations appear complicated, it is surprisingly easy to find comparable data for any area as soon as the data presented for any one of the communities are studied and thoroughly understood.

HOWARD WHIPPLE GREEN

*Cleveland, Ohio*

*The Structure and Growth of Residential Neighborhoods in American Cities.*

By HOMER HOYT. Washington: Federal Housing Administration, 1939. Pp. 178. \$1.50.

The author has summarized his findings after studying nearly two hundred American cities. He has provided a formula for analyzing the growth and development of American cities which has proved of value in the analysis of the problems of the Federal Housing Administration. He presents the pattern of the structure of cities and changes taking place during a period of time.

Starting with the ground plan, using topographical maps which he calls land survey maps, showing street patterns, the ground area covered by structures, the water courses, and other topographical features, he introduces land coverage and land-use maps and settled area maps. He presents the block data map, and maps showing the age of dwellings, owner-occupied dwellings, condition of dwellings, dwellings without tubs or shower baths, Negro population, family units without central heat, family units overcrowded, and average rents. He demonstrates that the average of actual rents of rented homes and equivalent rents of owned homes is the best single factor for measuring quality of housing.

In brief, the six chapters of Part I relate to the technique of measuring the structure of residential neighborhoods.

In Part II, which relates to the growth of residential neighborhoods, he considers factors which in the past have caused our cities to grow, and describes how these factors influence the stability of residential neighborhoods

and the forms of city growth. Here he uses a series of settled area maps or dynamic maps, and considers changes in transportation facilities over the past century and their relation to the growth and development of cities. He then considers changes in urban land uses, vertical expansion, lateral expansion, and the effect of industrial, commercial, and retail trade uses and their movements. He discusses the use of dynamic maps in the study of the past movements of residential neighborhoods and the significance of the shifts which are continually taking place in all large American cities.

The discussion of the determination of rents in an unhampered economy as it appears on pages 50 and 51 is worthy of every student's careful consideration.

HOWARD WHIPPLE GREEN

Cleveland, Ohio

*A Field Study in Siam of the Behavior and Social Relations of the Gibbon (Hylobates Lar).* By C. R. CARPENTER. Introduction by A. H. SCHULTZ. Comparative Psychology Monographs, Vol. XVI, No. 5, 1940. Pp. 200. Bibliography and index. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. Price \$2.00.

In spite of the considerable attention which the habits of the lower primates have received in anthropological and sociological literature, our knowledge of their lives under natural conditions is, to an amazing degree, still sketchy and incomplete. Anyone who has encountered the array of anecdotal literature in this field—used and culled, often, for the deliberate purpose of affording this or that theorist a “factual” basis for ideas about the family—must have been impressed with both the inadequacy of the approach and the poverty of reliable observations upon the home life of our arboreal cousins.

In the past ten or fifteen years we have, thanks to the labors of Yerkes, Kohler, and others, learned much about primate psychology. Unfortunately, however, the study of the group life of arboreal animals in a wild state presents great difficulties and has been largely neglected. The result has been a reliance upon chance observations recorded, often, by untrained observers.

Dr. Carpenter's study of the South American howling monkeys, published in 1934, was a model of what might be accomplished by great pains and tenacity in this heretofore neglected field. In it he laid the basis of the techniques which he has since continued: the careful stalking and observation of his subjects under wild, natural, conditions through the use of blinds and other devices. This present study of an anthropoid much more closely related to ourselves, richly fulfills the promise held out by Dr. Carpenter's earlier monograph. Almost every page holds evidence of vital interest to the student of human institutions which stretch back toward the subhuman past. It is becoming ever more apparent, as these studies multiply, that the group life may differ markedly in distinct species. Gibbons, for example, are monogamous. The sex ratio is approximately equal. The lack of marked sexual differences in size and strength eliminates the sort of male dominance observable among baboons. Moreover, adult females are antagonistic and will not tolerate each other. As a result the gibbon social unit normally con-

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sists of a monogamous pair with their young, moving over a definite, circumscribed territory. As the young come to maturity they seek sexual alliances with similar animals from other families and establish their own "households." If the male of the original family becomes senile or dies, or if something happens to the mother, incestuous relationships are readily formed. Siblings of unlike sex may, if they mature together, start a new family.

Communal activities such as mutual grooming, play, feeding, and other activities including a careful survey of gibbon vocalizations, are all thoroughly considered. The result is to give us as thorough a grasp of gibbon forest life as any living man has as yet succeeded in presenting. We have no work comparable to it on any one of the other three great anthropoids. It is a unique and distinguished performance which should be read by every student of human society. Even though Dr. Carpenter has richly demonstrated the dangers of casual generalization, one is eerily conscious, as one peruses his work, of vicariously encountering a social world suggestive, in some respects at least, of the unthinkable elder and pre-human past below the Pliocene.

LOREN C. EISELEY

*University of Kansas*

*La Psychologie animale.* By PAUL GUILLAUME. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1940. Pp. 210. 15 fr.

*La Psychologie animale* is a simple and readable account of comparative psychology as it exists today, clear enough in presentation to be easily understood by the non-technical reader. The book is accurate and up-to-date, the author being familiar with the recent American literature as well as the European. This fact will be perceived only by reading the book itself since the references at the back are all secondary sources.

The American reader is likely to feel that too large a proportion of the book is devoted to a few systematic problems. Although Guillaume believes animal psychology is of necessity the study of behavior, he spends an undue amount of time defending this position and pointing out the fallacies inherent in any criteria of consciousness in sub-human animals. Considerable space is devoted to the problem of instinct in spite of the fact that the author states that the concept of instinct adds nothing to our knowledge of the environmental and behavioral forces that determine stereotyped or forced responses in any animal. The nature of animal intelligence is discussed in some detail with reference to Guillaume's own experimental researches.

Many problems in comparative psychology receive no special treatment within this volume. The absence of any discussion concerning motivation or social behavior is particularly noticeable.

HARRY F. HARLOW

*University of Wisconsin*

*General Psychology.* By WILLIAM STERN. New York: Macmillan & Co., 1938. Pp. xxii+589. \$4.50.

The basic idea of the personalistic standpoint is the statement that "men-

tal phenomena may be fully understood only as both the natural and cultural contexts are comprehended, and moreover, as the interrelation of both becomes a proper object of research." Recently, the importance of linking cultural and biological facts has been widely accepted as the central theme for psychology. Stern set forth this program many years ago, and has tried to outline certain approaches in more detail. "The center of the personal world, the person, is a finite, structured totality which as such includes extension within itself." This personal world contains the personal present, that is, the present situation as seen by that person, the personal past and the personal future.

In this book problems of perception, memory, thinking, imagination, volition, and feeling are treated in regard to general characteristics and individual differences. Some chapters, for instance those on sense phenomena and perception, are given as a short outline with a more extensive bibliography attached; other problems are discussed more in detail. Particularly characteristic of Stern's approach is his treatment of the problem of remembrance, which he defines as the "history of the person and his world as experienced." In other words, instead of viewing memory merely as a question of reproduction, he sees it closely related to the emergence of the world in which the individual lives. In a similar way he discusses imagination and play.

The reader might find Stern's language too philosophical, his ideas too speculative, although he tries to link them throughout to psychological experiments. However, Stern's pioneer work, *The Psychology of Early Childhood*, which has a somewhat similar character, has proved to be of great value for a long time. This may be because his systematizations have closer contact with common-sense psychology than many psychological approaches which pride themselves on keeping particularly close to "facts." Although Stern's *General Psychology* can be considered in many respects to be only a first step, there exists probably no other attempt to link cultural and biological problems in every branch of psychology to such an extent.

KURT LEWIN

*University of Iowa*

*The Psychodynamics of Abnormal Behavior.* By J. F. BROWN with the collaboration of KARL A. MENNINGER. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1940. Pp. xvi+484. \$3.50.

This is a fluent and lucid book. The author is an apt student who draws his information from several disciplines, with all of which he appears to be well-acquainted: psychiatry, social psychology, sociology, and psychoanalysis. The intellectual hero of the book is the founder of psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud. The author credits him with being the greatest student of human nature ever produced by science. The chapter on psychiatry, written in collaboration with Dr. Karl A. Menninger, is the best in the book. Dr. Brown's work is superior to the ordinary textbook on psychopathology and has ambitions far above the average. It is this surplus of ideas which requires special comment.

The book has throughout the flavor of carrying Brown's obvious sympathy for psychoanalysis to the point where it does Freud's theories more harm than good. Whereas the points in favor of psychoanalysis are sometimes well-taken, they are at other times so exaggerated that they weaken the value of the author's thesis. The chief weakness of the book lies in the vague definition of certain terms and concepts to which the author continually refers: "transference," "inter-personal," "libido" and others. The blame for the vagueness cannot be laid at Freud's door; it is evidently produced by a desire on the author's part to stretch the meaning of certain terms and concepts beyond Freud's original intention for them. Like many of the younger psychoanalysts, Brown shows a thirst for the expansion of the "lebensraum" of psychoanalysis, even if this means, perhaps, the sacrifice of concepts which were dear to Freud and which were for him the cornerstones of psychoanalysis. An example is Brown's use of the term "inter-personal." The psychoanalyst is visited by patients who volunteer to be analyzed. It is true that there are in the psychoanalytic situation two persons present, the doctor and the patient, but of these only *one* person is explored and treated; the doctor is, during the process of analysis, not himself an object of study and treatment. The procedure is, therefore, *uni*-personal, not *inter*-personal. Freud, himself, made correct use of terms like "psychoanalytic situation," "psycho-neurosis" and "psychoanalytic therapy" and never used the term "inter-personal situation" to describe his psychoanalytic procedure. For Freud, the coining of a new term went parallel with a profound change in concept.

One of the virtues of the psychoanalytic works written by Freud himself was that he delineated his terms and concepts precisely and differentiated with careful clarity what psychoanalytic procedure is, and what it is not. It was his ceaseless watch at the borders of his domain and his violent protests against trespassers which made him at times an unpleasant man to deal with. On the other hand, it served the purpose of keeping the course ahead clear and the concepts untainted by false interpretations. It is exactly in this feature that a certain group of his pupils have tried to advance beyond the master's point of view. This advance does not come as the result of organic growth attained by painful research, step by step, in the grand manner of Freud at his best, but by an easy eclecticism, putting psychoanalysis hastily together with features of laboratory psychology, organismic theory, gestalt psychology, field theory, and sociology, to name only a few.

It is to this class of ambitious books that Dr. Brown's *The Psychodynamics of Abnormal Behavior* belongs. It does not add anything of substance to our knowledge, but it tends to confuse hard-won methods and procedures with one another. I wonder what sort of marginal notes Sigmund Freud would have made in this book had he lived to read it. I wonder how he would have reacted to Dr. Brown's statement that psychoanalysis is a study of "inter-personal relations," or what he would have said to the dilution of the fundamental concept, "transference," when Brown refers to it as taking place between "any two persons who are engaged in any social intercourse" (page 289). What would he have said to the statement that

psychoanalysis is full of "methodological weaknesses and that the field theoretical approach in psychology is mending this? (As a matter of fact, Freud wrote of "a transference of feeling" as being "transferred upon the physician on the occasion of the analytic treatment . . . the patient's feelings do not originate in the present situation and they are not really deserved by the personality of the physician" in *Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse*, I, page 477.)

I wish that there would come from the rear of the little psychoanalytic army a real clinical worker who would call together Freud's disintegrating band of followers and reaffix their strength and their hope to the methods laid down by Freud and divert them from trying to find new bases in outlandish and evasive words and ideas.

This fundamental criticism of the book does not alter my opinion that it is written by an able scholar who has produced a manuscript with a style of tempting persuasiveness. It should be of interest to readers who are looking for a psychoanalytic philosophy combined with experimental psychologies. I believe, however, that actual and earnest workers in the various fields of anthropology, sociology, psychology, psychiatry, and psychoanalysis itself will find little if any substantial advance in Dr. Brown's book. It seems to me that he hitches the thoroughbred horse of psychoanalysis to the streamlined automobile of experimental psychology, with the result that neither functions at its best.

J. L. MORENO

*Beacon Hill, Beacon, New York*

*A Study of Jealousy as Differentiated from Envy.* By T. M. ANKLES. Boston: Bruce Humphries, Inc., 1939. Pp. 109. \$2.00.

The purpose of this study is to analyze the components of jealousy and the mechanism involved with the idea that its deadly effects may be counteracted. The method of study consisted in selecting at random subjects who were casual acquaintances often made and interviewed across the table in public restaurants. The author then proceeded in somewhat the manner of the "inquiring reporter" to question the persons on the general topic of jealousy. What specific questions were asked in this so-called "personal interview" is not clear since nowhere does the author list them. Out of fifty persons interviewed, only thirty were suitable subjects. That this may have been due to the author's failure to establish rapport, rather than to lack of the "powers of introspection" on the part of the subject, seems not to have been taken into consideration. The interviews were "followed up" by a questionnaire consisting of twelve questions used not on the same persons but on ten university students. How and why this number were selected is not discussed.

The book consists in the main of thirty short and highly superficial cases of individuals expressing jealousy with comments by the author of a psychoanalytic nature. From this study he concludes that all the various kinds of jealousy—filial, parental, sexual, professional, etc.,—have common factors.



These factors are: possessiveness, self-feeling, sadism or masochism, and "fear of loss."

The study is sketchy, amateurish, and lacking in scientific accuracy. It throws little new light upon the psychology of jealousy.

HARRIET R. MOWRER

*Evanston, Illinois*

*Social Psychology*. By CHARLES BIRD. New York: The Appleton-Century Co., 1940. Pp. xv+564. \$3.50.

*Social Psychology*. By OTTO KLINEBERG. New York: The Holt Co., 1940. Pp. xii+570. \$3.00.

Bird assumes that student interest in science varies with its applicability to practical solutions. His brave effort to interest students by the applicability of social-psychological research to the solution of social problems is probably as successful as the admitted artificiality of the experiments and the dessication of their findings will permit. The secondary aim, to reveal the fundamental behavior processes underlying social adjustments, has been better fulfilled by those parts of the text not cramped by the use of statistical materials. Due caution is shown in critiques of experimental material and in the tentative conclusions drawn therefrom. The so-called "summary" sections often include a further development of the thought or evidence. The style is occasionally heavy or repetitious, occasionally vigorous and persuasive. "Tedium may be reduced by avoiding too detailed a discussion of techniques found useful in securing conviction."

The problems selected are (in excellent sequence) those of motivation, competition and cooperation, imitation, suggestion, prestige, prejudice and propaganda, crowd behavior, leadership, delinquency, and war. The approach is situational and operational rather than atomistic or instinctual.

As compared with Bird, Klineberg excels in the discriminating and illuminating use of ethnologic and psychoanalytic data. Klineberg further includes sections on social aspects of animal interaction; language; "human nature"; sense perception; "intelligence"; "race"; sex; laughter; emotions; personality; behavior deviations. The last is an excellent integration of some of the more recent studies in the fields between social science and psychiatry. Bird, using the problem unit, shows what motivations and incentives operate in each problem; Klineberg shows what culture complexes and problems grow out of each more or less "dependable motive"; and nearly any drive (covering both motives and goals) may be basic or secondary to any other, regardless of its organic and/or social origins.

Klineberg's text, though cluttered with authors' names and conflicting opinions, is succinct and well-knit, and covers most essential materials for many relevant problems passed over by Bird in his larger volume.

Neither writer utilizes sociologists' useful distinctions between individual, person, personality, personage, and individuality. Neither fully utilizes the non-elementalistic (space-time, structure-function) approach of modern physics.

Both authors give due weight to constitutional and spontaneous func-

tional differences of individuals. With a few remarkable exceptions generous recognition is accorded the work of inductive sociologists in the joint fields.

THOMAS D. ELIOT

*Northwestern University*

*Industrial Conflict: A Psychological Interpretation.* Ed. by GEORGE W. HARTMANN and THEODORE NEWCOMB. New York: The Cordon Co., 1939. Pp. xi+583. \$2.75.

One approach to the understanding of a book is to study its authors and the conditions under which it was written. When such an analysis is made of *Industrial Conflict*, one finds that only one-half of the twenty-six authors are academic psychologists. The volume, then, is not just another academic textbook for classroom purposes. It is the first of a series of yearbooks published by the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues. This organization was formed some years ago to propagate the idea that psychology has a very definite contribution to make to social issues.

Early in 1939, when this yearbook was being planned, a poll of the SPSSI membership showed only 12 percent who favored the proposition: "The standards and appearance of objectivity should at all costs be preserved. Partisanship of any degree or kind will seriously discredit the work of the Society" (p. vii). The editors took their cue from this and arranged for the writing of the volume from a pro-labor standpoint. They further justified their position in the statement: "The plain facts of conflict indicate that *more* workers than owners are more severely blocked and injured in their activity impulses" (p. 103). But just what does this mean? If the editors are merely saying that there are more workers than owners and so more total worker frustration, there can be no argument. But if they mean that the typical worker tends to be more frustrated than the typical member of the employer group, many observers might well disagree. The high incidence of heart and stomach troubles among bosses, the worry over the obtaining of jobs for the plant and the keeping of the books "in the blue," the far longer hours many managers work—all these items and many more make one wonder just how it can be shown that the frustrations of the "higher-ups" are less acute than those of the laborers.

The book opens with a defense of positive action and the branding of the much-vaunted objectivity of the academically-minded social scientist as pseudo-objectivity. The psychologist must bestir himself as "by common consent most of the ills of the world today are agreed to be psychological" (p. 19). The chapters in Part I treat of methodology, the historical background of the current labor-capitalist conflict situation and word pictures of two particular conflict areas, the Detroit industrial region, and Johnstown with its 1937 strike.

The second section describes the several personal sources of conflict. There are chapters on a variety of subtopics, of which "work adjustments of adolescent subnormal girls" and "work satisfaction" are samples. To the reviewer the most interesting chapter was that which dealt with documents

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obtained from an employer and a C.I.O. organizer who had viewed the same series of conflicts. More documents must be gathered, of course, before significant conclusions can be reached, but at least the approach has important potentialities.

The third part is concerned with the parties to the struggle. A. N. Kornhauser opens the discussion with a factual account of the psychological bases of class divisions. His contribution is followed by B. Freedman's psychoanalytic interpretation of the labor struggle. Flügel's well-known description of the conflict in terms of displaced father-hatred is dismissed as pseudo-analysis. Conflict is said to need no interpretation. Rather it is the acquiescent behavior of the exploited that is abnormal. This latter Freedman handles by the typical word-magic of "life instincts." In the same section racial complications, attitudes, and morale are rather briefly treated. T. Newcomb's comparison of the attitudes of members of A.F. of L. and C.I.O. groups is particularly worth while.

The fourth division is split into two parts, one devoted to the several industrial forces, and the other to a consideration of public opinion. The contributions to the first subsection, and J. A. Slade's legal essay in the second, can hardly be termed psychological in character. The chapters by S. C. Menefee and Ellis Freeman, however, are of a different order. The former is packed with illuminating data on social stereotypes. The latter, while mainly of an inspirational character, shows unmistakably the touch of social psychology.

The volume ends with a summary for psychologists and another for laymen. These chapters by G. W. Hartmann are so mild that they can offend only the most reactionary. The reviewer has no important complaint to offer, but should point out the fact that Hartmann's two essays could just as easily have been written long before he had read the contributions of his numerous co-authors.

It is no secret that psychologists are having difficulty deciding whether the SPSSI is, as Hartmann maintains, "in a measure at least, the organized conscience of the profession" (p. 541), or a group of radical upstarts who are attempting to solve social problems with flimsy tools and with a narrow and biased view of the other social disciplines. The ideas that psychologists wherever possible should dig social applications from their research findings, and should turn where they can to social research, do not seem to be the points of contention. One can hope, of course, that this volume will unify psychological thought as it touches social issues. However, it is the reviewer's guess that the left-wing attitudes so openly expressed will but intensify the already self-righteous feelings of the one group and the fears of the conservative opposition. The poor liberal will be frowned upon by both camps. Yet psychologists of all persuasions must honor the enthusiasms which have led to the establishment of this series of yearbooks and will welcome whatever factual material they may contain.

PAUL R. FARNSWORTH

*Stanford University*

*Order and Possibility in Social Life.* By DOUGLAS G. HARING and MARY E. JOHNSON. New York: Richard R. Smith, 1940. Pp. xii+772. \$4.00.

*Introductory Sociology.* By ROBERT L. SUTHERLAND and JULIAN L. WOODWARD. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., Second edition, Revised, 1940. Pp. xxii+863. \$3.50.

*Men, Groups and the Community; A Survey in the Social Sciences.* By THOMAS H. ROBINSON and associates at Colgate University. New York: Harper & Bros., 1940. Pp. xix+965. \$3.50.

*Modern Human Relations; An Elementary Sociology.* By NORMAN M. KASTLER. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1940. Pp. xvi+462. \$1.72.

The Haring and Johnson volume, designed as an introduction to sociology, covers a wide range of materials. First comes a Book giving brief descriptions of seven primitive societies, of the Inca Empire, and of contemporary Chinese culture. This is followed by two Books on the "human species" and the "human individual," consisting largely of quotations from biochemists, geneticists, and neurologists. The last three Books are titled, respectively, Human Social Behavior, Human Societies, and Implications of a Scientific Approach to the Study of Human Societies.

The "frame of reference" is based on conceptions of the late F. H. Giddings—"pluralistic behavior," "interstimulation and response," "consciousness of kind," and related ideas. Science is regarded as the study of motions in nature; and the scientific study of society as the observation of populations and their behavior, together with the classification and statistical analysis of data thus obtained. Ideas and emotions must not be ignored, but can be studied only indirectly, that is, by observing and analyzing what people do and say.

The volume is the product of a long and rather penetrating study of social life. Its examination should be profitable for professional sociologists and for advanced university students; but it seems doubtful that it would be very intelligible or interesting to the beginning student.

The conceptual frame of reference and organization used in the original edition of Sutherland and Woodward remains unaltered in this revision. While the book as a whole has not been rewritten, extensive changes have been made in a number of sections to include data from recent sociological literature and to increase the clarity and unity of the text. The discussion of social interaction has been expanded to deal more adequately with co-operation. A new chapter describes the organization for leisure-time activity and for public health services as well as explaining the fundamental principles underlying social work. The discussion of social movements has been elaborated and additional material added on social control to provide a more adequate treatment of social reorganization.

New to this edition are sixteen groups of well-chosen half-tone illustrations greatly increasing the attractiveness of the book. Questions designed to encourage the application of sociological principles have been added, but they have proved of limited value in the reviewer's classes. The revision,

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as a whole, represents an improvement on what was already one of the most interesting and most teachable undergraduate texts in sociology.

The Colgate University volume is the result of ten years of experimentation with a freshman survey course. The structural organization of the text is sociological, beginning with a perspective of community life showing the significance of specialization and the role of culture and communication in bringing about community organization. Part Two describes social organization, concentrating largely on economic and political aspects of community life. Part Three discusses the nature of social change, emphasizing the significance of invention, diffusion and culture lag. Part Four discusses the problems of workers, consumers, investors, voters, and the problems of education and the family. The final section considers methods of solving our social problems.

The volume aims at a synthesis of all the social sciences, but it has not wholly succeeded in this. The economists and political scientists have been more successful than the sociologists in the control of subject matter and point of view. Especially has there been a neglect of social-psychological factors, a deficiency most evident in the discussion of the family.

Kastler's high-school text describes itself, in the sub-title, as an elementary sociology, but the greater part is devoted to economic, political, and social problems. The book is readable enough for high-school students; and charts, diagrams, and sketches add both interest and significance. The factual material is well selected; and divergent positions on current issues are indicated. Despite the excellent material, current issues are not presented in such a way as to come alive for the student, perhaps because the author was too concerned in making the discussion attractive, readable, objective—and unobjectionable. There are some surprising mistakes in interpretative statements, as when, in speaking of modern States, he says that "all the activities of the individual are controlled by the State," and that in industry "all the planning and direction comes from the State" (p. 339). Despite shortcomings, however, a resourceful teacher could use this text quite effectively.

SEBA ELDRIDGE AND MARSTON MCCLUGGAGE

*University of Kansas*

*Social Pathology*. Rev. ed. By STUART A. QUEEN and JENNETTE R. GRUENER. New York: Thomas Y. Cowell Co., 1940. Pp. x+662. \$3.50.

*Social Pathology* by Queen and Gruener, although announced as a revised edition of the earlier work by Queen and Mann, is essentially a new book. The only conspicuous resemblance between the present volume and its predecessor is in the method of approach, by which groups of socially inadequate persons are dealt with on the basis of the obstacle chiefly responsible for their limited social participation.

In the preface the authors state their objective to be an explanation of how "various handicaps—physical, mental, economic, and other—affect the social participation of individual persons." This objective has been realized in most effective fashion. The clear description, the selected statistical

material, and the case histories, all combine to make an informative and interesting book. Some sample chapter headings are: Senescence: The Aged; Chronic Illnesses; The Diabetic and the Cardiac; Economic Deprivation: People with Low Incomes; Mobility: The Transient; Limited Schooling: The Uneducated; and Class Barriers: "Poor Whites." Only in Part I, which presents the theoretical setting of the work, does the reviewer find fault. To him the division of social problems into "practical" and "theoretical" aspects seems impossible of attainment. It is his opinion, moreover, that the excellence of the book is due largely to the fact that Part II (main body) deals extensively with "practical" matters.

CARL M. ROSENQUIST

*The University of Texas*

*A Study of Rural Society: Its Organization and Changes.* Revised Edition. By J. H. KOLB and EDMUND DE S. BRUNNER, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1940. Pp. xvii+694. \$3.75.

Texts in rural sociology during the last quarter century, with some exceptions, have appeared in a developmental series from what might be called the humanitarian-agrarian treatise to a conceptually structured organization of data and theories. Definitely one of the three or four most widely used classroom books in this field, the Kolb and Brunner is well along in the developmental sequence. A somewhat stiffer analytical treatment of the data (which are quite complete and well-sourced) and a more boldly explicit frame of reference would have moved it even farther along in the series.

The general plan of the book is unaltered by revision. The five major parts concern rural society's organization and structure, its people and their characteristics, its major occupation (agriculture), its functions and institutions, its trends and policies. The authors' preface to the second edition identifies the actual changes introduced by revision as the addition of a chapter on rural youth, the inclusion of further material on agricultural labor and farm tenancy, revision to date of material concerning rural relief, public health, welfare, and agricultural legislation and policy. Recognition of research since 1935 has been inserted in the treatments of the rural community, standards of living, education, religion, merchandising, and recreation.

This book is unlike some other major introductory texts in rural sociology particularly because it holds to a common-sense level of exposition and a current-events time perspective (e.g., layman's use of the word *social*, p. 144 and Chapter VI; topical subheading, "youth's morale still high," p. 285; "youth knows what it wants," p. 287; caption, "the road an organization travels," p. 156). To some upperclass college students it is so "common-sense" that they see in sociology only what they already knew; to others it is a preferred alternative to discussions that are conceptually formalized and systematic.

The book's very popular first-edition acceptance as a text attests the non-concept orientation of many college instructors in rural sociology. The

two most recent first edition rural sociology texts, both also widely accepted, present systematic frames of reference in concepts that a beginner can hardly understand without special study of the language as well as the facts. Very likely there is a middle ground for introductory texts in which concrete illustrative materials are presented within a systematic organization of social theory.

HOWARD BEERS

*University of Kentucky*

*Urban Society* (second edition), By NOEL P. GIST and L. A. HALBERT. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1941. Pp. viii+629. \$3.50.

The authors of this volume are to be commended for their contribution to the growing literature in the field of urban sociology. Although numerous volumes have appeared in recent years dealing with the multifarious aspects of urban life, there have been very few really good textbooks for college or university courses among them. This reviewer considers the volume under discussion as one of them.

The first edition of *Urban Society*, published in 1933, was one of the best to appear up to that time. This new edition is a thoroughly revised text. It is in many respects a new volume. A very large part of the original content has been rewritten with the inclusion of many recent data. There has been a considerable amount of rearrangement and relocation of materials so as to give the present volume a more logical sequence of subject-matter than was true of the first edition. Three entirely new chapters have been added which greatly increase the usability of the volume as a text-book. The chapter on "The Metropolitan Region and Urban Dominance" is a brief summary of recent investigations and the chapter on "Housing" is especially timely in view of the widespread attention being given to that problem. The chapter on "Population Trends" supplies a need that was felt in the first edition.

The volume still has its limitations. For example, some teachers of courses in urban sociology might like to have seen a chapter on "Municipal Functions." This would be particularly true in those schools where there is not the opportunity to offer a wide variety of courses in the social sciences and where the course in urban sociology must cover all phases of urban life.

In spite of that limitation, however, the volume has distinctive value as a text. Its content does cover a wide range of topics. It is well organized and clearly written. The work of many investigators has been drawn upon and many foot-note references are given. Each chapter is followed by a list of suggested projects for further study and a well-selected bibliography. Many tables, charts, maps and illustrations provide visual aid for the reader.

There is no other text (in the mind of this reviewer) that presents to the student so complete an analysis of the phenomenon of urbanism in the modern world as this volume does.

PERRY P. DENUNE

*Ohio State University*

*Handboek der Maatschappijleer; Wording, Groei, Crisis, en Herstel der Maatschappelijke Orde.* By W. M. J. KOENRAADT and MAX VAN POLL. Hilversum: Paul Brand's Uitg.-Bedrijf, 1938. Vol. I, pp. 386; Vol. II, pp. 329.

In a genuinely scholarly manner, Koenraad and Van Poll examine the pre-Munich socio-political scene of Europe and pass judgment on the rise of totalitarianism. Writing under the imprimatur of the Roman Catholic Church, their views are, of course, not strictly neutral. Yet, their insight into the dynamics of political phenomena is more illuminating than most of the impartial texts. The purpose, however, is not to describe but to formulate a basis of reconstruction, to reconcile Catholic organization with the socio-political changes in the Netherlands during the twentieth century. Although the suggested schema of reconstruction relate specifically to the Netherlands, these volumes richly deserve translation by a Catholic scholar.

*The Startle Pattern.* By CARNEY LANDIS and W. A. HUNT, New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1939. Pp xii + 168. \$2.50.

This book is a first-rate contribution to the study of one of man's fundamental reaction patterns. By using ultra-rapid motion-picture photography the authors were able to secure data enabling them to describe and analyze the components of the response which follows upon the presentation of a stimulus of intense and "surprising" characteristic. Their subjects ranged all the way from young children to adults, and from normal to pathological persons. The startle reaction appears to be one of the fundamental protective devices of the organism, not unrelated to the foundations of emotional responses. While this pattern does not seem to be subject to much if any modification through learning, nevertheless it is overlaid with a variety of what the authors term "secondary behavior," acquired through a person's social-cultural conditioning. The learned superstructures reveal certain more or less conventionalized patterns—vocal and overt—revelatory of one's time and place. The book should prove useful for students of both normal and abnormal behavior.

*Social Forces in Personality Stunting.* By ARNOLD H. KAMMAT. Cambridge, Mass.: Sci-Art Publishers, 1939. Pp. 256. \$2.50.

The thesis of this book is that "most of the physical adults" of all races and societies are "intellectually, emotionally, and volitionally immature," and that the "cause" of this lies in the "essentially exploitative, autocratic, and competitive" nature of human society. The major exploitative activities are "industrial, political, and military." The author undertakes to describe and interpret the ills of society against the background of this view. In doing so he draws heavily upon the concepts of Freud and Adler. He firmly believes that only through the development of "culture," which he defines as "the creation and appreciation of artistic, scientific, philosophical, and ethical values," may men escape their immaturity and build a happy world. It is obvious that his use of the term *culture* scarcely conforms



to that of contemporary cultural anthropology. And his confusion of psychological and sociological concepts, for example, "collective paranoia," leaves much to be desired from the angle of systematic analysis. Nevertheless this is a chatty and stimulating volume, drawing, as it does, upon tidbits of history and literature to carry forward the argument.

*Love Problems of Adolescence.* By OLIVER M. BUTTERFIELD. New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1939. Pp. vii+212. \$2.10.

This monograph, a Teachers College doctor's dissertation, analyzes the number and frequency of "love problems" as noted by 1,169 young Protestants of both sexes ranging in age from 13 to 25 years. In addition to check lists of problems, personal interviews were extensively used. An attempt was made to relate these problems to "current culture pressures." Among the most important findings are the following: (1) Heterosexual adjustment is not unrelated to other matters such as vocational and other ambitions. (2) The "sexual drive" is, in fact, in many cases not the dominant problem at all. (3) Many subjects reported no sense of mental distress over any problem. (4) Often emotional confusion seemed chiefly related to lack of consistency on the part of parents, or to too rapid shift from rural to urban culture. (5) Lack of opportunity for meeting members of the other sex was noted by many of the respondents. (6) There were a number of problems revolving around standards of mate selection, long engagement, pre-marital sex relations and the matter of breaking engagements. (7) Most of the spontaneous questions respecting marriage had to do with sexual adjustments and birth control. On the other hand the topic of divorce was considered remote and largely academic by most of the respondents.

The study is a useful survey of a fair sample of our high school and college populations from a rather wide area, and while the method was not as precise as a formal testing instrument might have made it, the very informality of contact with the investigator may have secured opinions and facts not otherwise so easily obtained.

*Minor Mental Maladjustments in Normal People.* By J. E. WALLACE WALLIN, Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1939. Pp. vi+298. \$3.00.

This volume is made up of a hodge-podge of "case studies" of college and university students who attended the author's courses at various times. The respondents were provided "an inventory of early difficulties of adjustment, together with suggestions as to processes of adjustment" and the narratives were organized around this outline. The materials are put together under such chapter titles as "Fears and Phobias," "Dreads, Anxieties, and Worries," "Feelings of Inferiority and Inadequacy," "Daydreaming," "Effects of Superstitious Beliefs," and a variety of others. These accounts vary in length from a few sentences to several pages, and while some of them are interesting, there is no systematic attempt at their interpretation. Perhaps most teachers of courses in mental hygiene, personality problems, and social psychology have at one time or another collected similar narratives

from students. But it is always difficult to know just what use to make of such collections except for illustrative purposes. And with few exceptions the periodical literature of psychiatry and abnormal psychology would serve as a better source than this volume. Certainly it is presumptuous to designate this volume as a "case book" in any technical sense, as the title page does.

For the student of contemporary social control, there is an interesting footnote on page 15 which states that "upon consultation" it was "deemed advisable not to include in this volume a section on sex practices, problems, and maladjustments." Whether this pressure was exerted by the publisher or other source is not indicated.

*Psychology of Individual Differences.* By A. R. GILLILAND and E. L. CLARK. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1939. Pp. xvi+535. \$3.00.

This is a more or less conventional textbook on human variability. It contains a good review of most of the literature on the subject. It is well-written and amply provided with the usual paraphernalia of charts and tables. But in the interpretative sections the authors say nothing of the growing evidence that at least some of the individual differences revealed in children and adults in our society reflect not so much innately as culturally determined deviations. With reference to this matter—to say nothing of other aspects—the book is not as up-to-date as Anastasi's book in the same field.

*The Pecan Shellers of San Antonio: The Problem of Underpaid and Unemployed Mexican Labor.* By SELDEN C. MENEFEE and ORIN C. CASSMORE. Washington, U. S. Printing Office, 1940. [W. P. A.] Pp. 83.

This is part of an older story with different people in a different place. Minorities with blank faces snared in the spread and clutch of an impersonal mechanics. Quick mechanization displaced them from handicraft jobs, racial discrimination and no skill made other jobs inaccessible to them . . . if there had been other jobs. In the face of technological innovation there were pleas and attempts to return to handicraft, but to little avail. This pamphlet sets forth in cold print and neat tables a factual picture with a minimum of interpretation.

*A Memorandum on Research in Income and Levels of Living in the South.* By WILLIAM H. SEWELL. Stillwater, Oklahoma: Social Science Research Council of the Oklahoma A. and M. College, Nov. 1940. Pp. 30.

A competent survey of the literature on this subject with over 160 bibliographic items. The author stresses the necessity for basic sociological research on family life, especially in the South.

*The New Deal in Old Rome.* By H. J. HASKELL. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1939. Pp. xii+269. \$2.50.

This book is an interesting account of Roman economic history by a non-professional scholar. It should have considerable appeal to those teachers

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of the Classics who wish to suggest the modern implications of Classical studies as well as to those conservatively-minded individuals who wish to believe that there *was* a new deal in old Rome and *still* Rome fell. The author notices a number of resemblances between programs of liberal reform in ancient and modern times. None the less the reader is left wondering just when the new deal in old Rome took place.

*Development of Contemporary Civilization. Part II of A History of Western Civilization.* By WILLIAM J. BOSSENBROOK and others. New York: D. C. Heath & Co., 1940. Pp. xxiii+805. \$3.75.

In a cooperative enterprise, Bossenbrook with eleven other members of Wayne University's staff have forged a tool for the craft, a text along lines of the New History, which isn't so new now. In time, it covers two and one-half centuries, beginning with the "expansion of Western civilization" and ending with the "fascist offensive." In scope, it is an *omnium gatherum*: art, legality, technology, politics, philosophy, science, economics. Unfortunately there were not enough pages. In so far as a theory of history may be said to underlie the treatment, it is one compounded of "geographic orientation," "commercial enterprise," and "technological progress." As a teaching device its charts, maps, graphs and illustrations are interesting. It should make a nice text with which to work.

*A Social and Economic Survey of Beadle County, South Dakota.* By BERYL McCLASKEY. Columbia University Contributions to Education, Teachers' College Series. Chicago: The Ararat Booksellers, 1940. Pp. xi+260. \$2.00.

This is an attempt to present and evaluate certain factors of socio-economic organization and disorganization in a highly agricultural area, located on the eastern margin of the high plains. From a very sketchy historical summary based on secondary material, the study plunges into an analysis of economic and social problems and closes with a twelve-point recommendation which few people in Beadle County or public officials in South Dakota would accept in whole or in part. A mass of material has been collected but a sociological frame of reference is lacking.

*Julius Rosenwald Fund: Review for 1938-40.* By EDWIN R. EMBREE. Chicago: Julius Rosenwald Fund, 1940. Pp. 44.

The million dollars spent in 1938-40 went mainly for four purposes: (1) rural schools in the South; (2) fellowships for Negroes and White Southerners; (3) aid to the Negro universities; and (4) Negro health. There were 50 Negro and 46 White fellowships. Over sixty-two thousand dollars was spent on race relations. The largest item was rural education, nearly three hundred thousand dollars. Of this million dollars, \$134,658 went for "direction and administration," i.e., it cost nearly fifteen cents to give away a dollar.

*The Civilian Conservation Corps.* Recommendations of the American Youth Commission and American Council on Education. Washington, D. C.: American Youth Commission, 744 Jackson Place, 1940. Pp. 23.

This free pamphlet is most interesting and informative. After reviewing the work of the CCC, it concludes that more than two million youth have been benefited and the cause of conservation has been advanced a generation. They also conclude that it should be a permanent organization available for certain types of youth even if the depression disappears, but that the administration of the program should be unified and simplified.

*Waverly: A Study in Neighborhood Conservation.* By DONALD H. McNEAL and ARTHUR GOODWILLIE. Washington, D. C.: Federal Home Loan Board, 1940. Pp. 97.

This well-printed, well-bound, and well-illustrated book gives in great detail the procedures and plans of a housing experiment in a neighborhood in Baltimore which was not sub-standard, but was on the downgrade. How completely the plan had been carried out is not made clear, and of course the results anticipated cannot be assessed until ten or fifteen years have passed. This project differs from the usual housing activities in that it attempts to prevent the area from becoming "blighted" (the initial symptoms of "blight" having been observed) rather than to "cure" the disease after it has reached a serious condition as most of the current housing projects are attempting to do. If it is successful, it will doubtless compel some marked changes in housing policy. Certainly some sociologists should be included in any follow-up research that is undertaken.

*A Program for Teacher Education in Ohio.* Prepared by the Colleges of Education of the five State universities. Columbus; Ohio State University Press, 1940. Pp. 38. 15¢ per copy, less in quantity.

This is a very good statement of the problem under the general headings: Basic Viewpoints, Factors of Competency, and Organization and Administration. These are developed under 38 propositions, each of which is explained and defended briefly. The general idea is that education must be democratic; that teachers and administrators must be socially intelligent and oriented realistically toward the kind of world we are living in. They even use the term "mores." The implication is that the good teacher must be well grounded in the social sciences, no matter what subject he teaches. This should have been stated explicitly.



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